28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (Section 504 requires that “an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers . . . . to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee’s program or benefit may have to be made”).

See Order on Motions to Dismiss [#61] at page 13, note 2. For these reasons, plaintiff’s third claim for relief against NFBC for violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12138 is groundless, baseless, and must be dismissed with prejudice with judgment entered in defendant’s favor. C. Rehabilitation Act Claim Fails Plaintiff’s third claim against NFBC is for violation of 29 U.S.C. §701, et.

THEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiffs on their First Claim for Relief (Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.), Second Claim for Relief (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.), and Third Claim for Relief (California Government Code § 11135); 2. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint may be amended pursuant to Rule 15(b) to conform to proof, and Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiffs on their due process claim; 3.

60 Case 1:13-cv-03089-WMN Document 106 Filed 04/11/16 Page 72 of 87 C. The Deputies Failed to Accommodate Mr. Saylor’s Disability Throughout Their Encounter with Him The requirement that a public entity must reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities “derives from the statute’s reference to ‘reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services.’” Paulone, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)). The regulations interpreting Title II “further elucidate the requirement of reasonable accommodations,” stating that “a public entity must ‘make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.

II. Plaintiff Has Stated a Valid Claim for Which Relief Can Be Granted Plaintiff alleged in her First Amended Complaint that she suffers from a “diagnosed and qualifying invisible disability” which limits her major life activities of thinking, talking, concentrating, hearing, retrieving information, etc. as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Doc. No. 14, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, PageID.

See Anderson v. DSM N.V., 589 F.Supp.2d 528, 535 (D.N.J.2008) (defendants were private corporations and thus did not come within Title II's “concerns [about] the activities of public entities” ) (emphasis in original)); Phillips v. Perkiomen Crossing Homeowners Ass'n, No. 95–CV–1535, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14375, at *2–3 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 29, 1995) (home owners' association not a public entity as defined by the ADA because there was “no evidence that [it was] affiliated with state or local government in such a way as to fall under Section 12131”). Because it appears that Defendant is a private organization and is not an agency of state or local government, and Plaintiff has not articulated the basis on which it contends the contrary, this Court finds that Defendant is not a public entity as defined by the ADA and thus not covered by Title II of the ADA.

II. Plaintiff Has Stated a Valid Claim for Which Relief Can Be Granted Plaintiff alleged in her Second Amended Complaint that she suffers from a “diagnosed and qualifying invisible disability” which limits her major life activities of thinking, talking, concentrating, hearing, retrieving information, etc. as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Doc. No. 57, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, PageID.

There is no question that Defendants are subject to the ADA, the RA, and parallel state and city laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (defining “public entity” as a state or local government department, agency, or instrumentalities); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1) (noting that defendants are “recipient[s]” of “federal financial assistance”); New York City Human Rights Law, Ch. 1, § 8- 4 Each plaintiff, clearly disabled under the ADA, also has a disability within the meaning of state and city laws barring disability discrimination, which define “disability” more broadly. Lovely H., 235 F.R.D. at 259.

Case 2:09-cv-00287-CBM-RZ Document 129 Filed 01/14/11 Page 9 of 32 Page ID #:2482 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CALIF, et al., v. City and County of Los Angeles, Case No.: CV 09-0287 CBM (RZx) PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF CONTENTIONS OF FACT AND LAW 4 D IS A B IL IT Y R IG H TS A D V O C A TE S 20 01 C EN TE R ST R EE T, FO U R TH FL O O R B ER K EL EY ,C A LI FO R N IA 9 47 04 -1 20 4 provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C.§12131(2). “Disability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.”

See 42 U.S.C. ~ 12131, et seq. "Public entity is defined in the ADA as: (A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 502(8) of Title 45) . [42 U.S.C. § 12131.] This section clearly does not include individuals.