The Court heard argument on the instant motion on November 22, 2011 (Doc. # 305). Count I of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges a FLSA Claim against Defendant Cox. The FLSA requires employers to pay a minimum wage and overtime to employees who are employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. An employer who violates these provisions is liable to the affected employees for their unpaid wages and overtime compensation, as well as for an equal amount as liquidated damages. Id. § 216(b).

12 These exceptions include showing the pay disparity resulted from: (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 13 Defendant cites Brewster, 788 F.2d at 992-93, for the proposition that Plaintiff's admission to not believing her supervisor intentionally discriminated against her is fatal to her case.

125. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that Defendant’s willful regular business custom, policy and practice of requiring its employees to attend training sessions without the payment of wages, according to the mandates of federal law is, and at all times herein mentioned was, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206. Defendant’s employment policies and practices wrongfully and illegally failed to compensate Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Nationwide Class “BA” for minimum wages earned as required by federal law.

2. Further, Defendants are hereby enjoined from committing future violations of the FLSA’s a. Minimum wage provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 215(a)(2); and b. Recordkeeping provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a)(5), and the implementing regulations found in 29 C.F.R. Part 516. SO ORDERED.

In sum, the FLSA does not support plaintiff's argument. Hence, I conclude that it was not error to calculate liquidated damages at the rate prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(l). See Wicaksono, 2011 WL 2022644, at *7 (concluding that this approach "avoids the implication unsupported by the statute or by case law . . . that 29 U.S.C. § 218 makes it a violation of federal law to fail to pay the state minimum wage rate" (citations omitted)).

However, Judge Frank’s Order fails to say why that would be the case. Defendants respectfully disagree that the law treats section 206 differently than section 207. Nothing in the Act, the regulations, the case law, or even Judge Frank’s Order,

13 an hour, with the rest of their federal minimum wage coming from customer tips. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1), §203(m), and § 203(t). Thus, under § 203(m)’s tip credit, employers may pay tipped employees at an hourly wage below the minimum wage, provided that for the workweek the hourly wage and the employees’ tips, taken together, are at least equivalent to the federal minimum wage, which between 2009 and 2015 was $7.

25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(c). Multiplying $7.

(Id. ¶ 21.) Then, after quoting Section 206(a), Plaintiffs conclude that they were not compensated "for the time spent engaging in the pre-shift and post-shift [ ] activities[.]" (Id. at ¶¶ 23-25.)

A plaintiff must prove that the skill, effort and responsibility required in the performance of the jobs are “substantially equal.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 204. Although formal job titles or descriptions may be considered, the controlling factor in the court's assessment of whether two jobs are substantially equal must be actual job content.