stay was inadequate to support liability under § 1324(a)(1)(A)Gii), and reversed the conviction of a defendant who allowed her undocumented immigrant boyfriend to reside with her. (See United States v. Costello (7th Cir. 2012) 666 F.3d 1040, 1050; see also, e.g., DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties, Inc. (3d Cir. 2012) 672 F.3d 241, 248) [holding that, although defendant landlords were “likely aware that someoftheir residents lacked lawful immigration status and did nothing to alert federal authorities to this fact,” this was insufficient to constitute harboring]; United States v. Silveus (3d Cir. 2008) 542 F.3d 993, 1003-04 [cohabitation with an undocumented immigrantlegally insufficient to support harboring conviction]; United States v. Alabama (N.D. Ala. 2011) 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1335,italics omitted [stating “no Fifth Circuit or Eleventh Circuit case has held that the mere provision of rental housing to someonehe kneworhad reason to know was an unlawfully-present alien” violates 8 U.S.C. § 1324 and collecting cases].) The federal case law reflects an understanding bythe courtsthat, particularly in light of the fact that “[t]he numberofillegal aliens in the United States was estimated at 10.8 million in 2010,” Costello, supra, 666 29 F.3d at p. 1047, Congress could not have intendedto criminalize wholly innocentinteractions with noncitizens present without valid immigration status.

The retainer agreements were the mechanism by which the defendant encouraged aliens to remain in the United States illegally, and such assistance falls with the statute. See United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1249-52 (11 Cir. 2009) (finding that district court did not err by giving supplementalth jury instruction of the dictionary definition of “encourage” in 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) trial; “[t]o ‘encourage’ means to knowing instigate, to incite to action, to give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to raise confidence, to help, to forward, and/or to advise.”).

For example, Congress has authorized states to broadly participate in enforcement actions in specified circumstances. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (authorizing DHS to empower state or local law enforcement with immigration enforcement authority when an “actual or imminent Case 2:11-cv-02746-SLB Document 2 Filed 08/01/11 Page 60 of 85 50 mass influx of aliens . . . presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (authorizing state and local law enforcement to arrest aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States and were previously removed after being convicted of a felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) (granting certain state and local law enforcement officers the authority to make arrests for violations of federal smuggling and harboring laws). Outside of such specific authorizations, Congress has also recognized two avenues for the involvement by state and local law enforcement officers.

There simply is no evidence during the Policy’s history that there has been any conflict between federal immigration law and the Policy. More specifically, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that the Policy conflicts with, or has conflicted with, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iv). There also is no evidence of an imminent possibility of conflict between federal immigration law and the Policy.

¶ 208. Likewise, this phrase references an alien’s unlawful status and mirrors 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), which provides criminal penalties for individuals who “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law.” (emphasis added) 5.

In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant has engaged in an open and ongoing pattern of violations of section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In particular, plaintiffs allege that Mohawk has violated and continues to violate: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A), which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly hire [ ] for employment at least 10 individuals with actual knowledge that the individuals are aliens” during a twelve-month period; (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which makes it a federal crime to “conceal[ ], harbor[ ], or shield from detection, or attempt [ ] to conceal, harbor or shield from detection” aliens that have illegally entered the United States; and (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which makes it a federal crime to “encourage[ ] or induce[ ] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” According to the plaintiffs' complaint, Mohawk has committed hundreds, even thousands, of violations of federal immigration laws.

In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant has engaged in an open and ongoing pattern of violations of section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In particular, plaintiffs allege that Mohawk has violated and continues to violate: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A), which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly hire [ ] for employment at least 10 individuals with actual knowledge that the individuals are aliens” during a twelve-month period; (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which makes it a federal crime to “conceal[ ], harbor[ ], or shield from detection, or attempt [ ] to conceal, harbor or shield from detection” aliens that have illegally entered the United States; and (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which makes it a federal crime to “encourage[ ] or induce[ ] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” According to the plaintiffs' complaint, Mohawk has committed hundreds, even thousands, of violations of federal immigration laws.

In re Winton Shirt Corp., 104 F.2d 777, 779 (3 Cir. 1939). In United States v. Elizabeth Ramirez, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 23398 (5" Cir. 2007), the defendant was prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The defendant did not employthe illegal aliens in a business.

The anonymous plaintiffs in this civil suit appear to have been victims in that criminal case. The indictment included counts of transporting illegal aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii); harboring illegal aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii); employing smuggled aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A); conspiracy to bring, transport, harbor or induce illegal aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I); and aiding and abetting bringing, transporting, harboring or inducing illegal aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). Neither Andrew L. Grant nor Grant Family Farms were named as defendants in the criminal case.

Plaintiffs are further required to make sufficient averments as to subparagraph (B) of said statute, requiring that employers have “actual knowledge” that the hired employee is an unauthorized alien “that has been brought into the United States in violation of this subsection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(B). As set forth in Zavala— a case relied upon by Plaintiffs in support of their Response—the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for failing to allege that the defendant “had actual knowledge that the aliens not only were ‘unlawfully present in the United States,’ but also were ‘brought into the United States in violation of this subsection.”