However, the Little court found it important to note that the range of the exception was broadened when amended in 1972 to cover the religious employer’s non-religious activities as follows: This Subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1. The Court also found it instructive that Title VII contained another, similar exception applicable to religious educational organizations which provides that: it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such [institution] is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular 10 religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such [institution] is directed towards the propagation of a particular religion.

483 U.S. at 339. Here, the religious employer exemption “is neutral on its face,” id.: like the § 702 exemption, which refers broadly to “religious corporation[s]” and other associated entities, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, the religious employer exemption applies to all churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or associations of churches, and the exclusively religious activities of any religious order, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (cross-referencing 26 U.S.C. §§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii)).9 And like the § 702 exemption, the religious employer exemption is “motivated by a . . . 9 By contrast, the law that the Seventh Circuit struck down in Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk permitted marriages to be solemnized by officials of certain religions but not by those of others.

483 U.S. at 339. Here, the religious employer exemption “is neutral on its face,” id.: like the § 702 exemption, which refers broadly to “religious corporation[s]” and other associated entities, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, the religious employer exemption applies to all churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or associations of churches, and the exclusively religious activities of any religious order, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (cross-referencing 26 U.S.C. §§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii)).9 And like the § 702 exemption, the religious employer exemption is “motivated by a . . . 9 By contrast, the law that the Seventh Circuit struck down in Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk permitted marriages to be solemnized by officials of certain religions but not by those of others.

Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 763, 810 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (even assuming the effect of EEOC’s 1 Far from being intended to infringe upon religion, Title VII protects the convictions of religious institutions by allowing them to restrict employment to those of their own faith. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a). 16 2:14-cv-13710-SFC-DRG Doc # 51 Filed 04/07/16 Pg 30 of 50 Pg ID 620 investigation and litigation were to force conformance to Title VII’s strictures against using religious criteria to make employment decisions, such would not “substantially burden” owner’s religious beliefs or practices).

69 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)(1). 71 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986); see also Benton v. Kroger Co., 640 F.Supp. 1317, 1321-1322 (S.D.Tex.1986) (citing Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 270 (5th Cir.1984)).

Maintenance Industries, Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 796 (8th Cir. 2009); Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(3) (adopting the four factor test in the Title VII context); EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 2: Threshold Issues, No. 915.003, at 44-47.

: DEFENDANT CITY OF PHILADELPHIA’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Defendant City of Philadelphia submits this Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges claims of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and hostile work environment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 et seq. Plaintiff’s claims fail because: (1) regarding Plaintiff’s claims of race and sex discrimination, Plaintiff fails to plead facts to show he suffered discrimination or that his rejection during probation could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination, and (2) regarding Plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment, Plaintiff fails to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Mr. Williams alleges that his employer subjected him to a hostile work environment and retaliated against him for engaging in protected EEO activities. He brings claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, et seq (“Title VII”). See generally Complaint and Amended Complaint, Dkt.

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT John McHugh, Secretary of the Department of the Army, (“Army” or “Defendant”), by and through the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia, and the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I. INTRODUCTION Mr. James King (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Mr. King”) filed his original Complaint on December 20, 2012, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 et seq., and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPPA”), 42 U.S.C, § 1320d-9. (Doc.

Therefore, all further references to the “Proposed Second Amended Complaint” will refer to the updated version entered at Docket No. 111. 2 Case 3:12-cv-00388 Document 116 Filed 04/09/13 Page 2 of 12 PageID #: 2149 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq. (“Title VII”), for intentional discrimination and disparate treatment (see Proposed Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 115-124 (Title VII intentional discrimination) and 125-131 (Title VII disparate treatment)); (2) it adds an additional named plaintiff, Aaron Payne, who participated in a June 28, 2012 casting call for The Bachelor in Baltimore, Maryland (¶¶ 18-20 and 87-91); (3) it removes or amends various allegations on which the court previously relied in dismissing the First Amended Complaint3; (4) changes the forms of relief requested, particularly as to injunctive relief (see, e.g., id.