The plaintiff alleged that he was a United States citizen and was discharged by REI, which had hired numerous H1-B non-immigrants by falsely representing to the INS that there was a shortage of qualified U.S. workers. He alleges that such actions are in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) and that a private right of action for a violation of § 1182(n) must be implied because the statute does not authorize such a cause of action. In a case of apparent first impression, the Fourth Circuit ruled that no implied private cause of action should be created under § 1182(n) because an administrative remedy already exists:Subsection (n)(5) covers complaints regarding an employer’s misrepresentation or failure to state that it has offered the job in question to any U.S. worker who is equally or better qualified.

In addition, the Department of State (DOS) in its Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) notes that, “whether or not a controlled substance is legal under state law is not relevant to its illegality under federal law.5 As these policies and federal laws remain in full force and effect as to cannabis as a controlled substance, we initially provide a brief review of the current landscape.6Existing Authorities U.S. immigration law sets forth grounds to determine the inadmissibility (being barred from entering U.S.) or removability (deporting/removing a foreign national present in the U.S.) of non-US citizens [which term includes lawful permanent residents (LPR), who are also often referred to as “green card” holders]. Several inadmissibility grounds apply in particular to cannabis legalization/decriminalization:Controlled Substances Ground of Inadmissibility: Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (INA), 8 USC §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), provides that a foreign national who is in a violation of (or a conspiracy, or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a state, the U.S., or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance is subject to being found ineligible to be admitted to the U.S. or ineligible to receive a visa.7 There is no immigrant visa waiver, but there is a discretionary nonimmigrant visa waiver.8Drug Trafficking Ground of Inadmissibility: Section 212(a)(2)(C) of the INA, 8 USC §1182(a)(2)(C) renders ineligible: (1) any alien who the consular officer or DHS knows or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemicals as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 USC § 802), or is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others, in the illicit trafficking in any controlled or listed substance or chemicals, or endeavored to do so.9 There is no immigrant visa waiver, but there is a dis

regulations underlying immigrant and nonimmigrant programs, and was instituted in the wake of Presidential Proclamation 10052 (P.P. 10052), which was widely publicized for implementing an entry ban on certain categories of immigrant and nonimmigrant workers. Of note, the proclamation’s “Additional Measures” section calls for enhanced enforcement protocols to regulate the H-1B, EB-2, and EB-3 nonimmigrant and immigrant programs. This has been an easily overlooked provision that we have been monitoring.P.P. 10052 instructed the DOL Secretary of Labor to make use of his enforcement power and to “consider promulgating regulations or take other appropriate action to ensure that the presence in the United States of aliens who have been admitted or otherwise provided a benefit, or who are seeking admission or a benefit, pursuant to an EB-2 or EB-3 immigrant visa or an H-1B nonimmigrant visa does not disadvantage United States workers in violation of section 212(a)(5)(A) or (n)(1) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) or (n)(1)).”8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) requires that employers demonstrate that there are no sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available to perform the role, and that employment will not adversely affect wages and working conditions of similarly employed workers in the United States.

The term “aggravated felony” is defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), and the various aggravated felony offenses are enumerated in subsections in relevant part- (M). M. Fraud and Deceit Offenses.8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) provides “an offense that – (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in [26 U.S.C. § 7201] (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000” is an aggravated felony.As a general matter, an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is statutorily ineligible for most forms of discretionary relief from removal, including cancellation of removal and asylum, although the alien may, under certain narrow circumstances, be eligible for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Notwithstanding an aggravated felony conviction, any alien may apply for deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture regulations if they fear torture upon returning to their home country.

But then he received a denial with no explanation other than a general cite to the Immigration and Nationality Act’s terrorism ground of inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).The Unknown Ground of InadmissibilityThat ground of inadmissibility can be triggered in nine different ways, including if a consular officer “has reasonable ground to believe” that the individual “is engaged or is likely to engage in any terrorist activity.”

One of those requirements is that the person not have been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in the immigration laws. At issue here is another condition – that during the lawful permanent resident’s initial seven years of continuous residence in the United States, he must not have committed certain other offenses listed in 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2). Here, petitioner Andre Barton is a longtime permanent resident who had been previously convicted of a firearms offense, drug offenses, and aggravated assault offenses.

Decided: April 14, 2015The Fourth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) applies to both legal aliens and illegal aliens, and renders both ineligible for cancellation of removal from the United States when they have committed a crime of moral turpitude which falls under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or § 1227 (a)(3), even if the crime committed would otherwise fall under a petit-offense exception within those statutes. The Fourth Circuit thus upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) denial of Marina Hernandez’s application for cancellation of removal from the United States.

injunctions or some other more lenient standard.Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson, No. 23-175: This case concerns the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The question presented is: Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.Williams et al. v. Washington, No. 23-191: This case arises out of an action filed by Alabama unemployment benefits claimants against the Alabama Department of Labor. The claimants alleged that the Department delayed the processing of their unemployment compensation claims, in violation of their due process and Social Security Act rights. The question presented is: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.Department of State v. Muñoz, No. 23-334: This case concerns a consular officer’s denial of an immigrant visa in a written notice citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), the provision making a noncitizen inadmissible if the officer believes that he will engage in “unlawful activity” in the United States. The questions presented are: (1) Whether denying a visa to a U.S. citizen’s noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, (2) Whether, assuming such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due.

A lawsuit filed on August 10, 2023 against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security alleges that the agency violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702, by exceeding its authority and determining that a group of visa applicants were “inadmissible” without reviewing a full record of evidence. The plaintiffs in Sharma et al. v. United States Department of Homeland Security1are nearly 70 former F-1 students who were labeled “inadmissible” for employment authorization after they were defrauded by a group of would-be visa employers, which committed violations of the F-1 program guidelines by asking the students to pay for “pre-employment trainings” to receive offer letters and then failing to provide them with actual work assignments or remuneration.The lawsuit claims that DHS improperly marked the plaintiffs as “inadmissible” on the basis of alleged fraud or willful misrepresentation under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), without the chance to prove that they had not, in fact, engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation while trying to procure immigration benefits. In cases of fraud or misrepresentation, an inadmissibility determination can be a permanent bar to a visa and lawful status in the United States.F-1 OPT Visa Program OverviewThe F-1 Optional Practical Training program (“OPT” and “STEM OPT”) is a student visa-specific training program geared towards post-graduates and STEM graduates. The program allows students to apply for and receive an employment authorization document (or “EAD”) as part of their F-1 visa status for employment in fields related to their course of study undertaken while earning or after completing their undergraduate or graduate degrees in the United States. Eventually, many F-1 students are candidates for employment visas.Case Facts In this case, each of the referenced plaintiffs had either sought employment or accepted employment as part of the F-1 OPT program from one

se significant costs and impair access to care? 2) Does the Final Rule violate appropriations statutes requiring that “all pregnancy counseling” in the Title X program “shall be nondirective”? 3) Does the Final Rule violate §1554 of the Affordable Care Act, which prohibits HHS from promulgating “any regulation” that creates “unreasonable barriers” to obtaining appropriate medical care; impedes “timely access” to such care; interferes with patient-provider communications “regarding a full range of treatment options”; restricts providers from disclosing “all relevant information to patients making health care decisions”; or violates providers’ ethical standards? 4) Does the rule fall within the agency’s statutory authority.Dept. of Homeland Security v. New York, No. 20-449: The Court granted review on two questions related to the Department of Homeland Security’s issuance of a final rule interpreting and applying the statutory term “public charge” in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(4)(A), under which an alien is “inadmissible” if, “in the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] at the time of his application for admission or adjustment of status, [the alien] is likely at any time to become a public charge”: 1) Whether entities that are not subject to the public-charge ground of inadmissibility contained in 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(4)(A), and which seek to expand benefits usage by aliens who are potentially subject to that provision, are proper parties to challenge the final rule. 2) Whether the final rule is likely contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious.Wooden v. United States, No. 20-5279: Did the Sixth Circuit err by expanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1) of the Armed Career Criminal Act in the absence of a clear statutory definition with regard to the vague term “committed on occasions different from one another”?