Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County v. Litchfield Historic District Commission, 768 F.2d 183, 198 (2nd Cir. 2014)(prohibiting discrimination "on the basis of religion or religious denomination"). On the Equal Terms claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) provides that "no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution." To establish a prima facie Equal Terms claim, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that 1) it is a religious Case 1:16-cv-00395-CG-MU Document 100 Filed 11/13/17 Page 52 of 71 30791195 v2 53 assembly or institution, 2) subject to a land use regulation, that 3) treats it on less than equal terms, 4) with a nonreligious assembly or institution.

Again, Defendant has failed to address this element of Plaintiffs’ claims and therefore for the reasons stated above and in their Motion, Plaintiffs, and not the City, are entitled to summary judgment on Counts II and V of their Complaint. B. RLUIPA’s “Equal Terms” Provision (Count III) With respect to Defendant’s arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ Equal Terms claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1), the City again ignores the existence of similarly situated nonreligious assembly and institutional land uses that support Plaintiffs’ claim. See generally PM at 23-24, 28, 49-50 (arguments incorporated herein).

The RLUIPA statute itself, which provides relief from the Case 1:16-cv-00395-CG-MU Document 90 Filed 10/16/17 Page 47 of 49 48 30565570 v1 imposition or implementation of a “land use regulation,” defines “land use regulation” as “the application of such law, that limits restricts a claimant’s use or development of land [ ], if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or contract or option to acquire such interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), 2000cc-5. TMAA therefore does not come within the terms of the statute as TMAA was not a claimant with any of the aforementioned ownership or leasehold interests when the application was submitted, denied, and appealed.

803 (2000), creates three sorts of claims for religious land users: “substantial burden” claims, “equal terms” claims, and “nondiscrimination” claims. Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(a) with 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(2). The distinction RLUIPA makes between nondiscrimination claims and substantial burden claims erases any doubt that RFRA—which uses substantially identical language to RLUIPA’s substantial burden provisions—targets burdens rather than intentional discrimination.

Even if such a burden exists, the intrusion is excused if the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden: “(A) is in Case 3:11-cv-00313 Document 169 Filed in TXSD on 11/21/14 Page 12 of 29 9 furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 1.

With particular reference to Plaintiff’s individual claims, and considering the factual dissimilarity of the Society and the Plaintiff, the Subpoena seeks no relevant information. Plaintiff’s First and Second Claims for Relief allege violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C §2000cc, et. seq. (“RLUIPA”); these claims do not involve a comparison of Plaintiff’s operations with those of the Society.

The ARFA does not violate the Establishment Clause, and there is no reason to heed Defendant’s call to change the text of the State Constitution. Defendant’s argument regarding ARFA is nearly identical to constitutional challenges unsuccessfully levied against the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We turn to Surfside’s contention that RLUIPA impermissibly elevates religious in a manner contravening the Establishment Clause.”), as well as the United States Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005). 5. Defendant further states that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) was struck down by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and implies Case 1:16-cv-00395-CG-MU Document 109 Filed 12/11/17 Page 2 of 6 3 that this was done on First Amendment grounds.

Under RLUIPA, the Defendant has an independent burden to establish that it used the least restrictive Case 1:16-cv-00395-CG-MU Document 59 Filed 06/08/17 Page 5 of 15 6 means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Plaintiffs seek to ascertain which documents the Defendant might use to meet that burden.

................................................................................ 16 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ................................................................................... 17 Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................ 2 Regulations 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) ............................................................................... 17 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) ............................................................................... 17 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b) ............................................................................ 9 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) .......................................................................... 12, 13 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) ................................................................................ 12 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 ....................................................................... 2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 ................................................................... 14 2:12-cv-11656-AC-LJM Doc # 31 Filed 01/18/13 Pg 10 of 29 Pg ID 202 1 INTRODUCTION After being granted leave to amend their complaint while a motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiffs have filed an amended complaint that contains the same fatal flaws as their original one. Again, Plaintiffs repeat their allegations that they have been frequently stopped, questioned, and detained at the United States border, but they offer no factual support for their conclusion that these actions were discriminatory, much less that any government official actually prevented them from practicing their Islamic faith.

.......... 9 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 14 2:12-cv-11656-AC-LJM Doc # 14 Filed 09/14/12 Pg 8 of 27 Pg ID 58 vi Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) .................................................................................................................. 14 Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................. 2 Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb ................................................................................................................... 1, 14 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 ............................................................................................................... 7, 10 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 ................................................................................................................... 10 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 ................................................................................................. 12 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 ............................................................................................................................ 10 2:12-cv-11656-AC-LJM Doc # 14 Filed 09/14/12