Under the amended act, "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." (42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m), emphasis added). As the majority in Nassar summarizes, under this standard "[i]t suffices . . . to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer's motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer's decision."

Id. at 4. First, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), it is unlawful to refuse to hire, to discharge, or to discriminate against individuals with respect to compensation or other terms of employment on the basis of race. Id.

ent for employment preferences; Understand that tribal governments may seek to include a specific tribal affiliation preference in future contracts; Determine, where possible, whether the preference can fairly be read to stem from a federal interest in promoting tribal self-government; Continue monitoring legal developments in this area because EEOC may seek to have the panel's opinion reviewed en banc or may appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court; and Consult counsel regarding any EEOC, state, or local agency charges of national origin discrimination that employees may file.1 --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 4783087 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014).2 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a, 396e.3In his deposition during the District Court proceedings, former Secretary of the Interior Stewart Lee Udall stated that the hiring preferences were included in the leases based on trust obligations the U.S. government has to the Nation. EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150091, *8-9 (D.Ariz. Oct. 18, 2012).4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i). Similarly, tribal governments are exempt from the definition of "employer" under Title VII.

l does not ask job applicants or employees questions that are likely to elicit information about a disability or seek information about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health, unless such inquiries are related to a request for reasonable accommodation.AI and Title VII Disparate Impact DiscriminationOn May 18, 2023, the EEOC released technical guidance entitled, “Assessing Adverse Impact in Software, Algorithms, and Artificial Intelligence Used in Employment Selection Procedures Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov/select-issues-assessing-adverse-impact-software-algorithms-and-artificial-intelligence-used (last visited Aug. 3, 2023). According to the guidance, selection procedures, including the use of these tools, should be evaluated under Title VII and, specifically, the disparate impact theory. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Disparate impact occurs when a neutral test or selection procedure disproportionately excludes individuals with a protected characteristic, and the test or selection procedure is not “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2), (k).Under Title VII, disparate impact occurs when an employer: (1) uses a selection procedure that has a disparate impact on a protected characteristic; (2) cannot establish that the selection procedure is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; and (3) has a less discriminatory alternative procedure available. Id. at § 2000e-2(k). The EEOC relies upon the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Guidelines) under Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1607. These Guidelines provide support for employers to determine if their tests and selection procedures are lawful under Title VII. Id. Applying the Guidelines to the tools, employers can be held responsible unde

Id., p. 15. The district court began its analysis by considering 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which states that is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of the individual’s sex, and then the definition of discriminate (“to make distinctions on the basis of a class or category without regard to individual merit.”). Id., p. 16.

Id., p. 15. The district court began its analysis by considering 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which states that is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of the individual’s sex, and then the definition of discriminate (“to make distinctions on the basis of a class or category without regard to individual merit.”). Id., p. 16.

[1] In so ruling, the Supreme Court narrowed and clarified the definition of "supervisor" and rejected the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) broad definition of "supervisor."[2] In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court held that Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to the traditional principles of "but-for" causation and not the lessened causation test stated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).[3] The heightened standard requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.

Alternatively, the timing of her action would be protected by the doctrine of equitable estoppel: "By telling the plaintiff to stop inquiring about openings for drivers, because she would be notified of such openings without having to call Local 727's business agent, the agent, on the approach taken by the district judge, placed her in an impossible position: she could infuriate him by continuing to call him to inquire about openings and emphasize her interest in them; she could sue the local prematurely for discrimination (because she didn't at that time know that the Division had an ironclad policy against referring women); or she could simply forgo any remedy under Title VII." The district court also erred in holding that a union's failure to refer cannot violate Title VII, because act makes it unlawful for a union to "fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual" because of the individual's sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2). Court notes its agreement with a decades-long line of cases that applicants may bring Title VII actions for failure to refer or hire even without filing formal applications for every position, provided that they did "everything reasonably possible to make known ... their interest in applying for a job."

and because the jury charge only contained the "sole" cause language, the employee's substantive rights were misstated and a new trial had to be granted. Court does not decide who bears burden of proof, whether McDonnell Douglas method of proof applies or whether 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies.Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 103 FEP 276 (5th Cir. 2008). Panel: WIENER, Benavides, Prado. Claims on Appeal: § 1983 retaliation.

no “religious corporation” employer was involved in Bostock, and the Court recognized as much in conclusion: “So while other employers in other cases may raise free exercise arguments that merit careful consideration, none of the employers before us today represent in this Court that compliance with Title VII will infringe their own religious liberties in any way.” Id. (emphasis added).The Supreme Court has not addressed the “other employers in other cases” that the Court alluded to in Bostock. Those cases, to the extent they exist, remain in lower courts, and the scope of religious freedom pursuant to section 2000e-1(a) of Title VII remains unsettled.Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Exceptions for Religious OrganizationsTitle VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or terminate any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual, because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII applies to, among other classes of employers, private-sector employers with 15 or more employees.The term “religion,” as used in Title VII, “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. at § 2000e(j).Title VII contains exemptions applicable to religious organizations:[Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions] . . . shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the ca