Section 1401 - Nationals and citizens of United States at birth

6 Analyses of this statute by attorneys

  1. Supreme Court Decides Sessions v. Morales-Santana

    Faegre Baker Daniels LLPBrian PaulJune 14, 2017

    On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191, in which it held that an exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., that provides a benefit to children of unwed, non-U.S. citizen mothers but not unwed, non-U.S. citizen fathers violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., establishes a general method for a child born abroad to become a U.S. citizen at birth when one parent is a U.S. citizen who was physically present in the U.S. for a period of years and the other is not.

  2. The Supreme Court - June 12, 2017

    Dorsey & Whitney LLPTimothy DroskeJune 14, 2017

    The general rule, applicable to married couples, currently requires that the U.S.-citizen parent have five years’ physical presence prebirth. 8 U.S.C. §1401(g) (2012 ed.); 8 U.S.C. §1401(a)(7) (1958 ed., ten years prebirth). Those requirements have similarly been extended to unwed U.S.-citizen parents under §1409(a).

  3. Judge Porter Issues His First Precedential Opinion

    Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLCBruce D. GreenbergMarch 7, 2019

    Applying de novo review of the legal issue involved, Judge Porter affirmed the ruling of the District Court that plaintiff was not a citizen.The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §1401, addressed the situation here. That statute provides “a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years ….”

  4. The Supreme Court - June 2016 #8

    Dorsey & Whitney LLPTimothy DroskeJuly 2, 2016

    ation Act, that seeks damages—a remedy that is not available under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649: Whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory priority scheme.Visa Inc. v. Osborn, No. 15-961; Visa Inc. v. Stoubos, 15-962: Whether allegations that members of a business association agreed to adhere to the association’s rules and possess governance rights in the association, without more, are sufficient to plead the element of conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, as the Court of Appeals held below, or are insufficient, as the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held.Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191: (1) Whether Congress’s decision to impose a different physical-presence requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of foreign-born children through 8 U.S.C. §1401 and §1409 (1958) violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. (2) Whether the court of appeals erred in conferring U.S. citizenship on respondent, in the absence of any express statutory authority to do so.

  5. The Supreme Court - June 28, 2016

    Dorsey & Whitney LLPJune 28, 2016

    ation Act, that seeks damages—a remedy that is not available under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649: Whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory priority scheme.Visa Inc. v. Osborn, No. 15-961; Visa Inc. v. Stoubos, 15-962: Whether allegations that members of a business association agreed to adhere to the association’s rules and possess governance rights in the association, without more, are sufficient to plead the element of conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, as the Court of Appeals held below, or are insufficient, as the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held.Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191: (1) Whether Congress’s decision to impose a different physical-presence requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of foreign-born children through 8 U.S.C. §1401 and §1409 (1958) violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. (2) Whether the court of appeals erred in conferring U.S. citizenship on respondent, in the absence of any express statutory authority to do so.

  6. 5 Cir: You can’t make up constitutional provisions

    University of Denver Sturm College of LawOctober 1, 2013

    The basis of his U.S. citizenship, Saldaña claimed, is his relationship with his father who is indisputably a U.S. citizen. At the time of Saldaña’s birth, the applicable law for transmitting citizenship to a child born abroad out of wedlock—as Saldaña was—required that the child “show: (1) he was legitimated before the age of 21 under the laws of the Mexican state where he resided or was domiciled as a child, see 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1964) (hereinafter INA § 309)2; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (1952); and (2) before his birth, his father had ten years of residence in the U.S., at least five of which were after the age of 14, see 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1964) (hereinafter INA § 301).” Saldana Iracheta, No. 12-60087, slip op. at 5-6.