4(e), an alien is eligible for release if the review panel and Director of the HQPDU find that the following criteria are met: (1) travel documents are not available or the Service opines that immediate removal is otherwise not practicable or not in the public interest; (2) the detainee is presently a non-violent person; (3) the detainee is likely to remain nonviolent if released; (4) the detainee is not likely to pose a threat to the community following release; (5) the detainee is not likely to violate the conditions of release; and (6) the detainee does not pose a significant flight risk if released. 8 If Respondent determines that detention of Petitioner should be continued, Petitioner may, of course, commence an appropriate action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the detention decision. And, of course, if the Court of Appeals vacates the stay of removal, Respondent will be at liberty to take the action required to effect Petitioner's removal from the United States and to detain him during the removal period.

See infra pps. 7 [The U.S. Supreme Court case of Preiser v. Rodriguez] . . . makes clear that, as a matter of Congressional intent, prisoners mounting a challenge to the lawfulness of their custody are to proceed by means of habeas. Chatman-Bey, 864 F.2d at 809 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)). Because § 2241 habeas permits the court to fashion the necessary relief "as law and justice require," Plaintiffs' request for habeas and declaratory and injunctive relief can be realized. In Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1986), it was held that a district court may not entertain a habeas corpus action unless it has personal jurisdiction over the custodian of the prisoner.

Article 9(4): Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. As the plain language indicates, the essence of the prohibition against arbitrary detention is a right to judicial review.72 The habeas corpus statute expressly provides that it is available where detention is contrary to treaties of the U.S., see 28 U.S.C §2241(c)(3), and therefore no new legislation is necessary to enforce Petitioner’s rights under the ICCPR. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n. 15.

. . . Article 9(4): Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. As the plain language indicates, the essence of the prohibition against arbitrary detention is a right to judicial review.80 The habeas corpus statute expressly provides that it is available where detention is contrary to treaties of the U.S., see 28 U.S.C §2241(c)(3), and therefore no new legislation is necessary to enforce Petitioner’s rights under the ICCPR. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n. 15.

The Government argues, contrary to precedent and prudence, for a presumption against confrontation and compulsion in Mr. Zuhair’s proceeding. The Government’s position rests upon three contentions, each incorrect: First, that the twin rights of confrontation and compulsion, embodied in the Sixth Amendment, attach only in criminal proceedings; second, that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to Mr. Zuhair; and, third, that Mr. Zuhair’s habeas petition is “constitutional habeas” and, therefore, is not to be accorded the procedural protections developed in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Leaving aside the 44 Case 1:08-cv-00864-EGS Document 44 Filed 08/22/2008 Page 44 of 48 Government’s disregard of the Supreme Court’s holding that Guantánamo “is not abroad” (Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261), and numerous holdings applying Fifth Amendment rights to detainees at Guantánamo, see supra Part I.C at 11-12, the Government’s focus on a “constitutional” foundation is again a red herring, since confrontation rights inhere in the statutory framework of habeas corpus and the “fundamental procedural protections” to which Boumediene held that Petitioners were entitled.

The question as to whether Petitioner's detention is in violation of the laws of The United States is one for a Federal Habeas Court to hear, 28 U.S.c. Section 2241. Accordingly, the Petitioner files the Habeas Corpus Petition, Pursuant to 28 U.S.c. Section 2241, requesting that the Court order a hearing on whether the Petitioner should remain detained and whether such detention is justified for over 36 months of detention. Petitioner clearly has a non-frivolous claim, as set-forth in the Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus, numerous Courts have granted relief in similar Circumstances, Following Zadvydas, and with guidance From various other Federal Court decisions, Prolong detention without a meaningful hearing to determine if such prolonged Detention is justified is unreasonable.

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 n.25 (2001). The language of Section 2241 is the same in all material respects as the habeas provisions enacted in 1789. Those provisions of the Judiciary Act have long been considered a reflection of what the Framers intended to protect through the Suspension Clause.

Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 323 n.15 (Leon, J.) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et seq.). B. The Relief Requested Is Necessary to Protect This Court’s Jurisdiction Over Mr. Zuhair’s Habeas Petition and Is Not “Ancillary” to It Even if the Government were correct in contending that 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) somehow survived Boumediene, this Court would still have jurisdiction because the relief requested by Mr. Zuhair is integral to his habeas proceedings and not a “collateral” or “ancillary” issue as the Government claims. Gov’t Opp.

In determining whether Guantanamo detainee could challenge the legality of their detention and in validating 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) as applied to those detainees, Boumediene did not disturb § 2241(e)(1) insofar as it removes jurisdiction over conditions of confinement claims litigated through habeas. Nor did it disturb the MCA’s provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2), withholding jurisdiction over challenges to “any aspect” of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien detained as an enemy combatant. See In re Guantanamo Bay Habeas Litigation, Civ. Nos. 05-1509, 05-1602, 05-1704, 08-1310 (RMU), – F. Supp. 2d –, 2008 WL 3155155, *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2008).

Those treaties, however, do not give rise to privately enforceable rights and cannot serve as a legal basis for petitioners’ requested relief. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004) (ICCPR does not “itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts”); MCA § 5(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (note)) (no person may invoke the Geneva Conventions as “a source of rights” in any civil court proceeding to which “the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party”). See also Medellin v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 & n.3 (2008) (noting presumption that treaties do not provide private parties with judicially enforceable rights).