(See Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 349, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 729.) The full text of Code of Civil Procedure section 155, subdivision (a), reads: “A superior court has jurisdiction under California law to make judicial determinations regarding the custody and care of children within the meaning of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(27)(J) and 8 C.F.R. Sec. 204.11) (uly 6, 2009), which includes, but is not limited to, the juvenile, probate, and family court divisionsofthe superior court. These courts may make the findings necessary to enable a child to petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service for classification as a special immigrant juvenile pursuant to Section 1101(a)(27)DofTitle 8 of the United States Code.

- 32 - States, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), and requires demonstrated proof of a "well- founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1986). Tellingly, the 2012 asylum denial rates for the New York immigration judges determining asylum applications for individuals in detention are reported to be between 70 percent and 92 percent.

Plaintiff “Has Been Helpful, Is Being Helpful, or Is Likely to be Helpful” in the Investigation or Prosecution of Defendant Agents’ Crimes The final requirement for U visa relief is that the petitioner “has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful” to the law enforcement agency or judge investigating or prosecuting the crime. 8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i). Here, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit alleging that Defendant and its agents engaged in activity amounting to the criminal acts enumerated above.

at 3481-82. The employer associations offer no arguments as to why, in their opinion, the DOL did not reasonably reject each of the proposed alternatives that they list on efficiency grounds or because they would have an adverse effect on the wages of U.S. workers, in contravention of the stated objectives of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii). The DOL’s explanation of its rejection of those alternatives therefore satisfied the lenient requirements of the RFA.19 In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the employer associations raise a challenge to 19 the DOL’s April 14, 2011, notice modifying the Appendix to ETA form 9142, Application for Temporary Employment Certification, to require employers to certify that they will pay the prevailing wage that “is or will be issued” to the employer for the period of the certification’s validity.

However, noneof the authorities cited by Bianka M. grants state courts the power to preemptively reject a request for SIJS predicate findings based on that court’s guess at how USCIS would decide a SIJS application. (See id., at pp. 422-426; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 155, as enacted by Stats. 2014, ch. 685, § 1, before amendment; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 76 Fed.Reg. 54985 (Sept.6, 2011) [proposed regulations for USCIS consideration of SIJS applications].) Evenif the Legislature had intended to grant the superior courts the power to preempt the USCIS—it did not—such 23 power would be an impermissible intrusion into the federal prerogative to grant SIJS relief. (Eddie E. II, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 326 [“ ‘[T]he federal government has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to .. . the final determination whether an alien child will be granted permanent [SIJS]’ ”].)

) The permissive joinder provision of the California Rules of Court providesthat “[t]he court may order that a person be joined as a party to the proceedingif the court finds that it would be appropriate to determine the particular issue in the proceeding 14 The SIJ statute also requires a finding that SIJ classification is in the best interest of the child. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).) The Superior Court found that it would not be in Bianka’s best interests to be returned to Honduras.

Of equal importance is the fact that a conviction for 72 an aggravated felony is also a lifetime bar to citizenship. 8 USC § 1101(f)(8). This is a critical concern.

(See Eddie E., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 326 [“[T]he federal governmenthas exclusive jurisdiction with respect to . . . the final determination whetheran alien child will be granted permanentstatus as an SIJ. [Citation.].]”) To begin with, Congress has authorized a federal executive agency to exercise independent judgmentin the adjudication of SIJ petitions (see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) (“the Secretary of HomelandSecurity consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile » Evenif state courts were required to make “bona fide” determinations, the Court ofAppeal’s suggestion here—that Bianka’s custody proceedings were “specially constructed proceedings designed mainly for the purpose of issuing orders containing SIJ findings” (see Bianka M., supra, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 860)—is without merit. In her petition to the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, Bianka advancedfour reasons she had soughtan order placing her in her mother’s sole custody: (1) Bianka prefers her mother’s custody (a preference the superior court is required to consider according to subdivision (a) of Family Code section 3042); (2) Bianka’s alleged father is abusive and violent; (3) being placed in her mother’s custody would help ensure continuity and stability in Bianka’s care; and (4) Bianka has serious health needs requiring her mother to havethe legal ability to make critical decisions on he

Again, the issue was a legal question of U.S. immigration law, not Jamaican law. The legal question was whether Plaintiff’s legitimation under Jamaican law satisfied 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1)—a legal question that was unequivocally decided in the affirmative at the time of Mr. Watson’s derivative citizenship in September 2002 under Matter of Clahar. Finally, the rest of the Government’s arguments on page 27 of its memorandum can be simply ignored, as they are: 1) either aspects of the former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (former INA § 321(a)), which are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s derivative citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (INA § 320)—e.g., proof of “legal separation” giving sole custody of plaintiff to his father; 2) “factual issues” created by the BIA that were never in dispute by the proper fact finders—e.g., documentation that plaintiff was in the legal custody of his father; or 3) “factual issues” that are presented for the first time in the instant action—e.g., no paternity tests or substantiating information presented to the IJ to establish plaintiff’s parentage.

Thus, the D.C. Circuit, subsequent to its decision in King (upon which the Plaintiffs rest much of their argument), re-affirmed the unique nature of American Samoa and the limitations of the application of the U.S. Constitution to the unincorporated, outlying territory. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Hodel reinforces the doctrine that, based on the Congressional determinations set forth in INA § 308(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) and INA § 101(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29), those born on American Samoa to non-U.S. citizen parents are U.S. nationals, but not U.S. citizens by virtue of birth on American Samoa. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed.