Under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), a court may vacate an arbitration award if “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of the party have been prejudiced.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Although an arbitrator is not required to hear all evidence proffered by a party, he “must give each of the parties to the dispute an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and argument.”

See, e.g., Holyoke, 219 Cal. App. 4th at 1311; New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1105. Rather, because the Arbitrator failed to disclose his brother, both 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) and CCP § 1286.2(a)(6) require vacatur of his Final Award.

II. Alleged Unfairness of Hearing VTrader and Kurlan also challenge the award pur- suant to § 10(a)(3) of the FAA, which allows the Court to vacate an order "where the arbitrators [*15] were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).

II. No Evidence Has Been Presented of the Arbitrator’s Partiality In the Second Circuit, “evident partiality within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. §10 will be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.” Morelite Const. Corp. (Div.

“ Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential–Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc ) (citing French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir.1986) and Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd. 943 F.2d 1056, 1059–60 (9th Cir.1991)). A district court's review of an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10 is “extremely limited,” G.C. and K.B. Inv., Inc. v.. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir.2003), and, therefore, this is “a high hurdle” to surpass, Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010).

The only post-Hall Street Third Circuit case Athena cites does not apply the manifest disregard standard. See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 256 (3d Cir. 2013) (losing party unsuccessfully argued that arbitrator was evidently partial in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)). Case 2:13-mc-00130-JCJ Document 6 Filed 07/08/13 Page 28 of 35 28 this Court should conclude, as they did, that “manifest disregard” may no longer serve as a ground for vacating an arbitration award.

The FAA also provides for vacatur “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). This part of the FAA is probably one that could not be applied to a labor arbitration award even by adoption, as it may establish a standard for review in conflict with that prescribed under Section 301 (that “an arbitration award must draw its essence from the CBA,” Rexam Graphic, 221 F. 3d at 1090-91).

Specifically, Section 10provides that an arbitration order may be vacated where the arbitrator "exceeded [her] power" or where the arbitrator was "guilty of misconduct by refusing to postpone the hearing." 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(3), (4). However, the scope of district court review under Section lOis extremely limited: "arbitrators do not act as junior varsity trial courts where subsequent appellate review is readily available to the losing party."

“The 9 Preis does not allege that the Award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). Case 1:14-cv-06327-LGS Document 8 Filed 08/15/14 Page 20 of 31 15 arbitrator’s rationale for an award need not be explained, and the award should be confirmed if a ground for the arbitrator’s decision can be inferred from the facts of the case[.]”

Thus, each of the Objectors’ bias claims Burton relies upon information known to them prior to Final Approval of the Settlement - and § 22.9 under which the arbitration was conducted - and was waived when instead of objecting to the appointment of Phillips as the fee arbitrator, she actively supported his appointment in filings to this Court. It is well-settled that a party mu raise any known issues regarding the impartiality of the arbitrator prior to the selection of the arbitrator, or those objections are waived.57 In failing to object to Judge Phillips prior to his approval, and instead keeping those objections pocketed for a later attack in the event she was unpleased with the Mills Group’s fee award, Burton has engaged in the very conduct found to result in waiver of a claim of bias under FAA § 10(a)(2) by every court to consi Therefore, no grounds exist for vacating the award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(A)(1). 2.