For instance, if (b)(2) is meant to apply only to the government, it would logically begin with a simple clause such as "in cases where the United States brings the action or elects to intervene," or the even simpler and equally elegant "as to the United States." retaliation claim under section 3730(h). Graham County, 545 U.S. at 415-16. The Supreme Court reasoned that section 3731(b)(1)’s reference to a six-year period running from “the violation of section 3729” was inconsistent with its application to a section 3730(h) retaliation claim, because section 3730(h) claims do not require a section 3729 violation.

The plain language of the Settlement Agreement supports Relators’ reasonable reliance and expectation that Defendants intended to leave unresolved only the issue of the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and not the entitlement to those fees. As previously discussed, the only statutory reference in the Settlement Agreement governing the Relators’ claims for attorneys’ fees is 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). And this reference is enumerated in six different sections of the Settlement Agreement, clearly indicating an agreement by Defendants to limit any challenge to the reasonableness of Relators’ attorneys’ fees.

This would at least leave in place the pleading which forms the basis for relator’s standing and the predicate for his own claims in the case. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). But defendant Armstrong has not sought this relief.

At a sales meeting in November 2009, Relator viewed a PowerPoint presentation that highlighted ways in which Novartis could "leverage the influence of the pharmacy" to increase drug sales; the presentation stated that Novartis could "offer discounts" to pharmacies so that the and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2010).

CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, as well as in the accompanying memorandum, this Court should reject Relators’ argument that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees. The FCA’s first-to-file bar is applicable to this case, and none of these Relators qualifies as the first-to-file, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). Accordingly, Defendants respectfully ask that the Court dismiss Relators’ claims for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses with prejudice.

United States v. Onan, supra, 190 F.2d at 6. 18 Case 4:12-cv-00129-HFS Document 4 Filed 03/30/12 Page 18 of 20 For the reasons set out herein, the United States and the undersigned representative of the Attorney General, pursuant to the authority granted by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), respectfully requests that the Court lift the seal in this matter and dismiss the case for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Respectfully submitted, David M. Ketchmark Acting United States Attorney By /s/ Jeffrey P. Ray Jeffrey P. Ray Deputy United States Attorney Missouri Bar No. 35632 Charles Evans Whittaker Courthouse 400 East 9th Street, Fifth Floor Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 426-3130 FAX: (816) 426-3165 E-MAIL: jeffrey.ray@usdoj.gov ATTORNEYS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 19 Case 4:12-cv-00129-HFS Document 4 Filed 03/30/12 Page 19 of 20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned Deputy United States Attorney hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION OF THE UNITED STATES TO DISMISS QUI TAM ACTION (WITH SUPPORTING SUGGESTIONS INCORPORATED) was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the Court’s procedures for filings in cases under seal on this 30th day of March, 2012.

at 25 (emphasis in original), ignores the plain language of the statute which reads, “fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B)(emphasis added). “Under all Case 3:11-cv-00442 Document 167 Filed 05/27/15 Page 15 of 19 PageID #: 4037 action, and the Settlement Agreement permitted all Relators to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 3730(d).

07[A], at 4-151 (2002-2 supp.) explains: Although many qui tam actions are settled with the agreement of all the parties, there is increasing recognition that the qui tam plaintiff loses nothing by objecting to the proposed settlement under 31 U.S. C. § 3730(c)(2)(B). After all, the threat of the plaintiff’s objection to the proposed settlement can be used to drive up both the settlement amount paid by the defendant and the percentage of the final settlement paid to the relator.

Case 3:11-cv-00442 Document 87 Filed 09/29/14 Page 30 of 33 PageID #: 739 31 competent representation, including counsel’s meetings with Relators, counsel’s and Relators’ meetings with the Government, legal research, and factual investigation. Relators are accordingly entitled to receive them from CHS under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1920. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Relators are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees totaling $3,137,779.50 and litigation expenses totaling $61,840.54.

No one other than Denenea had the access and the independent knowledge of the falsified documents and data within these government forms, or the manipulated databases in Allstate’s computer programs. Defendants also cite United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514 (10th Cir. 1996), as holding that information disclosed through civil litigation is considered a public disclosure under Section 3730(e)(4)(A). A simple reading of Ramseyer reveals that the public disclosure had nothing to do with any civil litigation, but that the disclosure arose out of a State audit of a healthcare company’s day treatment program. For that reason Ramseyer does not support defendant’s position.