Accordingly, the proposed Consent Decree is clearly reasonable. The comprehensive and expeditious recovery of costs adequately compensates the public, and the Settlements reflect the relative strengths of the parties’ litigation Case 1:02-cv-03858-AMD Document 7 Filed 03/25/2003 Page 21 of 25 13 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a); Cannons, 899 F.2d at 90; United States v. Hooker Chem., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 696. 14 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982).

10 responsibility for the Site were classified as the Settling Performing Defendants and have agreed to be jointly and severally responsible implementing the OU 1 remedial action and the payment of response costs. Those whose allocations did not exceed 1¼ percent of the total amount of hazardous substances contributed to the Site, and were considered to have met the requirements for de minimis parties under CERCLA Section 122(g)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A), were classified as Settling Non-Performing Defendants and, do not have responsibilities for the cleanup of the Site beyond their monetary contributions based upon the allocation. Further the Defendants and EPA agreed that the contributions of the Settling Federal Agencies to the Site were so negligible as to not require a payment under the Consent Decree.

only applies to de minimis or cost-recovery settlements with EPA or a State under CERCLA Section 122(g) or (h), respectively, or judicially-approved settlements: No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced more than 3 years after – * * * (B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g) [122(g)] of this title (relating to de minimis settlements or 9622(h) [122(h)] of this title (relating to cost recovery settlements) or entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3); see also Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 354 (6th Cir. 1998).

Likewise, Plaintiff does not claim that Louisiana-Pacific has entered into any CERCLA settlement or otherwise been subject to any of the various settlement processes outlined in the statute. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9622. Simply put, Plaintiff fails to allege that any CERCLA-required cleanup or remedial activities have occurred at the Facility.