Filed April 21, 2016
To the contrary, Congress found that people with disabilities have been subjected to systematic discrimination in a broad range of public services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). Title II’s application to public transportation, thus, is part of a broader remedy to a constitutional problem that is greater than the sum of its parts.
Filed May 30, 2017
20 B. There Are No Safeguards Adequate to Protect People with Disabilities from Assisted Suicide 1. Limiting Assisted Suicide to Terminally Ill Persons Will Fail to Protect Nonterminal People with Disabilities Given the "history of purposeful unequal treatment" to which people with disabilities are subjected, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(7), assisted-suicide "safeguards" cannot prevent abuse against people with nonterminal disabilities. History demonstrates that assisted suicide has not and will not be limited to terminally ill persons.
Filed September 5, 2012
This case directly implicates the United States’ interest in enforcing titles III and V of the ADA to ensure the “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” envisioned by Congress. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). Currently, virtually every person who wants to attend a law school in America must take the LSAT, and, as a practical matter, an applicant’s LSAT score may be dispositive as to whether and where they are admitted, what scholarships they are eligible for, and even what summer jobs or internships they can obtain.
Filed March 30, 2017
“Title II and the ADA more broadly were motivated in part by Congress’ finding that, in addition to ‘outright intentional exclusion,’ individuals with disabilities also suffer from indirect forms of discrimination, such as ‘the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers.’” Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 909 (6th Cir. 2004), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). “Thus, to ensure that the individual is not denied the benefits of the public service, the public entity must remove the architectural barrier of its own creation.”
Filed January 9, 2017
Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim against Avon under the FMLA and all such claims should be dismissed with prejudice. B. Plaintiff has Failed to State a Claim For Relief Against Avon Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101, (“ADA”), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) Similar to her claims against Avon under the FMLA, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Avon under the ADA upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she is entitled to damages against Avon under the ADA based on the theory that Avon terminated her employment because of her actual or perceived disability and/or in retaliation for her requesting a reasonable accommodation.
Filed June 10, 2010
) FN3. As onedistrict court has explained: The ADAinitially was enacted as Public Law 101-336 and was organized into Titles I through V. When the ADA wascodified as 42 U S.C. § 12101, et seq., the "Titles" were re-labeled as "Subchapters." Titles I, H, and HI became SubchaptersI, II, and HI, Tespectively, and Title V became Subchapter IV. Page 2 Van Hulle v. Pacific Telesis Corp., 124 F.Supp.2d 642, 643 n. 2 (N.D.Cal.2000).
Filed June 12, 2006
The purpose of the ADA, as stated in the statute itself, was: (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; … (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority…in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §12101(b) (“Purpose”) (emphasis added). Congress’s stated goal in enacting the ADA was to extend broad civil rights protections to people with disabilities, thus eliminating the need for further legislation in this area.
Filed October 31, 2016
The ADA seeks to protect individuals with disabilities from discrimination by employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). Creasy bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), by a preponderance of the evidence.
Filed June 25, 2015
i. Plaintiffs Have Properly Alleged the Elements of a Claim Under Title III. Consistent with the ADA’s “clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), Title III directs that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a) (parallel regulations).
Filed June 29, 2012
49 Congress imposed the institutional obligation to afford equal opportunity on, among others, public and private educational institutions and, in doing so, recognized that as technology advanced, new opportunities for equal access could develop.50 At the same time, the ADA is not a blank check, requiring institutions to act in ways that are unduly burdensome. Thus, before the HathiTrust institutions found a mechanism and a partner with the technology to create a digital archive of library collections, academia had not offered the blind the opportunity afforded others: to have full access to the trove of knowledge that has been committed to print over human history, and to readily search and retrieve from that vast array of books the specific titles that may allow the blind knowledge-seeker to advance his own understanding and perhaps even the 47 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). 48 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 60 (1989) (emphasis added).