From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Commonwealth of Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Sep 27, 1976
542 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976)

Summary

finding proposed intervenor's concern about settlement negotiations being conducted in a manner adverse to its interests as "unfounded" without the introduction of proof supporting the concern

Summary of this case from RLI Ins. Co. v. Nexus Servs., Inc.

Opinion

No. 76-1270.

Argued June 8, 1976.

Decided September 27, 1976.

Henry M. Massie, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va. (Andrew P. Miller, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va., and Walter A. Marston, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. of Virginia, on brief), for Commonwealth of Virginia.

Thomas C. Gordon, Jr., Richmond, Va. (William N. Letson, Pittsburgh, Pa., William R. Jentes, Chicago, Ill., and John S. Battle, Jr., Richmond, Va., on brief), for Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Circuit Judge, BUTZNER, Circuit Judge, and KUNZIG, Judge.

United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation.


The Commonwealth of Virginia appeals the district court's denial of Virginia's motion to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) in a suit by the Virginia Electric Power Company (VEPCO) against Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse). VEPCO's suit against Westinghouse is one of thirteen similar actions brought against Westinghouse, which have been combined and transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia for a coordinated and consolidated proceeding. Because denial of intervention will not impair or impede Virginia's interests, and its interests are adequately represented by the other party to the action (VEPCO), and in the further interest of judicial economy, we find intervention not warranted. The trial judge, in denying Virginia's motion to intervene, acted properly and did not abuse his discretion. We therefore affirm.

VEPCO's dispute with Westinghouse concerns a contract for nuclear fuel supply through 1979 at a fixed price. Westinghouse has tried to disaffirm the contract, calling it "commercially impractical." VEPCO seeks a declaratory injunction, specific performance, and damages amounting to $522 million. Virginia seeks intervention, alleging that the outcome of the VEPCO-Westinghouse litigation would have direct impact on Virginia citizens, and that the Commonwealth of Virginia should be made a party to assure that the impact would not be harmful.

Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows intervention of right when:

. . . the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

Accordingly, Virginia must show first, an interest sufficient to merit intervention; second, that without intervention, its interest may be impaired; and third, that the present litigants do not adequately represent its interest. All three tests must be met if Virginia is to prevail.

The test on review is whether the district judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for intervention.

The district court is entitled to the full range of reasonable discretion in determining whether these requirements [of Rule 24(a)(2)] have been met. Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local U. # 638 of U.S., 520 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1975).

Virginia and Westinghouse argue extensively the question of whether Virginia has a sufficient interest in the litigation based on protecting the "general welfare" of its citizens. Since we decide that Virginia has no right to intervene on other grounds, we do not decide here whether Virginia has sufficient interest in the VEPCO-Westinghouse litigation to permit intervention. For purposes of analyzing the second and third requisites of Rule 24(a)(2), we assume that Virginia's interest is adequate.

Virginia must show that "as a practical matter," its interest may be "impaired" or "impeded" by the trial court's failure to allow intervention. Virginia conceded at oral argument that its primary concern lies with being a party to settlement negotiations; that its interests are adequately represented by VEPCO should the case proceed to trial. Virginia is concerned that VEPCO, during settlement negotiations, might compromise the case in a manner which would be adverse to Virginia consumers. The Commonwealth has introduced no proof of this, and such concern appears to be unfounded.

We note that appellant's burden of showing an inadequacy of representation is minimal. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538, 92 S.Ct. 630, 636, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (ftn. 10). Nonetheless, we find that Virginia has not met its burden. Virginia seeks no relief other than that which VEPCO seeks for itself. In fact, the Commonwealth's pleadings have been nearly identical to those submitted by VEPCO. It is difficult in light of this fact, to consider the representation of Virginia's interests by VEPCO inadequate. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, et al., 3 F.R.D. 251, 254 (W.D.Va. 1943). When the party seeking intervention has the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a presumption arises that its interests are adequately represented, against which the petitioner must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance. Ordnance Container Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 478 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1973). Virginia has not succeeded in showing adversity of interest and has not even attempted to show collusion between VEPCO and Westinghouse. Nor is there any indication of nonfeasance by VEPCO's attorneys.

Virginia's concession at oral argument that it was primarily concerned with the outcome of the settlement negotiations, and that its interests at trial would be adequately represented by VEPCO, is significant. We fail to see how a party, which admittedly is adequately represented at trial by parties to the action, is somehow entitled as of right to participation in settlement proceedings.

In addition to the near identity of interests, the near duplication of pleadings, and Virginia's concession at oral argument, we also must consider the potential unmanageability of the VEPCO-Westinghouse litigation should we allow intervention. At least thirteen other states are possible litigants. It is not unlikely that Virginia's success would provide the incentive for other states to seek intervention. The resultant complexity of the litigation, combined with increases in cost and judicial time, would hinder resolution of the present conflict. The trial court, deluged with additional briefs and pleadings, would be provided with no new viewpoints and little if any illumination to the original Westinghouse contracts disputes.

Our conclusion is, and must be, that since Virginia did not show that its interests would be impaired or impeded by denying intervention, and did not show the inadequacy of the representation of its interests by the existing parties, the trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in denying intervention. The decision of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Commonwealth of Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Sep 27, 1976
542 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976)

finding proposed intervenor's concern about settlement negotiations being conducted in a manner adverse to its interests as "unfounded" without the introduction of proof supporting the concern

Summary of this case from RLI Ins. Co. v. Nexus Servs., Inc.

finding proposed intervenor's interests were adequately represented where proposed intervenor asserted same claims as plaintiff and conceded that plaintiff would adequately represent its interests at trial, but was primarily concerned with the ability to participate in settlement discussions

Summary of this case from American Renovation Construction Company v. U.S.

denying intervention where intervenor's interests were adequately represented by plaintiffs

Summary of this case from United States v. North Carolina

denying intervention because the applicant sought the same relief as the plaintiff

Summary of this case from Aref v. Holder

affirming district court's denial of motion to intervene where movant failed to "show adversity of interest and ha[d] not even attempted to show collusion between [the parties to the suit;] [n]or [was] there any indication of nonfeasance"

Summary of this case from N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. Cooper

stating that, even where a proposed intervenor's "burden of showing an inadequacy of representation is minimal," the case for intervention is far weaker where the proposed intervenor "seeks no relief other than that which [an existing party] seeks for itself"

Summary of this case from Ass'n for Educ. Fairness v. Bd. of Educ.

stating standard of review

Summary of this case from JLS, Inc. v. Public Service Commission

In Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976), the court stated that, "[w]hen the party seeking intervention has the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a presumption arises that its interests are adequately represented.

Summary of this case from In re Community Bank of Northern Virginia

In Commonwealth of Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976), the court considered the application of the Commonwealth of Virginia to intervene as plaintiff in a suit by an electric utility serving the state against its supplier of nuclear fuel for breach of the supply contract.

Summary of this case from New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line

explaining that where the pleadings filed by the proposed intervenor-plaintiff "have been nearly identical" to those submitted by the named plaintiff, "[i]t is difficult in light of this fact, to consider the representation of [the proposed intervenor-plaintiff's] interests by [the named plaintiffs] inadequate"

Summary of this case from N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. Cooper

reasoning that a movant's concern that it would be disadvantaged if left out of settlement negotiations is insufficient

Summary of this case from Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. v. Mountain W. Hospitality, LLC
Case details for

Commonwealth of Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec

Case Details

Full title:COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, PROPOSED INTERVENOR-APPELLANT, v. WESTINGHOUSE…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Date published: Sep 27, 1976

Citations

542 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976)

Citing Cases

N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. Berger

Importantly, all these requirements must be met before intervention is mandatory; a failure to meet any one…

North Carolina State Conference of Naacp v. Cooper

Nor can Karcher be read to suggest that a state statute can supplant a federal court’s obligation to…