Thus, Patel’s detention furthers Congress’s purpose in passing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c): ensuring that Patel is present at the conclusion of removal proceedings. Patel’s petition should be dismissed because, as an alien removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without a bond hearing does not offend the Constitution. CONCLUSION Considering the ambiguity of the statute, the clearly expressed intent of Congress regarding the detention of criminal aliens pending decision on removal, the deference due to the BIA’s interpretation under Chevron, and the constitutionality of mandatory immigration detention, the petition of habeas corpus relief should be denied.

CONCLUSION Petitioner has failed to exhaust his prescribed administrative remedy: appeal of his bond determination to the BIA. Additionally, to the extent he seeks review of the Immigration Judge’s bond determination, review is precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Accordingly, the Respondents respectfully request this Court dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for lack of jurisdiction.

Moreover, the Board’s overly broad construction of § 1226(c) is inconsistent with the overall immigration detention scheme. Immigration officials retain the broad authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to detain and, if they so choose, release noncitizens facing removal, including people with past criminal convictions. Section 1226(c)(l) is specified as an exception to this general rule.

Id. at 1281-82 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226-28, 1231, 1357(a)-(d) (granting ICE agents authority to arrest, detain and deport aliens)); Compl., Dkt. # 1, at Ex.

¶ 7 (“ICE no longer uses deterrence as a factor in individual custody determinations . . . .”). Thus, ICE does not have a “No-Release Policy” for families, and further is not considering deterrence as a factor in its discretionary detention determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) with regard to families. There is thus no basis to find that any individuals – either adults or children – are detained in a family facility other than as 26 In R.I.L.R., the Government moved for reconsideration of the Court’s finding.

at 1121, n.8. 15 Case 1:15-cv-00011-JEB Document 37 Filed 03/20/15 Page 15 of 32 The more reasonable reading of Section 1252(f)(1) is that Congress intended to prohibit the courts, other than the Supreme Court, from making class-wide injunctive rulings related to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232, and instead required that such relief be provided on an individualized basis.8 This prohibition makes sense in the overall context of Section 1252 as a whole, which is designed to very narrowly limit and channel review of immigration decisions and actions.9 Nonetheless, despite the fact that Congress clearly intended to grant ICE broad discretion in custody determinations in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and to limit class-wide injunctive relief related to the operation of that discretion, the Court has issued a nationwide injunction preventing ICE from considering one particular factor in making custody determinations with regard to a subset of individuals. The injunction severely (and indefinitely) limits ICE’s discretion and provides ICE with no outlet for redress should mass migration and threats to national security change in the future.

Dr. Taitz does not claim to be counsel for any Flores plaintiff, and she has articulated nothing that would permit her to enlist the aid of this Court to construe Flores and oversee the Government’s compliance as part of a fraud or any other type of claim. 20 Plaintiff claims that Defendants “are flagrantly violating 8 U.S. Code 1226(b),” ECF No. 40 at 14, but the quoted text pertains to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3). 21 Defendants further note that, by its plain language, 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which applies to “persons,” does not apply to the Government.

¶¶ 62, 83- 89.) Plaintiffs assert that ICE allegedly “disregard[ed] mandatory duties defined by federal statutes” and, specifically, violated 8 U.S.C § 1226(c)(1) and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) when ICE did not detain or deport Mr. Lopez-Sanchez. (E.g., Compl.

Moreover, mandatory detention also applies to aliens who have committed certain inadmissibility offenses, even if they have not been convicted of a removable offense or have been in custody at all. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A) and (D). Accordingly, the statute extends to aliens who may not have been released from post-conviction confinement.

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, provisions like Sections 1226(a)(3) and 1231(a)(7) prove that Congress Case 1:14-cv-00254 Document 64 Filed in TXSD on 01/07/15 Page 33 of 88 16 knew how to authorize the DHS Secretary to grant work authorizations in particular circumstances for particular individuals; it would be absurd to suggest that the Secretary can nonetheless do whatever he wants with unreviewable discretion. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338-39 (1994) (“[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely” when it “includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another,” and as a consequence, an agency cannot find administrative power where Congress omitted it).