Among these provisions is the following declaration of public policy: Whereas . . . the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, . . . it is necessary that . . . he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 102. These provisions mirror the NLRA’s recognition that employers and employees have unequal bargaining power, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (“Employees . . . do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract . . . .”), its protection of “concerted activit[y]” and “mutual aid,” 29 U.S.C. § 157, and its prohibition of interference, restraint, or coercion, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Substantively, Norris-LaGuardia provides that “any . . . undertaking or promise in conflict with the public policy declared in section 102 of this title, is declared to be contrary to the public policy of the United States, [and] shall not be enforceable in any court of the United States . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 103.

It provides, among other things, that [*16] the NLRA was enacted to provide "equality of bargaining power between employers and employees" and to "protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of association . . . for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151. Collective legal action balances the playing field by providing a feasible means for employees to assert rights where they would otherwise "have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available."

1). 1 The Hotel asks the Court to compel the Respondent, Mori Pam Rubin, in her official capacity as a Regional Director, Region 31, of the NLRB, 2 to cease prosecuting an administrative complaint which alleges that the Hotel engaged in discriminatory hiring practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 151 et seq. (“the NLRA”). Further, the Hotel asks the Court to permanently enjoin the NLRB from proceeding with the pending unfair labor practice case and to compel the NLRB to dismiss the administrative complaint.

Thus, a prohibition on class actions addressing wages violates the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. Case 2:11-cv-02109-DDP -VBK Document 12 Filed 07/25/11 Page 14 of 16 Page ID #:99 Page 14 OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 L A W O F F IC E S O F M A R K Y A B L O N O V IC H L O S A N G E L E S Section 7 encompasses civil lawsuits and, in fact, “[i]t is well settled that the filing of a civil action by employees is protected activity unless done with malice or in bad faith.”

(/d. at pp. 776, 778.) In particular, the court noted that EERA does not mandate the application of the same agencyprinciples that apply under the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) or the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (Lab. Code,§ 1141 et seq.).

Only the first and fourteenth claims for relief are alleged against State Defendants. Pauma’s first claim is entitled “[Declaration of Procedure Governing the Resolution of Work Related Disputes (1999 Compact, Addendum B at § 13(a) & 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. versus 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.)]” (Doc. 13, p. 47).

1. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq.

1. D.R. Horton and its path through the courts The Court need not hold a trial in order to deny Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration. It should conclude that even if Ms. Simon did enter into the agreement, the agreement is unenforceable as a matter of law because it conflicts with Ms. Simon’s rights under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. That conclusion is consistent not only with the language and purposes of the NLRA and FAA, but also with the trajectory of the case law.

¶ 37. On May 24, 2011, prior to the CBA’s expiration, the NBPA filed with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) an unfair labor charge against the NBA Case 1:11-cv-05369-PGG Document 26 Filed 10/19/11 Page 8 of 32 3 alleging, among other things, that the NBA had engaged in bad-faith bargaining in violation of its obligations under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq. (“NLRA” or “the Act”). See id.

Rev. 439 (1995), Docket # 66-25 , 11 E. Sclar, You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics ofPrivatization (2000), Docket ## 66-21 and -22 11 M. Warner and A. Hefetz, "Privatization and the Market Structuring Role of Local Government" (2000), Docket ## 66-24 11 III Case 1:03-cv-00413-NPM-RFT Document 109 Filed 07/12/10 Page 4 of 29 Defendants David A. Paterson, Governor of the State of New York; Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State ofNew York ("Attorney General"); and Colleen Gardner, Commissioner of Labor of the State of New York ("Commissioner,,)l; by their attorney the Attorney General, respectfully submit this Memorandum of Law in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The sole issue on this motion is whether New York Labor Law § 211-a is preempted as a matter of law by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 ("NLRA"), under precedent springing from Machinists v. Wise. Employment Relations Comm 'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) ("Machinists").