_______________________________________) Case No. 1:14-cv-1523 [PROPOSED] ORDER AND NOW, after consideration of the United States’ motion for partial summary judgment and any opposition and reply thereto, it is hereby: ORDERED that the United States is entitled to partial judgment in its favor as to Count I of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 41); and it further ORDERED that the Internal Revenue Service is statutorily authorized to charge a fee for the issuance and renewal of a preparer tax identification number (“PTIN”) because the PTIN provides compensated tax return preparers a “service of thing of value” under 31 U.S.C. § 9701. Date: ______________ ____________________________ United States District Judge Case 1:14-cv-01523-RCL Document 66-3 Filed 09/07/16 Page 1 of 1

In this respect, the Appropriations Act is similar to the User Fee Statute, which refers merely to “a service or thing of value provided by the agency.” 31 U.S.C. § 9701. Both Congress and the D.C. Circuit have recognized that such language is insufficient and concluded that the User Fee Statute is not a superseding fee statute.

Case 1:16-cv-00951-KBJ Document 25 Filed 12/19/16 Page 11 of 22 8 Even setting aside the extreme nature of the DOC’s position, which, if accepted, could result in virtually every record created by the DOC being placed practically out of reach under FOIA, a reference to “services” or “activities” does not identify “particular types of records” as FOIA requires, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vi); it thus does not meet the standard set by Congress and the D.C. Circuit in Oglesby. See 132 Cong. Rec. 29618 (1986) (noting that the User Fee Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 9701, does not qualify as a superseding fee statute as it merely states that the agency head “may prescribe regulations establishing the charge for a service or thing of value provided by the agency”); Oglesby, 79 F.3d at 1177 (agreeing that 31 U.S.C. § 9701 is not a superseding fee statute). On its face, the Appropriations Act fails to meet the first requirement of a superseding fee statute under FOIA’s Displacement Provision.

L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 657 (all of Federal Communications Commission appropriations offset by regulatory fees); 12 U.S.C. § 2250 (annual assessment by Farm Credit Administration covers cost of administering programs); 42 U.S.C. § 2214 (90% of Nuclear Regulatory Commission budget authority offset by annual charges).11 Consequently, DRN’s theory of bias “would bring down too many 11 See also Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9701(a) (“[E]ach service . . . provided by an agency . . . to a person . . . is to be self-sustaining to the extent possible . . . .”); id. § 902(a)(8) (similar).

In reality, the return preparer regulatory program neither generates profits nor raises revenue for the government; the Service can only use PTIN and registered tax return preparer competency examination user fees to recover its full costs in regulating return preparers – not for whatever other purpose the Plaintiffs like to imagine. 31 U.S.C. § 9701; Office of Management and Budget Circular A-25, 58 F.R. 38142 (July 15, 1993). Fifth – because they cannot dispute that the administrative record overwhelmingly supports the return preparer program – the Plaintiffs take issue with notice-and-comment rulemaking itself, which they claim is dominated by “industry insiders” such as attorneys and certified public accountants.

6......................................................................................................................................... 38 28 U.S.C. § 1367............................................................................................................................. 14, 34, 38 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .................................................................................................................................... 50 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) .................................................................................................................................... 50 28 U.S.C. § 1653......................................................................................................................................... 48 28 U.S.C. chap. 7 (§§ 701 et seq.) .............................................................................................................. 38 5 Case 1:04-cv-12558-NMG Document 88 Filed 10/15/2005 Page 5 of 51 31 U.S.C. 9701............................................................................................................................................ 38 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(4).............................................................................................................................. 23 49 U.S.C. § 40117................................................................................................................................. 34, 35 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) ...................................................................................................................... 21, 22, 23 49 U.S.C. § 41707........................................................................................................................... 16, 25, 28 49 U.S.C. § 41712....................................................................................................................................... 22 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) ............................................................

E. No Federal preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). The Domestic Defendants and Lufthansa argue that 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)25 preempts the (FOOTNOTE CONT’D) 23 The authority (or “Act of Congress” in the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1340) for issuance of the regulations contained in 19 C.F.R. part 24 comes from 5 U.S.C. § 301; 19 U.S.C. §§ 58a–58c, 66, 1202 (General Note 23, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States), 1505, 1520, 1624; 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461, 4462; 31 U.S.C. 9701; Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat.