Therefore, even construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, without legitimate allegations that Avon was her employer, and that it terminated her employment in May 2016, the Complaint fails to state a claim under the FMLA, the ADA, or the common claim of unjust enrichment. A. Plaintiff has Failed to State a Claim For Relief Against Avon Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §2601 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she is entitled to damages against Avon under the FMLA based on theories of interference and retaliation. (Ex.

A. Plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 2615. Plaintiff also alleges a claim against Defendant Commonwealth under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff wrongly claims that Defendant Commonwealth interfered with Percell’s exercise of her FMLA rights pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

Through june and July of 2014, the Plaintiff continued to suffer retaliation, including from the human resources department which improperly categorized the Plaintiff's approved intermittent family leave as sick time, and then charged the Plaintiff with "Chronic or excessive absenteeism" and "failure to follow call off/ call on procedures". The supervisor that charged the Plaintiff explained that she was "'told' to put a packet together", which charges were a part of the ongoing retaliatory action taken against the Plaintiff and were also in violation of her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. sec 2601, et. seq.

For all these reasons, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied. BACKGROUND I. Statutory and regulatory background A. The Family and Medical Leave Act The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., entitles eligible employees of covered employers to take unpaid leave or substitute accrued paid leave for up to 12 work weeks in a year for certain reasons, including birth and care of a newborn child; placement of a child for adoption or foster care; care of a spouse, parent, or child with a serious health condition; inability to work due to the employee’s own serious health condition; or a qualifying exigency arising out of military service by a spouse, child, or parent. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612.

at *1. The former employee argued that “the successor liability provisions of 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. (FMLA) and 29 C.F.R. § 825.107 overcome or trump the ‘sale free and clear’ provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) and allow [plaintiff] to sue Hudson.”

1……………………………………………………………… ................... 1 Case 5:17-cv-00710-HE Document 19 Filed 01/16/18 Page 6 of 38 1 Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 56.1 of the Western District of Oklahoma Local Rules, Defendant, Humana Insurance Company (“Humana”), requests the Court to issue an Order granting summary judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims, namely the alleged interference and retaliation claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. The evidence establishes that Plaintiff was absent from, late to, or left early from work 22 times in a seven-month period, which was a gross violation of Humana’s attendance policies.

16). Her amended complaint included claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Counts I–II), claims under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (Counts III–IV), a wrongful discharge claim under Pennsylvania law (Count V), claims under the ADA (Counts VI–VIII), and claims under the PHRA (Counts IX–XI). 1 In addition to adding her claims under the ADA and PHRA, Glenwright's amended complaint also changed the name of one defendant.

16). Her amended complaint included claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Counts I–II), claims under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (Counts III–IV), a wrongful discharge claim under Pennsylvania law (Count V), claims under the ADA (Counts VI–VIII), and claims under the PHRA (Counts IX–XI). 1 In addition to adding her claims under the ADA and PHRA, Glenwright's amended complaint also changed the name of one defendant.

11 (now 2 CCR 11087, et seq.). The regulations in effect in 2014 required that the definitions in the federal regulations issued January 6, 1995 (29 CFR Part 825), interpreting the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) (29 USC section 2601 et seq.) shall also apply to [the CFRA regulations], to the extent that they are not inconsistent [with the CFRA regulations]. See 2 CCR 7297.

Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 743 F.3d 1236, 1243 (citing Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq.) The FMLA contains expansive rights to intermittent and reduced schedule leaves that may be taken in small increments. See 29 USC § 2612(b).