Outcome on Appeal : Affirmed [plaintiff]. Grounds : District court did not err in granting to plaintiff judgment as a matter of law on defense under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) that employee - an assistant city attorney - was not an "immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." Looking principally to responsibility and powers inherent in position, trial record established that individuals at plaintiff's level were hired by chief administrative officer rather than mayor.

accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice without undue hardship on the conduct of USPS’s business.See42 U. S. C. §2000e(j) (defining “religion” under Title VII).The federal district court granted summary judgment to, and ruled in favor of USPS. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, basing its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion ofTrans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 84 (1977) and finding that “undue hardship,” as used in Title VII, meant “that requiring an employer ‘to bear more than ade minimiscost’ to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.” 35 F. 4th 162, 174, n. 18;see also29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e) (“An employer may assert undue hardship to justify a refusal to accommodate an employee’s need to be absent from his or her scheduled duty hoursif the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would require ‘more than ade minimiscost’”) (emphasis added).The U.S. Supreme Court granted Mr. Groff’s petition for writ of certiorari.Issue.Under 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j), is an “undue hardship” established when an employer shows that it bears more than ade minimiscost to provide a religious accommodation, or is a higher burden required for an employer to lawfully refuse to accommodate a religious belief of an employee?Primary Holding.“Undue hardship,” as used in 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j), is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business. “More than ade minimiscost” does not suffice to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII.Key Points of LawTitle VII.Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or terminate any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual, because of the individual’srace, color,religion, sex, or national origin.See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VIIapplies to, among other classes of employers, private-sector employers with 15 or more employees.Religion.The term “religion,” as used in Title VII,“includes all aspects of religious observ

Grounds: Adopting holdings of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits (and, by implication, the Seventh Circuit), panel holds that the "current" calendar year under § 1981a(b)(3) is the year when the discriminatory acts occur. This lines up with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), which defines an "employer" under Title VII as a person with fifteen or more employees "in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." The panel observes that "[t]he fact that Congress used the same terminology in the 1991 amendments as in § 2000e(b) makes it quite likely, under normal canons of statutory interpretation, that it intended to adopt the year of discrimination as the 'current' year in § 1981a(b)(3)."

Therefore, the only question is whether an employment agency's failure to refer an applicant may constitute an 'adverse employment action.'"But the case founders on a more basic point -- a failure to prove that a position existed that Suliman was qualified to fill:"On these facts, we need not decide whether an employment agency's failure to refer a plaintiff for employment qualifies as an 'adverse employment' action to resolve this case. The EEOC has failed to show that Nahan had an available position to which Kelly could actually refer Suliman when she applied for available temporary work through Kelly."It also holds that the employment agency was not obliged to prove that an accommodation (under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)) would place an "undue burden" on the host employer:"But, in the present case, the EEOC sued Kelly in its capacity as an 'employment agency,' not an 'employer,' and nothing in § 2000e(j) suggests that an 'employment agency,' in defending itself against a claim of religious discrimination, must demonstrate that the employer to which it would be referring the temporary worker would suffer an undue hardship if it had to accommodate that worker."Finally, it holds that there was no evidence of discrimination by Kelly, because it had a valid, non-discriminatory reason for not making the referral:"Here, Kelly's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not referring Suliman to Nahan was Nahan's facially neutral, safety-driven dress policy prohibiting all employees-permanent and temporary-from wearing loose clothing or headwear of any kind. Kelly's understanding that Nahan would not permit temporary workers to wear any type of headwear, including khimars, was well established.

Petitioner Gerald Groff, an Evangelical Christian who observed the Sunday Sabbath, worked as a letter carrier for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). Groff objected to delivering packages on Sunday. Although USPS endeavored to make other arrangements by assigning Sunday deliveries to other letter carriers, this accommodation resulted in scheduling conflicts, increased overtime expenses and resentment among employees for having to cover Sunday shifts. Groff was progressively disciplined for his unwillingness to perform his Sunday assignments and ultimately resigned. Groff subsequently sued his former employer under Title VII, asserting that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice without undue hardship on the conduct of its business.Title VII requires employers to “reasonably accommodate . . . an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice” unless the employer is “unable” to do so “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Prior to Groff, federal courts interpreted the Supreme Court’s 1977 Trans World Airlines v. Hardison decision to have established a de minimis hardship standard for denying religious accommodation requests under Title VII. Following Hardison, employers were not required to grant an employee’s accommodation if doing so would impose a minimal burden on their business. Groff significantly raises the bar for such rejections, requiring employers to show that the accommodation “would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of [the employer’s] particular business.” 600 U.S. __, __ (2023) (slip op., at 18).Religious belief is broadly defined under Title VII, which views “religion” as including “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interprets religious practices “to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with

ation with future EEOC guidance surely to follow the Groff case decision (and which the SCOTUS specifically invited).Although federal contractors may typically think of disability accommodations when one mentions reasonable required accommodations, contractors should take note of this new decision because the substantive compliance standards required under Executive Order 11246 generally follow those required under Title VII. (See41 CFR §60-50.3for OFCCP’s Rule on “Accommodations to religious observance and practice.” Also see our story from October 2020: “OFCCP Reminded Contractors To Grant Religious Accommodations.”)BackgroundCongress amended Title VII in 1972 to track the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) regulatory language and to clarify that employers must reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice unless the employer is “unable” to do so “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business” (42 USC §2000e(j)).What Happened in this Case?In Groff, the Court revived a lawsuit by an evangelical Christian former mail carrier accusing the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) of violating Title VII when it disciplined him for refusing to work on his sabbaths (Sundays). A federal trial court dismissed his claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Philadelphia) affirmed that dismissal.The trial court had found that Groff’s Sunday absences placed an “undue hardship” on his co-workers and the USPS. Sometimes, the USPS could successfully accommodate the worker by facilitating shift swaps, but that was not always possible. Moreover, Mr. Groff’s absences caused tension among other mail carriers who had to cover his shifts, the USPS asserted. The USPS relatedly disciplined Groff until he eventually resigned in 2019.The Third Circuit’s decision relied directly on the SCOTUS’ landmark 1977 decision in TWA v. Hardison (432 U.S. 63). SCOTUS decided Hardison almost 50 years ago on the basis of very

against religious discrimination. On June 29, 2023, a unanimous Supreme Court agreed.In Groff v. DeJoy—a case involving an employee who was denied a religious accommodation of not working on Sundays because it “imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workflow, and diminished employee morale”—the Supreme Court stated that “the de minimis reading of Hardison is a mistake,” and held that Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in “substantial increased costs” in relation to the conduct of its particular business.The Court anchored its analysis to the plain language of Title VII. When originally enacted, Title VII made it unlawful for employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (1964). After courts questioned whether requiring employers to accommodate certain religious practices would violate the Establishment Clause, Congress amended Title VII to clarify that employers must “reasonably accommodate . . . an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice” unless the employer is “unable” to do so “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. at § 2000e(j) (1972).Turning to the plain meaning of the term “undue hardship,” the Court explained that a “hardship” is commonly defined, at a minimum, as “something hard to bear”—and, by any definition, is something “more severe than a mere burden.” Meanwhile, something de minimis is, by definition, “something very small or trifling.” Against this definitional backdrop, the Court found that a de minimis cost test cannot be reconciled with Title VII’s requirements:So even if Title VII said only that an employer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not

Pregnant Employees Were Denied Accommodations and Required to Submit to Unnecessary Medical ExaminationsCHICAGO – Symphony Deerbrook, LLC will pay $400,000 and furnish other relief to settle a pregnancy discrimination lawsuit brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) over conduct at its Symphony of Joliet facility, the federal agency announced today.In its lawsuit, the EEOC charged that Symphony, a skilled nursing and rehabilitation facility, imple­mented a policy requiring employees to inform the company of any pregnancy and to obtain a note from their doctor releasing them to work without restrictions. The EEOC also alleged that Symphony denied employees with pregnancy-related restrictions reasonable accommodations and terminated them though other employees with similar restrictions were provided accommodations.Such conduct violates The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(K) and 2000e-(2)(a)(1), which prohibits employers from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and requires that employers treat pregnant employees the same as other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Such conduct also violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C)(4)(a), which prohibits employee medical examinations that are not job related or consistent with business necessity. The EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 21cv02978, after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process.The consent decree settling the suit requires Symphony to pay $400,000, which will be distributed among 11 affected employees. The two-and-a-half-year decree enjoins Symphony from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in the future, including denying pregnant workers job modifications available to other similar employees and requiring pregnant employees to obtain do

Plaintiffs further alleged that Defendants employed a uniform, companywide policy regarding how to prioritize candidates for open onsite positions, gave first consideration for open positions to visa-ready Indian candidates, and only considered local United States candidates if no visa-ready Indian candidates were available.Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendants on March 7, 2019, alleging three claims, including: (1) disparate treatment on the basis of race and citizenship in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) disparate treatment on the basis of race and national origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; and (3) disparate impact on the basis of race and national origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Id. at *5.Plaintiffs moved for class certification, seeking to represent a class comprised of, “[a]ll individuals who are not of South Asian race, or Indian national origin, or visa holders who applied for positions with (or within) HCL in the U.S. and were not hired.”

Flowers v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 14-11498 (11th Cir. Oct. 16, 2015)Short:In Flowers v. Troup Cnty. Sch. Dist., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of the School District regarding a former employee’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., asserting racial discrimination. The Court noted that though the employee produced sufficient evidence for a jury to infer unfair treatment, he was unable to produce evidence to show the treatment was racially motivated.