The plaintiffs responded “that their state law claims [were] independent of their FLSA claims and are not preempted.” Id. In holding that the FLSA did not preempt plaintiffs’ state law claims, the district court reasoned: [S]tate laws do not conflict with the FLSA because in Section 218(a), Congress clearly did not preempt state wage laws. Thus, to enforce state wage laws does not interfere with any well crafted Congressional scheme.

Hence, I conclude that it was not error to calculate liquidated damages at the rate prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(l). See Wicaksono, 2011 WL 2022644, at *7 (concluding that this approach "avoids the implication unsupported by the statute or by case law . . . that 29 U.S.C. § 218 makes it a violation of federal law to fail to pay the state minimum wage rate" (citations omitted)). c. Liquidated Damases under Both Statutes For plaintiff's minimum wage and overtime claims that were timely under the FLSA and the Labor Law, the Court awarded liquidated damages under the FLSA because it provided a higher measure of recovery than did the Labor Law, i.e., 100 percent unpaid wages versus 25 percent.

The FLSA’s “savings clause,” 29 U.S.C. § 218, certainly does not suggest otherwise, as it only authorizes state laws with a higher “minimum wage” or lower “maximum workweek” than the FLSA has. 29 U.S.C. § 218. Here, neither Plaintiff’s Arizona claim nor her Oregon claim provides a different “minimum wage” or “maximum workweek” than does the FLSA.

See 339 U.S. at 518-519. Because 29 U.S.C. §218 treats federal laws other than the FLSA and state laws in a parallel manner, it equally demonstrates Congressional awareness that the same work may be subject to both the FLSA and a state law. Therefore, when work is subject to both the FLSA and a state law, the employer must comply with the higher of the two requirements in order to comply with both.

The Tidewater court explained that“(t]he FLSA includes a ‘savings clause,’ WHICH PROVIDES:‘Noprovision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any .. . State law or municipal ordinanceestablishing ... a maximum workweek lower than the maximum workweekestablished underthis chapter .... (29US.C. § 218(a).) The federal courts that have addressed this question have interpreted this savings clause as expressly permitting states to regulate overtime wages.

. Further, in Divine v. Levy, another district court directly addressed this precise issue, concluding that the “savings clause” of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 218: refers only to minimum wage, maximum workweek, and child-labor; it is silent as to penalty provisions. Therefore, we should assume that the act of Congress, through this section, by implication, supersedes the penalty provisions of the various state statutes on the relation of employer and employee.

passim Case: 1:11-cv-00088-TSB Doc #: 148 Filed: 09/27/12 Page: 7 of 30 PAGEID #: 2081 1 INTRODUCTION Congress designed the Fair Labor Standards Act to provide the minimum protection to American workers with respect to overtime and minimum wage compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). The Act specifically states that it does not preclude, and thereby encourages, states to enact their own laws that provide additional or greater advantages to their workers.

Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).) In this case, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the FLSA and the greater wage and hour protections explicitly provided for under Maine labor law.

at 11, but only authorizes state laws providing “a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under [the FLSA] or a maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek established under [the FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (emphasis added). Yet nei- ther Arizona’s rule governing “the relevant time by which employers must pay . . . wages,” Opp.

States are free to provide greater wage protections to their workers, subject to broader-reaching procedures. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a); see, e.g., Overnite Transp. Co. v. Tianti, 926 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1991) (the FLSA does not preempt state overtime wage law). C. Plaintiffs’ NYLL Class Action Does Not Violate The Rules Enabling Act.