242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out the record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). Thereafter, if the nonmovant is unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002).The LHWCA is a federal workers’ compensation statute that provides covered maritime workers with “medical, disability, and survivor benefits for work-related injuries and death.” MMR Constructors, Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 954 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2020). The original version of the LHWCA, passed in 1927, applied only to workers on “navigable waters of the United States,” and to cases where state workers’ compensation laws did not apply. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)); Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 70 F.4th, 315, 317 (5th Cir. 2023). This “limited application caused problems because it was unclear where ‘the boundary at which state remedies gave way to federal remedies’ was.” Barrosse, 70 F.4th at 317-18 (quoting Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pa, 447 U.S. 715, 717, 100 S. Ct. 2432 (1980)). In response to this confusion, the Supreme Court created “the so-called ‘twilight zone,’ an area of concurrent jurisdiction that applies on a case-by-case basis.” Id. In twilight zone cases, an injured maritime worker can “elect[] to recover compensation under either the [LHWCA] or the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State in which the injury occurred.” Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 273, 790 S. Ct. 266 (1959). In 1972, Congress “extend[ed] the LHWCA landward beyond the shoreline of navigable waters of the United States” allowing, for the first time, land-based maritime workers such as Robichaux to recover under the LHWCA. Sun Ship, 447 U.S.

54 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2020). A claim under the LHWCA must first meet the status and situs requirements to apply.The status requirement limits application of the LHWCA to employees in “traditional maritime occupations,” including “any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker.” New Orleans Depot Servs. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)). The status test is satisfied when the person is “directly involved in an ongoing shipbuilding operation.” IngallsShipbuilding Corp. v. Morgan, 551 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1977). The situs requirement requires that the injury occur on the “navigable waters of the United States” and “any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 903(a); see also Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 719 (1980) (“In 1972, Congress … extend[ed] the LHWCA landward beyond the shoreline of the navigable waters of the United States.”).In this case, the court found that both the status and situs requirements were met. The plaintiff worked as a tacker, building barges and then as a crane operator on deck of a ship. These types of work satisfied the status test because they were essential steps of the shipbuilding process. The plaintiff’s alleged occupational asbestos exposures occurred at the Avondale Shipyard and on a rig in the Mississippi River. These two facilities satisfied the situs requirement, as they were areas used by Avondale in repairing and building vessels on and adjacent to navigable waters of the United States.Plaintiff argued that the LHWCA does not preempt the plaintiff’s negligence and intentional tort claims. The exclusivity provision of the LHWCA provides that:“The liability of an employer prescribed in section

Following the ALJs were presentations on the interplay between other benefits schemes (such as state workers’ compensation statutes) and the LHWCA; trends and forecasts in DBA claims and the business of military contracting in general; and an eye-opening presentation regarding pain management and the opioid crisis in America. Day Two included presentations addressing several other timely topics of interest to Longshore and DBA practitioners, including Section 22 modifications and trends, professionalism in settlement negotiations, and a panel of District Directors of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, who discussed practicing before the OWCP.Some takeaways from the Conference: The issue of whether a particular claimant was injured on a covered situs under 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) continues to be frequently litigated, and often turns on whether the claimant’s injury occurred in an “adjoining area” within the meaning of the Act; Similarly, while the issue of whether a structure is a vessel under the LHWCA continues to be frequently litigated, it is becoming more well-settled that a very large tension leg platform is not a vessel, due to the lack of self-propulsion, steering mechanism, and rudder, and its dedicated time on site; and Under the LHWCA, traumatic injuries get a one year statute of limitations; but occupational diseases get a two year statute of limitations. With respect to claimants experiencing delayed expression PTSD, it can be difficult determining which limitations period applies.

Global then sued Chartis seeking the state workmen’s compensation coverage that they had purchased. The determinative situs issue for coverage under the LHWCA was whether the site of injury was an “other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel” 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). According to the decision by the Fifth Circuit inDepot Services v. Workers’ Compensation Programs, 714 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013)(en banc), a work site, to be covered by the LHWCA, must (1) adjoin navigable waters and (2) customarily be used by an employer to facilitate one of the listed maritime activities.

Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana are exclusive states, meaning that they expressly provide in their workers’ compensation statutes that if an employee is covered by a federal compensation plan then they are not entitled to any recovery under the state statutes. 33 U.SC. 903(e) states that any recovery under state compensation laws will be credited against future recovery under the Longshore Act.In other situations, an employee may be uncertain as to whether he is a seaman under the Jones Act or is instead covered by the Longshore Act.