¶15. Nonetheless, a deputy requested that Blackman submit to a blood draw, which is permissible under Wis. Stat. 343.305(3)(ar)2 even in the absence of indicia of intoxication. As provided in the standard Informing the Accused information required pursuant to Wis. Stat. §343.305(4), the deputy advised Blackman that “If you refuse to take any test that this agency requests, your operating privilege will be revoked and you will be subject to other penalties.”

Because we conclude that the PBT was lawfully administered to Christenson, her argument that the trial court erred when it admitted the blood test results derived from the PBT necessarily fails.It doesn’t matter, the court adds, that Christensen was arrested for and charged with OWI, rather than violating § 343.303; all that matters is probable cause to believe a violation of § 346.63(1) or (2m) has occurred, ¶12.Blood Test Admissibility, Implied Consent Law Results of Christensen’s blood test were admissible, notwithstanding non-compliance with § 343.305 in procurement.¶18 To begin, nothing in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(d) states that a blood test procured in a manner which does not comport with subsection (b) is inadmissible. …¶19 Moreover, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled that “noncompliance with the procedures set forth in [Wis.

Padley makes three constitutional challenges to § 343.305(3)(ar)2. First:¶42Padley argues that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. is facially unconstitutional because, in all circumstances to which it applies, it requires drivers to submit to searches that violate the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Luke T. Nirmaier, 2011AP1355-CR, District 3, 12/28/11court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nirmaier: Michael M. Rajek; case activityThe odor of alcohol on Nirmaier following a traffic accident resulting in substantial bodily injury triggered the implied consent law, notwithstanding absence of probable cause to arrest at that point:¶9 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3) outlines different scenarios in which an officer may invoke the implied consent law and request a chemical test of an individual’s breath, blood, or urine. Although an officer normally invokes the implied consent law after arresting an individual for an alcohol or drug related operating offense, see Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a), an officer may also invoke the implied consent law before arrest in limited, specified circumstances, see e.g., Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(am), (ar).

The court declines to extend that holding to subsec. (8).¶8 Schroeder offers no authority holding the loss of the presumption of admissibility extends to procedural violations under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8). Rather, all of Schroeder’s cases involve an officer’s failure to give a defendant either all or part of the warnings outlined in § 343.305(4).

State v. Victor J. Godard, 2014AP396-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activityThe arresting officer provided Godard with accurate information about the implied consent law and thus did not cause Godard to refuse to submit to the implied consent blood test or deny him his right to a second test.Applying the three-part test for the adequacy of the implied consent information provided by the police, County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 380, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), and Washburn County v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, ¶56-57, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d 243, the court rejects Godard’s claim he was provided erroneous information about his right to a second chemical test if he consented to a blood draw:¶21As to the first prong, the transcript of the recorded arrest shows that Deputy Micale informed Godard of his right to a secondary test by reading him the “Informing the Accused” form verbatim. Micale also reiterated several times, in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), that if Godard wanted a secondary test of his choosing rather than the free intoxilyzer test offered by the State, then Godard would need to make those arrangements at a later time. Micale also told Godard that Micale would not transport Godard to an alternative hospital.

Most significantly, the implied consent law sets forth a penalty for noncompliance with the ten-day time limit. Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(10)(a) directs that revocation is to commence 30 days after the date of refusal if no hearing is requested. The inclusion of a penalty for noncompliance suggests that the term “shall” is mandatory.

The court rejects the argument.¶9 In Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4), the legislature set forth the language that a law enforcement officer must read to an individual accused of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. However, the statute does not restrict the information that must be read to an accused to that which is specified in subsection (4).

State v. James A. Schmidt, 2004 WI App 235 For Schmidt: Daniel S. DiehnIssue: Whether § 343.305(5)(a) requires that the driver request an additional test after the police have administered the primary test and, if not, whether Schmidt’s pre-blood draw request for a breathalyzer was properly rejected.Holding:¶11. Although Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) and (5) use the term “alternative test,” it is clear from these provisions that the accused does not have a right to choose a test instead of the one the officer asks him or her to take; rather, the “alternative test” is in addition to that test. It is for this reason that the case law sometimes refers to the “alternative test” as the “second” or “additional” test.

The court’s error was technical because it was insignificant, as the timing of the order’s entry did not impair Morris’s ability to file a hearing request. In addition, the general purpose of Wis. Stat. § 343.305 was fulfilled by entry of the revocation order. Our supreme court has opined that the purpose behind § 343.305 and laws relating to operating while under the influence of intoxicants is to identify intoxicated drivers and remove them from roadways as expeditiously as possible with minimal disruption to a court’s calendar.