The district court awarded Cosco costs, including the cost of the video exhibit. Although the district court decided the case based on its claim construction, it noted that it would have considered the exhibit, which Cosco relied upon in making its motion for SJ. Finding that the video exhibit was a necessity for Cosco in making its motion, the court held that an award of costs was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994), which defines the costs that may be awarded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Applying the law of the Sixth Circuit, the Federal Circuit reversed the award of costs as an abuse of discretion.

Award of Costs Under Rule 54(d)(1) Cannot Exceed the Scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1920 05-1292 January 26, 2006 Decision Last Month at the Federal Circuit - February 2006Judges: Rader, Bryson (author), and GajarsaIn Summit Technology, Inc. v. Nidek Co., No. 05-1292 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2006), the Federal Circuit modified an award of costs to Nidek Company (“Nidek”) because certain portions of the award were not statutorily allowable costs and other portions of the award were not supported by any evidence. The district court awarded costs to Nidek, the prevailing party in the underlying patent infringement suit, without explaining how it computed the amount.

At issue are the constraints of § 1920 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with taxation of specified costs, as applied under First Circuit law. The panel determines that video animations are not “exemplifications” as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Reviewing a variety of cases and Blacks Law Dictionary, which defines “exemplifications” as “[a]n official transcript of a public record, authenticated as true copy for use as evidence”, the panel determines that the First Circuit would adopt a narrow definition of “exemplifications” and refuse to allow recovery for video animations.

The Court noted that David had not claimed that Monsanto used fraud to procure his signature on the Technology Agreement. Finally, the Federal Circuit also disagreed with David’s argument that attorneys’ fees should be limited to those recoverable under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and costs should be limited to those available under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The Court reasoned that there was no reason to limit fees or costs because the Technology Agreement explicitly provided for fees and costs with no limit. Regarding the damages award based on a reasonable royalty, David challenged both the royalty rate and the number of units to which this rate was applied.

The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s order striking appellants’ pleadings under Rule 37 and the court’s inherent powers. In addition, the Court reversed the district court’s entries of judgment in favor of appellees and appellees’ counterclaims, reversed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs under the court’s inherent powers and under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and reversed the award of costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

The district court concluded that Mylan failed to prove any of its invalidity or unenforceability contentions, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. As the prevailing party, Daiichi submitted a bill of costs to the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 seeking approximately $2.2 million from Mylan. Mylan objected to Daiichi’s bill of costs on several grounds, including that certain discovery had been conducted jointly in this and a separate action against Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Teva”) in a different court, and that costs of the joint discovery should be apportioned between the two actions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the verdict. After winning the case, Defendants requested reimbursement for their “costs” incurred during the lawsuit, including copying costs, deposition transcripts, and daily trial transcripts, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1920. The request involved a significant amount of money.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. The issue before the Court was whether the expense-shifting provision of the FCRA authorized district courts to award costs that otherwise would be non-taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Because the phrase “reasonable attorney’s fees” includes certain litigation expenses and the FCRA provides for “reasonable attorney’s fees,” the Court concluded that district courts “have discretion to award non-taxable costs to prevailing parties under the FCRA and that the district court erred in concluding otherwise.”

He suffered serious potentially career-ending injuries and incurred various medical expenses and had to cancel contractual obligations allegedly incurred, proximately related to his injuries.The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The district court granted Kan Pacific summary judgment and awarded costs, including the costs of translating contracts and other documents from Japanese to English pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1920(6). Under that section, the district court has discretion to award fees for the compensation of interpreters as well as the cost of “special interpretation services.”

Court- awarded costs of $52,461.87 legally erroneous, because it allowed various charges not authorized by 28 U.S.C. §1920 (e.g., computer- aided research) and were excessive. Wile such costs might be recoverable under 42 U.S.C. §2000e- 5(k) for defense of frivolous action, employer made no such showingBryant v. Farmers Ins. Exchange , 432 F.3d 1114, 97 FEP 202 (10th Cir. 2005) . Panel : EBEL, Briscoe, Tymkovich.