l exposure to asbestos he developed mesothelioma.Defendant Avondale moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims as barred and preempted by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(a) and 933(i). The LHWCA is a federal workers’ compensation statute that provides covered maritime workers with “medical, disability, and survivor benefits for work-related injuries and death.” MMR Constructors, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.Programs, 954 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2020). A claim under the LHWCA must first meet the status and situs requirements to apply.The status requirement limits application of the LHWCA to employees in “traditional maritime occupations,” including “any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker.” New Orleans Depot Servs. v. Dir., Office of Worker’s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)). The status test is satisfied when the person is “directly involved in an ongoing shipbuilding operation.” IngallsShipbuilding Corp. v. Morgan, 551 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1977). The situs requirement requires that the injury occur on the “navigable waters of the United States” and “any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 903(a); see also Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 719 (1980) (“In 1972, Congress … extend[ed] the LHWCA landward beyond the shoreline of the navigable waters of the United States.”).In this case, the court found that both the status and situs requirements were met. The plaintiff worked as a tacker, building barges and then as a crane operator on deck of a ship. These types of work satisfied the status test because they were essential steps of the shipbuilding process. The plaintiff’s

As the Court explained, the central issue was whether complaints of pain could satisfy the LHWCA’s definition of disability: “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment.” 33 U.S.C. § 902(10). Joining a number of other Courts of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit held that “pain can be disabling.”

’’ As such, courts look to the LHWCA, which defines ‘‘injury’’ as accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment . . . and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2). Responses to Plaintiffs’ Recent Attempts to Avoid DBA Exclusivity Whether The Injury Arose In The Course Of Employment The DBA covers injuries that arise out of or in the course of employment.

’’ As such, courts look to the LHWCA, which defines ‘‘injury’’ as accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment ... and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2). Responses to Plaintiffs’ Recent Attempts to Avoid DBA Exclusivity.Whether The Injury Arose In The Course Of Employ- ment The DBA covers injuries that arise out of or in the course of employment.