See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702, courts should decline to review matters on equitable grounds that intrude into core executive powers); see also Al- Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting interjection into “sensitive” foreign affairs matters). Regardless, the 2014 Deferred Action Guidance was issued in accordance with Congress’s broad and explicit vesting of authority in the Secretary, charging him with “the administration and enforcement of [the INA and all other laws] relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1103, and the obligation to “[e]stablish[] national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.” 6 U.S.C. § 202(5).

However, the INS was abolished by virtue of 6 U.S.C. §291, and its functions have been transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security. (8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(1).) In addition, the duty of the Attorney General to administer and enforce all immigration laws, with certain exceptions, have been transferred to the DHS Secretary.

Here, the INA authorizes the Secretary to establish regulations, issue instructions, and “perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the statute.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (emphasis added); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (defining the term “unauthorized alien” as meaning that the alien is not at that time “authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General.”).

Penal Code §4000.)4 In addition, the Sheriff is required by the principles of comity to comply with such ICE detainers pursuant to the mandates of 8 U.S.C. §1103(a). With respect to federal law, it appears that Plaintiffs misconstrue the extent of the authority Congress provided to local officials to participate in the enforcement of immigration laws and effectuation of federal immigration policy, as such authority is fairly extensive.

7 is in no way ultra vires to the INA. Put simply, the Secretary’s interpretation of the INA generally, and her powers under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 are entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Congress has mandated that the Secretary promptly cooperate with state and local law enforcement agencies in controlled substance cases.

See Part I.A.2.b, supra. The canon of constitutional avoidance therefore requires reading both Section 1103(a)(3) and Section 1324a(h)(3) narrowly and to disallow DHS’s limitless discretion. C. Plaintiffs Have Standing For all of its complexities, the point of the standing doctrine is simple: to ensure that at least one plaintiff before this Court has “[t]he requisite personal interest” to create a “Case” or “Controversy” under Article III. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).

Instead, Congress delegated the authority to enforce the immigration laws of the United States to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(1), 1103(g)(1). This delegation acts to displace federal common law and the Court’s authority to entertain private causes of action in connection with the region occupied by the administrative agency.

Although the term “cooperate with [the Secretary]” is not expressly defined in section 1357, the meaning of the term follows from federal primacy in the 10 Any effort to read Section 1357(g)(10) as authorizing unlimited state-directed enforcement would violate clear congressional intent. First, the INA’s limited authorization of state involvement at the initial (arrest) stage of immigration enforcement in delineated circumstances (e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(10), 1252c, 1324(c)) would be nullified were Section 1357(g)(10) construed as authorizing unlimited state-directed enforcement. Any such construction would further undermine Congress’s intent by eliminating the close supervision contemplated by portions of Section 1357(g) which related to written agreements.

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979). Congress has directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to “establish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). Thus, the scope of 8 C.F.R. § 287.12 reflects the Secretary’s broad authority to do just that.

Recognizing the Secretary’s vast responsibilities, Congress conferred upon the Secretary the discretion to “establish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as [s]he deems necessary for carrying out [her] authority under the provisions of this chapter.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). The Secretary has determined that 8 C.F.R § 287.