The argument that “the text of the TCPA sufficiently defines an ATDS . . . is not persuasive because district courts must defer to FCC rulings.” Moore, 57 F. Supp. 3d at (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); collecting cases; “the FCC’s ruling that a predictive dialer is an ATDS applies in cases involving debt collection calls, not just telemarketing calls”); Luna, 2015 WL 4941781, at *2 (because “the Hobbs Act jurisdictionally divests district courts from ignoring FCC rulings interpreting the TCPA,” the court “must look not only to the statutory language in applying the definition of an ATDS, but also to FCC rulings addressing the same”). Likewise, the argument that the “court should disregard the FCC’s interpretation [of ATDS definition covering predictive dialers] because Congress did not give the agency authority to implement § 227(a) and because the interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the statute . . . comes perilously close to violating [Rule] 11.”

Pursuant to the Hobbs Act, “[t]he court of appeals…has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend [], or to determine the validity of…all rules, regulations, or final orders of the Secretary of Transportation issued pursuant to…part B or C of subtitle IV, subchapter III of chapter 311, chapter 313, or chapter 315 of title 49.” 28 U.S.C. § 2342(3)(A). Here, Plaintiff seeks to challenge FMCSA’s authority to regulate commercial motor vehicle safety, set forth in Case 1:16-cv-00876-TFM Document 20 Filed 02/15/17 Page 13 of 15 14 subchapter III of chapter 311, chapter 313, and chapter 315 of title 49, which falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction vested by Congress in the courts of appeals.

Under the Administrative Orders Review Act, known more informally as the Hobbs Act, the Court of Appeals is vested with “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of — all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47.” 28 U.S.C. 2342(1). … Indeed, for the Court to agree, or even disagree, with CBA’s argument would be to violate the Hobbs Act.

Notably, even where district courts believe the FCC’s interpretation is wrong, those courts must still apply the agency’s interpretation. Id.; see United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2000) (28 U.S.C. § 2342 implements jurisdictional bar to reconsidering whether FCC final order applies to affirmative defenses); Wilson, 87 F.3d at 399-400 (9th Cir. 1996); CE Design, Ltd. v. Prism Business Media, Inc., 606 F.3d 443, 448 (7th Cir. 2010) (district court cannot “ignore” FCC regulations on the TCPA under 28 U.S.C. § 2342). Relatedly, the Satterfield court’s reading of “prior express consent” according to Black’s Law Dictionary does not support Plaintiff’s position that consent must be “clearly and unmistakably stated.”

The Court is bound to follow the FCC’s rulings. Indeed, the Administrative Orders Review Act, also known as the Hobbs Act, grants federal appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of final FCC orders, see 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1), meaning they are binding on all district courts. See, e.g., Olney v. Job.com, Inc., No. 12-cv-01724, 2014 WL 1747674, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (“The FCC’s interpretations of the TCPA are controlling unless invalidated by a court of appeals.”)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (known as the Hobbs Act) provides exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals over actions that seek to enjoin, set aside, suspend, or determine the validity of DOT rules, regulations or final orders issued pursuant to subchapter III of chapter 311. Section 31150 falls squarely within subchapter III of chapter 311 and the jurisdictional scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2342. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin and set aside FMCSA’s actions in the PSP program established pursuant to section 31150 and further seek declaratory relief regarding the scope of the Agency’s authority under section 31150.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). The D.C. Circuit has exercised its authority to vacate FCC orders that are contrary to statutory terms, like the FCC’s Omnibus TCPA Order’s expansion of the definition of ATDS.

While the FCC has primary jurisdiction to offer interpretations of the TCPA, it by no means provides the final adjudication. Indeed, under 28 U.S.C. § 2342, the federal Courts of Appeal have exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside,. suspend (in whole or in part), ar determine the validity of all final orders issued by the FCC;.

2 United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (emphasis added), aff’d, 219 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Summa Corp., 47 F. Supp. 923 (D. Nev, 1978); United States v. Daniels, 418 F.Supp. 1074 (D.S.D. 1976), (“It follows from the grant of trial de novo jurisdiction to the district courts that this court is not limited to a review of the administrative record before the FCC, nor do the findings and conclusions of the Commission in this case carry any weight whatsoever”); NRC v. Radiation Tech., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1266, 1283 (D.N.J 1981). Case 2:16-cv-03886-ES-MAH Document 26 Filed 10/31/16 Page 10 of 25 PageID: 211 -6- The Hobbs Act’s cross-references binding 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) with 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) confer exclusive circuit court jurisdiction over appeals from forfeiture orders arising under paragraph 503(b)(3). As such, the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Hobbs Act have no applicability to this order, which began with a notice of apparent liability under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).

See 28 U.S.C. § 2342; Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc., 768 F.3d 1110, 1119 (11th Cir. 2014). B. Telecel’s and DIRECTV’s Calling Practices 1. Telecel Called Consumers on the National Do Not Call Registry. Telecel operates call centers in El Salvador and Maryland.