G. Whether Farmers Pride Acted in Good Faith Is Disputed Plaintiffs seek liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 260 for their claimed FLSA violations. 29 U.S.C. § 260 provides that: [I]f the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages. . . . 29 U.S.C. § 260. Section 260 has both subjective and objective components.

The district court had an ample basis to find that Hamler did not meet his burden as the employer. In any event, 29 U.S.C. § 260 merely provides that a district court “may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages” “if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court” that he acted in good faith. So, even if Hamler had proved he acted in good faith, the court still would have been within its discretion to award liquidated damages.

Further, even if the employer meets its burden, the court still retains discretion to award liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 260; Lee v. Coahoma Cnty., Miss., 937 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 1991). The employer “faces a ‘substantial burden’ of establishing good faith and a reasonable belief that its actions did not violate the FLSA.”

Page 4 Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 21995190 (N.D.II.), 149 Lab.Cas. P 34,771, 8 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1665 (Cite as: 2003 WL 21995190 (N.D.IIL.)) pliance with plaintiffs’ alleged request was in good faith and that they had a reasonablebasis for believing that the shift did not violate the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260. Defendants fail to do so.

However, NYLL § 198(1-a) does not afford courts similar discretion; either a violation entitles a plaintiff liquidated damages in the full amount, or not, as is the case here. See 29 U.S.C. § 260 (if employer demonstrates act or omission was in good faith, “the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title”). Case 1:08-cv-10240-PAE-FM Document 261 Filed 11/09/11 Page 25 of 28 -21- CV-6020, 2009 WL 1401694, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. May 18, 2009) (granting partial summary judgment and finding that defendant did not act in bad faith where defendant had consulted with labor counsel for legal advice as to proper compensation practice and relied on counsel’s advice, which was rational).

Under Section 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260, a judge is empowered to exercise discretion to eliminate the employer’s liability for liquidated damages if the employer shows that the action or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260. Defendant’s classification of the Plaintiffs as exempt pursuant to the exemptions described herein was made in good faith and Defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that this classification did not violate the FLSA.

Under the FLSA, if “the employer shows … that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission … was not a violation of the [FLSA] … the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 260. Here, the undisputed facts establish that Defendants had an honest intention to ascertain and follow the FLSA and acted in good faith.

To the extent that it seeks immunity under 29 U.S.C. § 259, it fails because (as this Court has already ruled), the defendants’ tip pool is not in conformity with Department of Labor regulations that were issued prior to the beginning of the statue-of-limitations period in this case. To the extent that this defense may seek to escape liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 260, defendants have not shown that the tip theft was “in good faith and that [they] had reasonable grounds for believing that [the] act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended.” The good-faith inquiry asks “how a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances and requires that the employer have honesty of intention and no knowledge of circumstances which ought to put him upon inquiry.”

. “The burden, under 29 U.S.C. § 260, is a difficult one to meet, however, and double damages are the norm, single damages the exception.”

A court may still award liquidated damages even where a defendant demonstrates good faith and reasonable grounds. See 29 U.S.C. § 260; Hayes v. McIntosh, 604 F.Supp. 10 (N.D.Ind.1984). Title 29 U.S.C. section 259 provides, in relevant part, that: 4:14-cv-02261-PMD Date Filed 09/03/15 Entry Number 97 Page 10 of 13 no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the [FLSA] . . . if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of the agency of the United States specified in subsection (b) of this section, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged.