Significantly, the legislature set forth an alternative procedure for monitoring the whereabouts of registrants who are unable to provide an address without imposing criminal liability.¶5 By applying well-settled principles of statutory construction, we conclude that a registrant cannot be convicted of violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6) for failing to report the address at which he will be residing when he is unable to provide this information. We determine that a registrant is unable to provide the required information when that information does not exist, despite the registrant’s reasonable attempt to provide it.

State v. Yancy D. Freland, 2011 WI App 80 (recommended for publication); for Freland: Michael D. Zell; case activityConviction for an out-of-state sex offense comparable to a misdemeanor in Wisconsin will be treated as a misdemeanor for sex offender registration purposes, § 301.45(6).¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(am)1. specifically defines has been “[f]ound to have committed a sex offense by another jurisdiction” to include a person who has been convicted “for a violation of a law of another state that is comparable to a sex offense.”

State v. William Dinkins, Sr., 2010 WI App 163, review granted 3/16/11; for Dinkins: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; Dinkins BiC; State Resp.; ReplyA prisoner subject to sex offender registration requirement, § 301.45, isn’t subject to criminal penalty for failing, on impending release, to notify authorities of his intended “residence” where he will be homeless.¶2 Dinkins’ primary contention, as we construe it, is that he could not be convicted of failing to provide his post-release address as required under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)5. because he could not locate post-release housing, and thus did not have an “address at which [he] … w[ould] be residing” that he could provide to the department. In response, the State argues that Dinkins could have complied with the address reporting requirement by providing the nearest address of any place he planned to sleep, including, for example, a park bench.

State v. George R. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, affirming State v. Bollig, 224 Wis.2d 621, 593 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1999) For Bollig: Thomas E. Knothe, Collins, Quillin & Knothe, Ltd.Issue: Whether a guilty plea colloquy involving a crime that would require sex offender registration under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 must inform the defendant of that requirement for the plea to be voluntary.Holding: Sex offender registration is a collateral not direct consequence of a plea, and therefore need not be included in the plea colloquy.Bollig pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault, an offense subjecting him to the sex offender registration requirement of § 301.45.

(¶12).In analyzing Dinkins, the trial court compared Savage’s circumstances—living on the street and being homeless—to Dinkins’s circumstances—being unable to report where he would live after his release from prison because he’d been unable to locate housing before his maximum release date. Relying on the supreme court’s reasoning that “a registrant cannot be convicted of violating Wis. Stat. § 301.45(6) for failing to report the address at which he will be residing when he was unable to provide this information,” 339 Wis. 2d 78, ¶52, the trial court interpreted Dinkins as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if it is impossible for a person to report an address because of something outside of their control like, for example, being in prison at the time, then there may be a defense.” Savage’s case was different, the court thought, because reporting the address where he would reside was not “impossible.”

Stat. § 938.34(15m)(bm): (1) by making a motion for the court to waive the requirements under § 938.34(15m)(bm), based on the court’s consideration of the factors in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1m)(e); or (2) by seeking a stay of the automatic sex offender reporting requirements under Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16), also based on the circuit court’s consideration of the factors in § 301.45(1m)(e) and the seriousness of the offense.¶22 Nigl concedes that he “never took any action to ask for the [reporting] requirement[s] to be stayed” after the dispositional order was issued under Wis. Stat. § 938.34(16).

¶13 Regardless, the circuit court reasoned Eric’s offense was too serious and public policy would not permit nonregistration. Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1m)(a)3. permits a court to deny a request to be exempt from the registration requirements if the court finds nonregistration is not in society’s best interest.

Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, No. 10-1664, slip op. at 5 (discussing Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I&N Dec. 143 (2007)). “Relying on that case, the Board concluded that Mata-Guerrero’s conviction for failure to register was a crime of moral turpitude and therefore that Mata-Guerrero was ineligible for a section 212(c) waiver, even though Wisconsin Statute § 301.45(2)(a) contains no element of intent or even knowledge.” Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, No. 10-1664, slip op. at 5The Tobar-Lobo decision was decided using the categorical approach to statutory interpretation.

State v. Joseph E.G., 2001 WI App 29, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 623 N.W.2d 137 For Joseph E.G.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison AppellateIssue: Whether § 301.45(1m) (1997-98) violates equal protection and substantive due process in failing to excuse juveniles convicted of false imprisonment from sex offender registration.Holding:¶12 In contrast to the facts that could relieve an offender from registration for those crimes enumerated in WIS. STAT. § 301.45(1m), the crime of false imprisonment is never consensual and never a crime solely because of the age of the victim. … Therefore, we conclude the classification created by § 301.45(1m) is rationally related to protecting the public, meets one of the legislative objectives of registration, and does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection as applied to Joseph.

State v. James L. Jackson, 2018AP2074, 12/26/19, District 2 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)Jackson pleaded to the crime of failing to give updated information to the sex offender registry. The information at issue was the fact that he’d created a Facebook account and email address. This ran afoul of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)6m., which requires a registrant to turn over (among other things) the “name or number of every electronic mail account the person uses” and “the name and Internet address of every public or private Internet profile the person creates, uses, or maintains.”