Walling, 140 F.2d at 832. Not only does this clause (and the surrounding statutory framework) establish a policy to guide the Secretary, but it also marks the “boundaries of this delegated authority,” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73, as the agency may exempt under the relevant provision only those employed in a “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity,” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The State Plaintiffs apparently reject these boundaries because they allege Congress must establish any salary “threshold.”

One of these exemptions is that there is no overtime requirement for a “mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing WESTl.AW Case 2:16-cv-00746-SPC-MRM Document 109 Filed 02/06/19 Page 431 of 520 PageID 1067 Paneto v. Motor Car Concepts II, Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007) 2007 WL 328730, 12 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 565 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 automobiles ... if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles ... to ultimate purchasers.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (10)(A). The requirements of this exemption are more explicitly stated in the Code of Federal Regulations: *3 A specific exemption from only the overtime pay provisions of section 7 of [the FLSA] is provided ... for certain employees of nonmanufacturing establishments engaged in the business of selling automobiles, trucks, trailers, farm implements or aircraft.

The Legal Test for an Exempt Administrative Employee Section 213(a)(1) of the FLSA provides an overtime pay exemption for any employee employed in a bona fide administrative capacity, as that term is defined in the relevant federal regulations. See 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(1). In order to demonstrate that the Service Supervisor and Service Supervisor Trainee positions with CTS were exempt, administrative positions as contemplated by the FLSA, CTS must make three affirmative showings: (1) the employee was paid on a salary basis of at least $455.

The sole difference between these statutory provisions is the method by which the employee is compensated. The Department of Labor's Field 'Courts have routinely applied 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)( 1 7J to hourly workers. Pellerin, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 664; Clark v. JPMogan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 08 CV 2400, 2010 WL 1379778, *3, 4,17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010); Gofron v. Picsel Techs., Inc., No.

Finally, that Mr. Clarke cut and paste Engineering protocols for others on his team does not constitute “the design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification of computer programs.” 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(17). “Documentation” in this context “deal[s] with the internal documentation process involved in programming and/or systems analysis, requiring knowledge of the system architecture, programming logic and language necessary to manipulate the internal operation of the computer itself.”

Case 1:04-cv-11996-RGS Document 27 Filed 06/07/2006 Page 9 of 18 10 Turning to the Town's first objection, for both RFA Nos. 22 and 36, the Town objected on grounds that the RFAs were "overly broad." It appears that the Town made this objection because the RFAs in question sought an admission, in the aggregate, that the entire class of Superior Officer Plaintiffs (RFA No. 22) and Patrol Officer Plaintiffs (RFA No. 36) were non-exempt employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§213(a)(1). That objection cannot be valid because the RFAs at issue seek to determine whether a finite group of Plaintiffs, fifty-six of them, shall be classified as exempt or non-exempt within the meaning of the applicable FLSA statutory provision.

That, fact is underscored by Lazy Days’ payment of commissions to Slanga. The payment of commissions has been repeatedly held to be a significant factor in determining that an employee is subject to the overtime exemption in 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10). Brennan v. Deel Motors, 475 F.2d at 1097; Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, 370 F.3d at 450; Dayton v. Coral Oldsmobile, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 290, 292 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (the fact that plaintiff was paid on a salary-plus- commission basis was “important in determining whether the job performed was exempt from the FLSA”).

an employee had to be compensated with a minimum salary equal to $913.00 per week which amounts to $47,476.00 annually. 4 The term “primary duty" within the meaning of Section 213(a)(1) is defined at 29 CFR 541.700. 29 CFR 541.700 provides: § 541.700 Primary Duty (a) To qualify for exemption under this part, an employee's "primary duty" must be the performance of exempt work.

But neither 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) specifically, nor the FLSA generally, provide indexing for wage rates. As previously noted, Congress has not indexed the minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206, the hourly wage for computer employees, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17), or the annual compensation for “nonprofit parents,” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(24). Defendants’ Opposition offers no response to these statutes, except to say tautologically that they do not specifically address the minimum salary threshold—which the Defendants concede may not be found anywhere in the FLSA—that they invented to implement Section 213(a)(1).

Individualized issues raised by the MCA exemption The FLSA exempts from its overtime requirements “any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation [“DOT”] has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service” pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 31502, the Motor Carrier Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (emphasis added); Vallejo v. Garda CL Southwest, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 862, 868 (S.D. Tex. 2014), appeal dismissed, 14 20666 (5th Cir. May 4, 2015); Glanville v. Dupar, Inc., No. H 08 2537, 2009 WL 3255292, *3 (S.D. Tex. 2009).