The preclusive effect of state judgments in federal court is Case 1:14-cv-21505-KMW Document 12 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/20/2014 Page 9 of 20 - 10 - 138873.00812/50598003v.1 determined by the full faith and credit statute, which provides that state judicial proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985), supra. (“This statute [28 U.S.C. § 1738] directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which judgment was rendered.”).

Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision on the basis of res judicata, holding that the California state court order denying arbitration had preclusive effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Id.

Id. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision on res judicata grounds, holding that the California state court order denying arbitration had preclusive effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Id.

In that case the Third Circuit considered a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's determination, made on appellate review in an unemployment compensation proceeding, that a teaching assistant was independent contractor, not employee, of a company that provided online professional development courses for educators. The Circuit Court held that a judicially reviewed decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Board was entitled to preclusive effect in a later Federal proceeding asserting claims under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment Collection Law (WPCL); citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738. The Third Circuit noted that the Plaintiff was represented by counsel before the Unemployment Compensation Review Board and appellate Court and the Court considered an extensive record, Case 2:14-cv-01290-NBF Document 61 Filed 07/26/16 Page 3 of 5 further noting that Plaintiff in the administrative proceeding had every incentive to litigate her case vigorously and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate issue of her employment status.

’” Id, citing 28 U.S.C. §1738. TMCC cannot ask this court to ignore 28 U.S.C. §1738 and Washington State law. 2.

Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction follow “the general rule that the law of the judgment state controls the preclusion effects of a state-court judgment.” 18B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4469 (2d ed.); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (judicial proceedings of every state shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States”); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, we look to state law.”); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A federal court is required under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to look to the preclusion law of the state court that rendered the earlier judgment or judgments to determine whether subsequent federal litigation is precluded.”). Under California preclusion law, “[a]s a general proposition, a receiver has no official duties and is not a proper party to any action after being discharged by the court.

Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, 795 P.2d 1223, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767. Pursuant to the full faith and credit statute (28 U.S.C. § 1738), federal courts must first look to state law to determine the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982).

It thus has no bearing in determining the preclusive scope of a judgment by a New York court, a question controlled by New York law. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 81; 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Under New York law, the res judicata effect of a judgment extends to all allegations related to the same underlying transaction or series of transactions that could have been asserted before the judgment was issued, not just to those allegations raised when the complaint was filed.

90, 94 (1980).14 Under the United States Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, and the statute implementing that provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts                                                              14 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments now speaks of res judicata as “claim preclusion” and collateral estoppel as “issue preclusion,” but, however denominated, the preclusive effect is the same. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94, n.5 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 74 (Tent.

The perfect unity of interests that existed between the Runyan plaintiffs and their counsel on one hand and the Defendants on the other before the Runyan action was filed precludes any notion that there was a “justiciable matter” under Amendment 80, § 6 of the Arkansas Constitution providing the Runyan circuit court with subject matter jurisdiction. For this reason, under Arkansas law, the Runyan judgment is not entitled to preclusive effect, which in turn means that this Court is not required to accord that judgment “full faith and credit” under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Marrese v. Am. Acad.