Torres v. Gianni Furniture Co., 1986 WL 6407, *1 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1986) (dismissing § 1981 claim as not alleging race discrimination where the plaintiff alleged that he “is a Cuban- American and as such is a member of a distinct minority.”).

For the reasons stated herein, the court finds as follows: • The Motion to Dismiss will be granted and this case will be dismissed with 16The plaintiffs’ lone claim under § 1981 implicates federal law – largely United States Supreme Court precedent – that applies equally in the proposed transferee court (the federal district court for the Central District of California). Likely for this reason, the thrust of the defendants’ argument in favor of transfer related to the convenience of the parties and witnesses, considerations that are not affected by the court’s disposition of this matter at the pleadings stage. Indeed, neither party raised any objection to this court’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss before considering the Motion to Transfer Venue.

See, e.g., De La Pena v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 953 F. Supp. 2d 393, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing at the pleading stage plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under Section 1981 and Title VII where plaintiff’s Case 5:16-cv-05782-EGS Document 5-1 Filed 11/15/16 Page 24 of 31 18 DM2\7253965.6 allegation of a single incident of physical contact involving being touched on the shoulder and pushed into a desk, where plaintiff did not allege that such contact caused injury or required medical attention, was not “severe”)

Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 268 (3d Cir. 2001); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1990); Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). Individuals may be held personally liable if they intentionally caused the employer-entity to infringe upon a plaintiff's Section 1981 rights or if they authorize, direct, or participate in the alleged discriminatory conduct. Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 518.

. IV. CONCLUSION For all of the above reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court (i) dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ individual and class Title VII claims (Counts Two and Three); (ii) dismiss or strike Plaintiffs’ individual and class Section 1981 claims (Count One) for alleged discrimination that occurred outside the statute of limitations period(s); (iii) dismiss or strike Plaintiffs’ individual and class Section 1981 disparate impact claims (Count One); and (iv) dismiss or strike Plaintiffs’ class claims (Counts One and Three), or in the alternative, order Plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement of the class definition and their individual and class claims (Counts One, Two, and Three). Respectfully submitted, this 7th day of February, 2017. /s/ Leslie A. Dent

10. The RICHR failed to act upon the Plaintiffs charge of discrimination within sixty (60) days of the filing of the charge and thus the Plaintiffs CRPD claim is properly before this Court pursuant to R.I.G.L. §42-87-4(b). 11. There is no requirement under 42 U.S.C. §1981, the RICRA, the FMLA, and the RIPFMLA relative to the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

5 Defendants also noted in their moving brief that to the extent plaintiff is alleging a retaliation claim under Section 1981, such claim must fail for similar reasons. Plaintiff’s opposition does not contest the fact that he cannot establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under Section 1981 and, accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss any retaliation claim under Section 1981 should be treated as unopposed. Case 2:14-cv-06820-ES-MAH Document 53 Filed 01/26/17 Page 10 of 14 PageID: 367 -7- .

Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Counts III and IV) should be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot sue state actors for discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981. Finally, should this Court decide not to dismiss Counts III and VI for reasons argued in Sections I and II of this Motion, this Court should dismiss Count IV because 42 U.S.C. §1981 does not afford Plaintiff’s the right to make a “Disparate Impact” claim. [Signature on Next Page] Case 2:16-cv-04579-CDJ Document 5 Filed 10/11/16 Page 7 of 9 8 Respectfully Submitted, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT Date: October 11, 2016 BY: s/ Frank E. Wehr II Frank E. Wehr II Assistant City Solicitor Pa. Attorney ID No. 318464 City of Philadelphia Law Dept. 1515 Arch St., 16th Fl. Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 683-5183 Case 2:16-cv-04579-CDJ Document 5 Filed 10/11/16 Page 8 of 9 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA JOSEPH P. DOUGHERTY, : : Plaintiff, : : v. : Civil Action No. 16-4579 : CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., : : Defendants.

Plaintiff Haney has no claims based on posted positions. He alleges: (1) a Title VII and Section 1981 claim based on unposted positions; and (2) violations of Title VII, Section 1981, and FEHA in connection with his alleged failure to be placed in special assignments. 4AC ¶¶ 178 (24:16-26:3), 181 (27:8-32:15), 549-57, 614-39; 6/27 Order, Dkt. 110. Plaintiff Hartsfield alleges: (1) Title VII and Section 1981 claims based on posted positions and unposted positions; and (2) Title VII, Section 1981, and FEHA claims based on special assignments. 4AC ¶¶ 178 (24:16-26:3), 181 (27:8-32:15), 561-68, 614-39; 6/27 Order, Dkt. 110. Plaintiff, Haynie brings a claim for harassment under Title VII in addition to his claims for failure to promote or place him in special assignments.

Defendants arguments in support of their motions to dismiss Plaintiff Boyd’s § 1981 failure to promote claim are valid, legally and equitably. The motions should be denied and Defendants should be estopped from arguing that anything other than a four-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s § 1981 failure to promote claim. 12 Case 2:11-cv-00748-MHT-SRW