See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 56-66; Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 738-47. In explaining this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited ERISA's “deemer” clause, which makes clear that employee benefit plans may not be “deemed” insurance companies “for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, in Moore v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit confirmed that “uninsured plans may not be regulated either directly or indirectly by the states and that these uninsured plans are regulated exclusively by the provisions of ERISA.” Moore, 786 F.2d at 927 (citing Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 747). As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that “Moore’s California statutory and common law claims are pre-empted by ERISA” and “Moore’s state law claims which relate to the Plan are subject to pre-emption.” Id. Further, Plaintiff’s citation to various California state court cases in the SAC does not assist Plaintiff because none of the cases dealt with – let alone addressed – the application of state law to an ERISA plan.

. Since the purported anti-assignment clauses here are invalid as a matter of New Jersey law, they cannot deprive Plaintiffs of standing to under ERISA other than claims arising exclusively under self-funded employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b). 2. Even if anti-assignment clauses were enforceable, the CarePoint Hospitals have sufficiently pled waiver Moreover, even if anti-assignment clauses were enforceable as a general matter, Defendants have waived them in this case.

See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 56-66; Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 738-47. In explaining this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited ERISA's “deemer” clause, which makes clear that employee benefit plans may not be “deemed” insurance companies “for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance contracts.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, in Moore v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit confirmed that “uninsured plans may not be regulated either directly or indirectly by the states and that these 3 Courts in many other jurisdictions similarly hold that anti-assignment clauses in ERISA plans are valid and enforceable.

. The “Relate To” Test *7 A deficient model of clarity, today's express preemption analysis involves the interpretation of Section 1144(a)'s “relate to” language, in tandem with legislative intent. Wilson v. Zoellner, 114 F.3d 713, 717 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).

Case 3:16-cv-02731-L Document 3 Filed 09/26/16 Page 13 of 18 PageID 228 - 13 - Plaintiff’s claims are not saved by ERISA’s “Savings Clause.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b). As the Fifth Circuit has held, DTPA claims based on violations of Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code are conflict preempted because they “provide a private right of action for the improper handling of insurance claims.”

Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1992) (“State insurance regulation of insured plans is permissible, but state insurance regulation of self- funded plans is preempted.”); ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (“Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title … nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer … for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies…”). Therefore, because ERISA preempts the application of California Insurance Code § 709.

Complete Pre-Emption Also Constitutes Conflict Pre-Emption: 28. State claims are subject to “conflict preemption under ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144; Franks v. Prudential Healthcare Plan, Inc., 164 F. Sup. 2 nd 865, 873 (W.D. Tex. 2001). The Franks court notes that a completely pre-empted claim may also be conflict pre-empted by necessity.

The statute under review required health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to provide an independent review of disputes between primary care physicians and HMOs, and to cover services deemed medically necessary by the independent reviewer. The Court agreed with Rush, the HMO, that the statute was subject to preemption under § 1144(a). However, the Court also held that the statute fell within ERISA's savings clause because it regulated insurance.

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added). This intent is reflected in the definitions of “State law” and “State” set forth 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c): “(1) The term ‘State law’ includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States applicable only to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather than a law of the United States.

One of these exceptions, as the Sixth Circuit noted, is the savings clause in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d), which provides that “nothing in the statute ‘shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States.’” (Sixth Circuit Opinion, p.12) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit, relying on Shaw, interpreted ERISA’s savings clause to preserve