The same is true with respect to commodity exchanges, which operate as quasi- governmental organizations that are authorized and required to enforce the CEA, CFTC regulations, and exchange rules to provide fair markets for trading. See 7 U.S.C. § 7(d); see also Barbara, 99 F.3d at 58; Mandelbaum, 894 F. Supp. at 678. Just like the New York Stock Exchange’s relationship with the SEC, commodities exchanges stand in the shoes of the CFTC in performing tasks to regulate commodities markets. Therefore, these exchanges and their employees and agents are protected by absolute immunity when performing those functions.

The same is true with respect to commodity exchanges, which operate as quasi- governmental organizations that are authorized and required to enforce the CEA, CFTC regulations, and exchange rules to provide fair markets for trading. See 7 U.S.C. § 7(d); see also Barbara, 99 F.3d at 58; Mandelbaum, 894 F. Supp. at 678. Just like the New York Stock Exchange’s relationship with the SEC, commodities exchanges stand in the shoes of the CFTC in performing tasks to regulate commodities markets.

Plaintiffs refer to this structure as an “Omnibus Trading Sub-Account,” under “Omnibus Sub Account rules.” (SAC ¶¶ 282, 453, 485; see also id. ¶ 816(c) (complaining that the Exchange “allow[ed] the rules relating to Omnibus accounts to exist”), ¶ 853 (complaining that the Exchange “set[] up rules to insulate [Peregrine] from scrutiny as in the case of these Omnibus Sub account rules”).) But as Plaintiffs acknowledge, Congress has granted the Exchange “rule-making authority” (id. ¶ 157), and the Exchange has “reasonable discretion” in carrying out that mandate, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(1)(B). And of course the Exchange’s rules must be reviewed and approved by the CFTC.

The statute sets forth various “core principles” with which exchanges must comply. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d). One of those principles is that exchanges “shall adopt position limitations or position accounta- bility for speculators, where necessary and appropriate.”

61 7 U.S.C.§6(a)-(b) ................................................................................................................................. 47 7 U.S.C.§6(o) ....................................................................................................................................... 58 7 u.s.c. §7 ...................................................................................................................................... 50,51 7 U.S.C.§7(d)(2)(A)(iii) ...................................................................................................................... 68 7 U.S.C.§ 9(1) ...................................................................................................................................... 43 7 U.S.C.§ 13-c(a) ............................................................................................................................ 58,70 7 u.s.c. § 25 ........................................................................................................................................ 43 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) .............................................................................................................................. 75 7 u.s.c. §25(b) ............................................................................................................................... 50.66 7 u.s.c. § 25(b)(1) ...............................................................................................

This is incorrect, as Plaintiffs plainly allege: The CBOT and CME are contract markets registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). They are required pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(2)                                                              16 Defendants claim that Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts to suggest that Defendants, or any third party, had the ability to manipulate the market price of any commodity. Def.

Insofar as Section 9(a) prohibits manipulation, plaintiffs have an express right of action under Section 22 of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 25, which provides: (a)(1) Any person . . . who violates this chapter or who willfully aids, abets, counsels, induces, or procures the commission of a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting from one or more of the transactions 7 E.g., Section 5(b)(2) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 7(b)(2), requires exchanges to prevent manipulation and corners; Section 8a(9) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9), allows the CFTC to intervene in order to prevent manipulation and corners; and former Section 5a(a)(10) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 7a(a)(10), required exchanges to establish delivery systems and delivery differentials in order to reduce the likelihood of a corner. Case: 1:05-cv-04681 Document #: 98 Filed: 07/31/06 Page 20 of 35 PageID #:653 13 referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this paragraph and caused by such violation to any other person – * * * (D) . . . if the violation constitutes a manipulation of the price of any such contract or the price of the commodity underlying such contract. 2. Consistent With This Overarching Congressional Purpose, Congress And The CFTC Have Refrained From Defining Manipulation In Any Exclusive Fashion Because the methods of “manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man”8 and woman, Congress and the CFTC hav

................................. 30, 31, 49 World Wrest. Entm’t, Inc. v. Jakks Pac., Inc., 328 F. App’x 695 (2d Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................ 41 Zola v. Gordon, 685 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ......................................................................................... 41 STATUTES, RULES AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 7 U.S.C. § 1a ................................................................................................................................. 45 7 U.S.C. § 2 ............................................................................................................................. 45, 47 7 U.S.C. § 24a ............................................................................................................................... 48 7 U.S.C. § 6s ..................................................................................................................... 45, 48, 49 7 U.S.C. § 7 ................................................................................................................................... 48 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 .............................................................................................................................. 48 Page(s) - vii - 7 U.S.C. § 7b-3 ....................................................................................................................... 45, 48 12 U.S.C. § 5303 ........................................................................................................................... 48 15 U.S.C. § 15b ............................................................................................................................. 36 15 U.S.C. § 77 ............................................................................................................................... 49 15 U.S.C. § 78c ................................................................................................

Inevitably ‘the terms and conditions' upon which valid governmental insurance can be had must be defined by the agency acting for the Government. And so Congress has legislated in this instance, as in modern regulatory enactments it so often does by conferring the rule-making power upon the agency created for carrying out its policy. See s 516(b), 52 Stat. 72, 77, 7 U.S.C. s 1516(b), 7 U.S.C.A. s 1516(b). Just as everyone is charged with knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large, Congress has provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register gives legal notice of their contents. 49 Stat. 502, 44 U.S.C. s 307, 44 U.S.C.A. s 307

¶ 3. v. United States, 518 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The trial de novo provision of [7 U.S.C. 7§ 2023] is clearly broader than the review standard provided for under the Administrative Procedure Act. It requires the district court to examine the entire range of issues raised, and not merely to determine whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence.”)