Such discovery may include the taking of depositions of witnesses. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(m) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (making Section 853 applicable to all criminal forfeiture cases); see also United States v. Saccoccia, 898 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D.R.I. 1995) (the United States can take depositions of defense counsel to determine source of their fees for the purpose of locating a pool of assets controlled by defendant that is subject to forfeiture). In addition, the reference in Rule 32.

The Government seeks only to maintain the status quo and avoid the dissipation of assets that would be forfeited to the United States upon conviction. Case 1:15-cr-00093-VEC Document 28 Filed 03/31/15 Page 12 of 13 13 Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the United States respectfully requests the entry of the proposed Restraining Order concerning the Subject Assets pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981, 28 U.S.C. § 2461, and 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(e)(1)(A) and 853(f). Dated: March 31, 2015 New York, New York Respectfully submitted, PREET BHARARA United States Attorney By: /s/ Andrew D. Goldstein Carrie H. Cohen Howard S. Master Assistant United States Attorneys Case 1:15-cr-00093-VEC Document 28 Filed 03/31/15 Page 13 of 13

10, 2008) (dismissal is “without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to file a new complaint . . . if subsequent developments” show further evidence); Precious Pearls v. Tiger Int’l, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58453, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2008) (dismissal was “without prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability to file a subsequent complaint” with more evidence); Sonito Shipping v. Sun United, 478 F. Supp. 2d 532, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissal “without Case 2:11-cv-03582-GW-SS Document 103 Filed 08/09/13 Page 10 of 13 Page ID #:3569 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 intended – as reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b) – that in adjudicating forfeiture actions courts apply procedures “which shall conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty.’” 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b).6 As such, these cases suggest strongly that if a forfeiture action, like an admiralty in rem action, is dismissed on threshold “probable cause” grounds, the effect of that dismissal is without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to re-file based upon new evidence. In the face of such clear precedent, Claimants only response is to cite four cases – none of which discuss the specific issue this Court directed the parties to address; namely, what impact judgment on Title 19 grounds would have on the Government’s ability to file a new action.

See Nat’l Parks Cons. Ass’n Inc. v. TVA,6 STATEMENT OF FACTS 480 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2007) (“National Parks II”). The Project began in 2003 and was stretched over five years in a series of physical changes to the kiln system,7 5 Pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461, as amended by 31 U.S.C. § 3701, EPA can seek a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day for each violation occurring on or before January 30, 1997; up to $27,500 per day for each violation occurring on or after January 31, 1997, and up to and including March 15, 2004; up to $32,500 per day for each violation occurring on or after March 16, 2004, and up to and including January 12, 2009; and up to $37,500 per day for violations occurring on or after January 13, 2009. some of which did not begin until 2007.

L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-373 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note), however, requires federal agencies to adjust penalties every four years based on changes in the Consumer Price Index. For violations occurring between February 15, 2005 and March 3, 2009, the maximum penalty for a corporation is $650,000.

The first is Section 113 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, which grants EPA the authority to take action against violations of the CAA or approved state SIPs. Under Section 113(b), EPA can seek injunctive relief and civil penalties of up to $37,500 per day for each such violation after January 12, 2009, pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461, as amended by 31 U.S.C. § 3701. The second enforcement provision is specific to PSD violations.

From October 1, 2001 until June 27, 2003, when Commerce officials shut down the project, Karron drew down $1,345,500 in ATP funds. In a related criminal proceeding, Karron was charged with one count of knowing misapplication of federal funds toward the payment of unauthorized expenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666, and a forfeiture allegation seeking forfeiture of all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461, or under the substitute asset provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). See United States v. Karron, No. 07-CR-541 (RPP).

101-410, and the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. 101-410, 28 U.S.C. § 2461. 19 Ohio Valley Co., held that: [s]ince the triggering mechanism for 183(a) limitation of liability is tied to an awareness of negligence, and because negligence is not significant in actions under sections 14 and 16 [of the RHA], it follows that the limitation of liability provisions are inapplicable to those sections.

See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (limiting the scope of property subject to forfeiture to “[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of” certain specified crimes) (emphasis added);1 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) (“The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy . . . affecting a financial institution . . . shall order that 1 See also 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2)(A) (defining “proceeds” as “property of any kind obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the commission of the offense giving rise to forfeiture, and any property traceable thereto . . . not limited to the net gain or profit realized from the offense”) (emphasis added). Although § 981 “authorizes only civil forfeitures, the forfeitable property it describes is made subject to criminal forfeiture by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (‘CAFRA’),” codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2007).

(tomg, ) (Entered: 06/06/2013) 06/07/2013 20 NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE NANCY E. POTTS appearing for USA. (POTTS, NANCY) (Entered: 06/07/2013) 06/11/2013 21 UNCONTESTED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF A STIPULATED ORDER FOR RESTRAINT OF ASSETS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), AND 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). INCORPORATING 21U.S.C.