If a contract has terms dictated by the Federal Government, but the Federal Government does not provide any way to enforce that contract, then (1) the Federal contract requirements are pointless, (2) the savings clause in 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) becomes meaningless, and (3) far from achieving its purpose, the preemption clause in 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) ends up defeating the very “presuppos[ition of] the vitality of contracts governing air carrier transportation” that the Wolens court found compelling. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 230, 115 S.Ct. at 825.

. If a contract has terms dictated by the Federal Government, but the Federal Government does not provide any way to enforce that contract, then (1) the Federal contract requirements are pointless, (2) the savings clause in 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) becomes meaningless, and (3) far from achieving its purpose, the preemption clause in 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) ends up defeating the 42 The savings clause was formerly part of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), Pub. L. 85–726, 72 Stat.

New subsection (h)(2) emphasizes that State authority to regulate safety, financial fitness and insurance, transportation of household goods, vehicle size and weight and hazardous materials routing ofmotorcarriers is unchanged since State regulation in those areas is not a price, route or service and thus is unaffected. This subsection is identical to section 41713(b)(4)(B), described above. New subsection (h)(3) permits continued State regulation over four enumerated standard transportation practices in an optional *86 **J758 manner.

C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Also Preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act Plaintiffs’ claims are also barred by the Airline Deregulation Act, which expressly prohibits enforcement of state laws “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). That provision “express[es] a broad pre-emptive purpose,” and “displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with [the Airline Deregulation Act’s] substantive requirements.”

This Court relied on DiFiore, which held that the ADA contains an unwritten “employment law” exception that preserves state-law claims that “relate[] to” both a “price” charged by and a “service” offered by an interstate air carrier. 483 F. Supp. 2d at 126; 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). As discussed above, however, this conclusion is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rowe and Altria and with the First Circuit’s decision in Buck.

As discussed, that use of state law could hardly be more “related to a price . . . or service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). II.

The ADA provides that states “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); see Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995) (the “ADA’s preemption Case 1:07-cv-00418-RJL Document 5 Filed 04/23/2007 Page 34 of 39 25 prescription bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“[s]tate enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or services’ are pre-empted” by the ADA).10 Courts confronting unjust enrichment claims against airlines consequently dismiss those claims as a matter of course. See, e.g., Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 32, 36 n.9, 38 (1st Cir. 2007) (plaintiffs’ claims, including an unjust enrichment claim, were based on “price grounds” and therefore preempted under the ADA); Harrington v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No.

The ADA provides, in pertinent part, that “a State … may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route or service of an air carrier.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713. Since this Court’s ruling on BA’s motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court held that a breach of a state law’s implied covenant of good faith nd fair dealing “is pre-empted if it seeks (“Mr. Sutcliffe’s contention that application of the fuel surcharge was confined to unexpected and suden changes to the price of fuel made by third parties in my opinion involves placing an unjustified gloss on the contractual power in question and is not a limitation warranted by recourse to obligations of honesty and good faith.”)

The ADA, which was passed by Congress as part of a scheme to deregulate the airline industry, provides that state governments “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). Enacted in 1994, the FAAAA was modeled on the ADA.

Id. After Congress employed the language of the Deregulation Act to deregulate the trucking industry, the Supreme Court again interpreted 49 U.S.C. § 41713. See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (noting that when Congress purposefully uses language from an existing statute, it also imports the judicial interpretation of that language).