ll covered, multi-family buildings, in such a manner that (i) the public use and common use portions of such dwellings are readily accessible to and usable by those with any mobility impairment or any other handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. §3602(h) and Va. Code Ann. § 36-96.1:1; (ii) all the doors designed to allow passage into and within all premises within such dwellings are sufficiently wide to allow passage by those with any mobility impairment or any other handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. §3602(h) and Va. Code Ann. § 36- 96.1:1; and (iii) all premises within such dwellings contain the following features of adaptive design: (a) an accessible route into and through the dwelling; (b) light switches, electrical outlets, thermostats, and other environmental controls in accessible locations; (c) reinforcements in bathroom walls to allow later installation of grab bars; and (d) usable kitchens and bathrooms such that those with any mobility impairment or any other handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. §3602(h) and Va. Code Ann. § 36-96.1:1, can maneuver about the space. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) and Va. Code Ann. 36-96.3(B)(iii).

Congress’ establishment of a very broad zone of interest to fulfill the FHA’s remedial purpose is clear from the operative provisions of the statute itself. The FHA defines an “aggrieved person” as “any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. §3602(i) (emphasis added). Congress broadly defined a “discriminatory housing practice” as “an act that is unlawful under section 3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. §3602(f). As an aggrieved person, Cook County is explicitly authorized to seek a broad range of remedies including actual and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief, including for injuries from BOA’s discriminatory housing practices that have occurred or are “about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. §3613(a) & (c). Plaintiff also has alleged proximate causation sufficient to defeat BOA’s standing argument.

Congress broadly defined a “discriminatory housing practice” as “an act that is unlawful under section 3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. §3602(f). And in Trafficante, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs need not have been the direct target of discrimination to have standing under the FHA.

tions applicable to the Fair Housing Act component of HUD’s investigation—such as his allegation that HUD should not have closed the investigation upon 1600 Pacific’s withdrawal of its complaint, or should have issued a “charge of discrimination” and referred the matter to the Department of Justice—these do not support any legal cause of action either, and are committed to HUD’s enforcement discretion. 1. MacKenzie does not state any claim for relief with his allegations that HUD’s activities under Title VI, Section 504, and Section 109 failed to comply with the Fair Housing Act, because these are separate statutes with different procedures. MacKenzie’s second amended complaint recognizes that HUD’s investigation of the City of Dallas actually consisted of four separate administrative matters, one for each which, in turn, is defined as an act made unlawful under sections 3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617 of the Fair Housing Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f). MacKenzie does not allege any unlawful acts under sections 3604, 3605, or 3606 (e.g., by alleging that he was refused some opportunity to sell or rent real estate on the basis of race). MacKenzie does claim that section 3617 was violated. (Doc. 85-1, ¶¶ 11, 18, 23.) However, section 3617 is limited to interference with rights granted by the other sections of the Fair Housing Act. Therefore, because MacKenzie does not assert any violations under those sections, MacKenzie has not pleaded facts showing himself to be an aggrieved person. Case 3:15-cv-00752-D Document 89 Filed 08/09/16 Page 19 of 26 PageID 1082 HUD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint – Page 15 of the four statutes that 1600 Pacific claimed the city had violated: the Fair Housing Act, Title VI, Section 504, and Section 109. (Doc. 85-1, ¶¶ 3, 24.) MacKenzie also recognizes that

Congress broadly defined a “discriminatory housing practice” as “an act that is unlawful under section 3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. §3602(f). Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that it is an “aggrieved person” under the FHA.

Case 4:07-cv-03255-SBA Document 60 Filed 12/21/2007 Page 22 of 29 S T E E F E L , L E V IT T & W E IS S A P R O F E S S IO N A L C O R P O R A T IO N O N E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , 3 0 T H F L O O R · S A N F R A N C IS C O , C A 9 4 1 1 1 -3 7 1 9 T e le p h o n e : (4 1 5 ) 7 8 8 -0 9 0 0 · F a c si m il e : (4 1 5 ) 7 8 8 -2 0 1 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DEFENDANT HIGHPOINTE VILLAGE’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (Case No. C07-3255 (SBA)) 21485:6629624.7 18 persons” as defined by the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(l) FAC at ¶ 85 (RJN, Exh. A).

(comparing 8 The Fair Housing Act is one example. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). The State Human Rights Law is another, at least as to common areas.

Thus, Plaintiff is disabled or handicapped within the meaning of the FHAA. 42 USC § 3602. Bone v. Vill.

On the injury issue, the Eleventh Circuit held, inter alia, that a FHA plaintiff needs to satisfy only the minimum Article III injury test to bring suit, and that even if courts would apply a “zone of interest” test to the FHA, the FHA’s “zone” is no narrower than that of Article III. Miami, 800 F.3d at 1278. The decision says Case 1:15-cv-04081-LMM Document 25 Filed 03/04/16 Page 2 of 19 2 absolutely nothing about whether cities satisfy the separately codified definition of “Person[s]” who can sue under the FHA (see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d))—that issue and FHA section were never raised or even cited in the Miami litigation by any party or court at either the trial or appellate level. Miami is irrelevant to this issue for a further reason because the Counties are simply incorrect where they argue that Florida law treats cities and counties interchangeably, and therefore allowing a Florida city to sue under the FHA allows a Georgia county to sue as well.

. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (emphasis added). As such, familial status does not include marital status and also does not include two adult individuals, like Ms. Russick and Mr. Gay, residing together.