The Ninth Circuit found that although successful plaintiffs are entitled to “the costs of the action” under the Lanham Act, the Lanham Act does not provide the “explicit statutory authority” required to award litigation expenses beyond the six categories of costs set forth in the general costs statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920. Accordingly, because the general cost statute doesn’t reference expert witness fees, the district court erred in awarding such costs to SDCC under the Lanham Act.

Witness Fees: Judge Zobel denied some of the subsistence expenses that Perrigo requested because there were no supporting receipts. Even though 28 U.S.C. §1821(c) does not require receipts, the District of Massachusetts does require supporting documentation.Expert Deposition Costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E): In the Order on Bill of Costs, the Court also addressed the parties’ dispute over expert deposition fees.

The US Supreme Court also interpreted the meaning of “full costs” as used in 17 U.S.C § 505. The Court determined that Section 505 has no special, expansive meaning, but is limited to the costs specified in the general costs statutes codified at 28 USC §§ 1821 and 1920. Rimini Street Inc. v. Oracle USA Inc. (IP Update Vol. 22, No. 3).The Copyright Act allows for the recovery of “full costs” by or against any party, other than the United States or an officer thereof.

This award, which included costs of expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting, was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “full costs” under the Copyright Act only refers to six categories of recoverable costs outlined in the general costs statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920. The term “full costs” in the Copyright Act means the costs recoverable under the general costs statute, and the word “full” grants no further authority to a court to award costs beyond those generally available (e.g., clerk fees, transcript fees, and compensation of interpreters).

In Rimini Street v. Oracle USA, the U.S. Supreme Court held unanimously that the “full costs” the Copyright Act authorizes federal district courts to award a party in copyright litigation means the costs specified in the general federal statute authorizing district courts to award costs, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920. While the Court’s decision is only directed toward the Copyright Act, it may have greater ramifications for all “200 subject-specific federal statutes that explicitly authorize the award of costs to prevailing parties in litigation.”

Indeed, the hearings of the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property held in early June expressed a great variety of viewpoints (e.g., those of technology companies, biotechnology companies and digital rights proponents). As of our publication date in mid-August a promised follow-up version of the proposed bill still has not emerged.SCOTUS: Full Costs in Copyright Cases Limited by General Costs StatuteBy Armen N. Nercessian and Crystal NwaneriIn Rimini Street v. Oracle USA, the U.S. Supreme Court held unanimously that the “full costs” the Copyright Act authorizes federal district courts to award a party in copyright litigation means the costs specified in the general federal statute authorizing district courts to award costs, 28U.S.C.§§1821 and 1920. While the Court’s decision is only directed toward the Copyright Act, it may have greater ramifications for all “200 subject-specific federal statutes that explicitly authorize the award of costs to prevailing parties in litigation.”

In March, the United States Supreme Court, in the context of a copyright infringement case, held that a district court could only tax to the losing party those costs specifically authorized under 28 USC §§ 1821 and 1920. The holding negated an award to Oracle of $12.8 million for litigation expenses such as expert witness, eDiscovery and jury consulting fees.

In March, the United States Supreme Court, in the context of a copyright infringement case, held that a district court could only tax to the losing party those costs specifically authorized under 28 USC §§ 1821 and 1920. The holding negated an award to Oracle of $12.8 million for litigation expenses such as expert witness, eDiscovery and jury consulting fees.

The Copyright Act gives federal district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. Rimini argued that “costs” is a term of art in federal statutes that refers directly to the taxable costs defined in 28 U.S.C.A. §1920; Oracle’s counter-argument was that the word “full” authorizes the courts to award expenses beyond the six categories of costs specified in the general costs statute, codified as 28 U.S.C.A. §1821 and §1920, and instead means recovery of all litigation costs. In a unanimous ruling authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court held that the provision authorizing award of “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation does not authorize courts to go beyond the specific types of costs available in the general costs statute.

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the term “full costs” in 17 USC § 505 of the Copyright Act has no special, expansive meaning, but is limited to the costs specified in the general costs statute codified at 28 USC §§1821 and 1920. Rimini Street Inc. v. Oracle USA Inc., Case No. 1625 (US Mar. 4.