Alternatively, Plaintiff should be granted leave of court to amend his Petition. 34 Id. 35 Id. at 794. 36 Id. 37 45 U.S.C. 51, et seq. 38 La. C.C. art. 2315. 39 49 U.S.C. 20301, et seq. 40 49 U.S.C. 20701, et seq., formerly known as, the Boiler Inspection Act. 41 La. R.S. § 9:2800.

FELA and the Jones Act are closely related, as both statutes allow employees -- railroad employees or seamen, respectively -- to sue their employers for damages if they are injured “while acting within the course of their employment[,]” and if their employers have been negligent. John A. Bourdeau & Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress under Jones Act (46 U.S.C.A. Appx. § 688) or under Federal Employers’ Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51 et seq.), 123 A.L.R. Fed. 583 (1995). Therefore, cases decided under FELA provide a helpful starting point for analyzing Jones Act and maritime law cases, in that the Jones Act incorporates the jurisprudence developed under FELA, and, in turn, maritime law incorporates the teachings of the Jones Act.

Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). In BNSF Railway, the Montana Supreme Court had found that Daimler’s limitations on general jurisdiction did not apply to claims brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., against railroad defendants. BNSF Ry., 137 S. Ct. at 1558.

FELA, in turn, provides injured employees with a cause of action for negligence. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 51. Case 2:16-cv-17271-ILRL-JCW Document 26-1 Filed 03/24/17 Page 8 of 28 4 However, it is a long-held principle that the definition of negligence is broadened in FELA and Jones Act actions, affording the statutes a liberal construction.

FELA, in turn, provides injured employees with a cause of action for negligence. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 51. However, it is a long-held principle that the definition of negligence is broadened in FELA and Jones Act actions, affording the statutes a liberal construction.

’” Id. at 2634; see also 45 U.S.C. § 51 (“Every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier . . .”). The Supreme Court held that FELA’s “in part” phrase should be interpreted in accordance with the language Congress expressly utilized and include conduct “‘no matter how small.

’” Id. at 2634; see also 45 U.S.C. § 51 (“Every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier . . . .”).

Medical surveillance is not one of them. Philip Morris’ manifest injury argument also misreads the Supreme Court’s decisions in Metro-North, supra, 521 U.S. at 424, and Norfolk & Western, supra, 538 U.S. at 135. Those cases arose under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C.S. § 51 et seq., and concerned workers exposed to asbestos. In Metro-North, workers without evidence of bodily harm or symptoms sought to recover for emotional distress and a lump sum cash award to pay for medical surveillance. 521 U.S. at 426.

39 See 46 U.S.C. § 30104. 40 See 45 U.S.C. § 51. Page 8 of 14 Case 2:16-cv-03488-JCZ-KWR Document 24-2 Filed 05/17/17 Page 8 of 14 The right of recovery as a seaman under the Jones Act does not depend "on the place where the injury is inflicted, but on the nature of the service and its relationship to the operation of the vessel plying in navigable waters."

Case No. 2:14-CV-00434-PPS-JEM DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOW COMES the Defendant, INDIANA HARBOR BELT RAILROAD COMPANY (“IHB”), and respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for Summary Judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff, Cory Henman, and in support thereof, states as follows: 1. This cause of action arises under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. and seeks to recover damages for an injury sustained by Plaintiff, Cory Henman, on October 1, 2013 while working for the Defendant in East Chicago, IN. 2.