At first glance, the waters can be murky when wading through a determination of a maritime employee’s status as a Jones Act seaman or a longshoreman. The determination of whether an individual is a Jones Act seaman or a longshoreman, which determination is based on the individual's job duties, the nature of their work, and the specific circumstances under which the individual is employed, is critically important. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., each provide different legal protections and remedies for workers who are injured on the job.To be considered a Jones Act seaman, an individual must be working on a vessel that is engaged in navigation, or on an offshore drilling platform. Also, the individual must have a connection to the vessel or platform that is substantial in terms of both duration and nature. For example, an individual who spends a significant amount of time working on a vessel or platform and whose work is essential to the vessel's or platform's function would likely be considered a Jones Act seaman.Under the Jones Act, a seaman injured on the job may be able to recover damages for their injuries, which damages may include:Medical expenses: Seamen are entitled to recover the cost of medical treatment related to their injuries, including hospital stays, surgeries, prescription medications, and rehabilitation.Lost wages: Seamen may be able to recover the wages they lost as a result of their injuries, inc
In doing so, the Court noted that neither knowledge of a mediation taking place nor publication of a judgment satisfied the requirement to provide notice of a settlement and a judgment against joint tortfeasors that arose out of his work-related injury. The petitioner, McGill C. Parfait, was an employee of Performance Energy Services LLC (“employer”) who sustained injuries to his chest and back in an accident that occurred on June 30, 2013, while working for his employer on a site covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 USC § 901 et. seq. (“LHWCA”).
In addition to this physical injury, Murray also exhibited a number of other conditions after the incident, specifically balance and gait problems, stuttering and erectile dysfunction. Murray sued the vessel owner for vessel negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.Specifically, Murray alleged that the vessel owner had negligently turned over the ship with a faulty floodlight in breach of the vessel owners’ turnover duty. Murray succeeded on his claim at the trial court level.
On May 17, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a decision affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s decision in Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., et al. v. Director, OWCP,et al., No. 16-60370. This matter arose as a claim filed under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 USC § 901 et. seq.
Petitioners, an employer and its insurer, sought review of an order denying petitioners’ motion for relief under section 8(f) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 901(f)(1).Section 8(f) enables employers to shift liability for certain disability benefits to the Longshore Special Fund. To obtain relief under section 8(f), an employer must show that the employee had a preexisting permanent disability which made the permanent disability “materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone.”
In January, a panel of the Fourth Circuit considered whether the “zone of danger” test outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994) is applicable to a longshoreman’s claim for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harborworkers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq. (LHWCA).
In Seaboard Spirit LTD, et al. v. Antwon Hyman, et al.,No. 15-12953, an unpublished opinion issued by the Eleventh Circuit on December 5, 2016, the Court of Appeals reversed a District Court’s opinion that had expanded a vessel owner’s liability to a longshoreman that has traditionally existed under 33 USC § 905(b) to also include a separate cause of action under 33 U.S.C. § 933. This decision fosters the precept that when a vessel is involved with an injury with one covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 USC § 901 et seq. (LHWCA) the injured plaintiff’s cause of action is solely governed by 33 USC § 905(b). When injured in the course and scope of his employment a longshoreman is provided compensation benefits pursuant to the LHCWA from his employer.
It is a substantive rule of law, as well as an evidentiary rule that disallows evidence of insurance or other collateral payments that may influence the fact finder. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no direct authority in the maritime tort context regarding the treatment of written off medical expenses for which liability existed under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) 33 USC 901 et. seq.
The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Department of Labor, posted proposed rules affecting section 906 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., Federal Register, Volume 81, No. 166, August 26, 2016. The Department invited written comments on the proposed regulations from interested parties by October 25, 2016.
Savoy v. WCAB (Global Associates), 2613 C.D. 2015 (Pa. Cmwlth., Aug. 25, 2016)Holding: Employees injured while performing traditional maritime functions such as ship repair on a vessel that is "on the water" are not covered by the Worker's Compensation Act. Rather, the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 901 - 950, provides the exclusive remedy.