40 Cal.4th at 58 & n.18 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Here too, this Court should adhereto the consistent interpretation of federal courts across the Nation, and broadly construe Section 230 to barthe injunctive relief against Yelp that was ordered here. VI. CONCLUSION This Court’s admonition a decade ago in Barrett applies just as forcefully now. “The Court ofAppeal gave insufficient consideration to the burden its rule would impose on Internet speech. ... Congress sought to ‘promote the continued developmentofthe Internet and other interactive computerservices’” by granting broad immunity to “Internet intermediaries” such as Yelp.

(See, e.g., Blockowicz v. Williams (7th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3d 563; Arista Records, LLC v. Vita Tkach (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107339.) Forall of these reasons, Yelp has failed to establish that section 230 or anyother law barredthetrial court from issuing the removalorder under the circumstancesofthis case. Therefore, Yelp’s nonstatutory motion to vacate the Bird judgment was properly denied.

See Doe y. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758 at *3 4 (rejecting plaintiff's contention that actual knowledge of tortious conduct precludes Section 230 immunity (following Zeran)). Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that Backpage's knowledge somehow become relevant to the issue of Section 230 immunity, the defective manner in which plaintiff has attempted to allege Backpage's knowledge renders the complaint subject to dismissal pursuant to Iqbal and Twombly. Plaintiff's complaint sets forth numerous conclusory allegations regarding Backpage's knowledge in paragraphs 11 through 13, none of which include any facts to support these conclusions.

The district court specifically found that plaintiff's federal claim under 18 U.S.C. §2252A "did not fit within any exception" to Section 230's immunity from civil liability. The fact that plaintiff relied on a statute that also included criminal penalties did not change the Section 230 analysis. Adopting the reasoning from Zeran, the district court noted that "Congress has decided that the parties to be punished and deterred are not the internet service providers but rather those who created and posted the illegal material. . . ."

Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). IV. CONCLUSION Malwarebytes respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Enigma’s FAC in its entirety with prejudice. Malwarebytes is immune from each cause of action under CDA Section 230(c)(2)(A) or (B), and Plaintiff cannot avoid immunity through amendment. Even if Malwarebytes were not immune from Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for each cause of action, and future efforts to amend would futile.

Plaintiffs’ speculation that they might not be able to enforce their judgmentdirectly against Bird (Answer3, 48) may give them a reason to lobby Congress to change existing law, but it does not give them an end-run around Section 230. Section 230 gives Yelp—and companieslikeit that host millions of third-party postings—the freedom they need to provide valuable information to the public without fear of 4] being dragged into court each time a business or powerful personis unhappywith criticism. This plainly advances the public good.

Nor could this case have a chilling effect on speech because, outside of these three postings — which werejudicially determined to be defamation-- Yelp is welcome to maintain its third-party content. In one final swipe at the removal order, Yelp seeks to knock down the court’s decision as part of simple “gamesmanshipthat attempts to circumvent Section 230.” (OBM,54, citing Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 836 F.3d 1263).

Congress understood as much when it enacted Section 230, declaring in the statute’s preamble that it is “the policy of the United States” to preserve the Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO Document 27 Filed 04/06/16 Page 23 of 31 Case No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO 19 Defendant Twitter’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Internet’s “vibrant and competitive free market . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). And Congress carefully crafted subsection 230(e)(1) with this lesson in mind, providing only a narrow exception for federal criminal prosecutions.6 Given subsection 230(e)(1)’s clear language and Section 230’s speech-protective purpose, it is unsurprising that every court to decide the question has concluded that Section 230’s criminal-law exception does not encompass private civil suits that purport to be based on federal criminal statutes.

Congress understood as much when it enacted Section 230, declaring in the statute’s preamble that it is “the policy of the United States” to preserve the Internet’s “vibrant and competitive free market . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). And Congress carefully crafted subsection 230(e)(1) with this lesson in mind, providing only a narrow exception for federal criminal prosecutions.5 5 Beyond robust procedural protections, the “filter of prosecutorial discretion” provides an additional safeguard in a criminal prosecution that is missing in a civil suit.

YAHOO! INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; CASE NO. 13-CV-00041-GPC (WVG) 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 K az er ou ni L aw G ro up , A P C C os ta M es a, C al if or ni a E. Yahoo’s Case Law Does Not Support Application of The “Good Samaritan” Exemption For Calls Regulated By The TCPA 1. Zango Yahoo cites to Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2009), and states that the court in Zango found the exemption under 47 U.S.C. § 230 “extended protection to a distributor of Internet security software that filtered adware and malware.” See Def.