Petitioners challenged the ordinance and the imposition of a conversion fee as unconstitutional.The U.S. Supreme Court held that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, bars a federal court from considering federal takings claims where a state had interpreted the state takings claims congruently with federal takings law. In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985), the Court had held that federal takings claims are not ripe until plaintiffs first seek entry of a final judgment denying just compensation in state court.

In the 5-4 majority opinion, the Court overruled, in part, Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), a 34-year old precedent that established a federal claim was not ripe until a state takings plaintiff exhausted its remedies under state law. The decision, among other things, eliminates the “Catch 22” dilemma created by Williamson in which a state judgment denying the takings claim precluded the federal claim from ever becoming ripe because of the preclusive effect of the state judgment under the federal full faith and credit statute (28 U.S.C. §1738). The ramifications of the decision remain to be seen, but property owners will certainly welcome the readier access to the federal courts for takings claims.In Knick, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania passed an ordinance requiring that “[a]ll cemeteries … be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours”.

[1] In the 5-4 majority opinion, the Court overruled, in part, Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), a 34-year old precedent that established a federal claim was not ripe until a state takings plaintiff exhausted its remedies under state law. The decision, among other things, eliminates the “Catch 22” dilemma created by Williamson in which a state judgment denying the takings claim precluded the federal claim from ever becoming ripe because of the preclusive effect of the state judgment under the federal full faith and credit statute (28 U.S.C. §1738). The ramifications of the decision remain to be seen, but property owners will certainly welcome the readier access to the federal courts for takings claims.

San Remo Hotel v. San FranciscoIn San Remo Hotel, et. al. v. San Francisco, et. al., decided on June 20, 2005, the United States Supreme Court considered the “narrow question” of whether it “should create an exception to the full faith and credit statute [28 U.S.C. § 1738] . . . in order to provide a federal forum for litigants who seek to advance federal takings claims that are not ripe until the entry of a final state judgment denying just compensation.” 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2501 (2005).

The dissent viewed the majority’s decision as a departure from well-established precedent to the effect that no constitutional violation occurs where the taking precedes the payment of just compensation, so long as an after-the-fact compensation mechanism was in place.The dissent also considered the “San Remo preclusion trap,” but reasoned that it was a factor weighing in favor of following the precedent set by Williamson County, rather than overruling it and injecting uncertainty into the law. Noting that the principle of stare decisis — the policy in favor of following, rather than reversing, precedent—had “enhanced force” where Congress had the ability to override the prior decision, the dissent focused on the fact that San Remo was based on the Court’s interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and that Congress, therefore, had the ability to dispose of the preclusion trap.Additionally, the dissent warned that the Court’s decision would send a flood of cases to federal court that more properly belong in state court, since the outcomes of those cases will often be determined based on sometimes-complicated questions of state law, which federal courts have no experience or particular expertise in resolving.Perhaps the most significant take-away from Knick is its focus on “restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned when they included the Clause among the other protections in the Bill of Rights.” Knick, 139 S.Ct. at 2170.

Ingersoll-Rand again moved for summary judgment, raising collateral estoppel as its defense.The District Court’s Ruling In their opposition to Ingersoll-Rand’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs raised four main arguments. After electing to apply the law of Massachusetts based on considerations of Full Faith and Credit under 28 U.S.C § 1738, the court rejected each contention. First, the plaintiffs maintained that the Massachusetts decision was not a final judgment on the merits because Hovsepian did not oppose the motion.

Ingersoll-Rand again moved for summary judgment, raising collateral estoppel as its defense.The District Court’s Ruling In their opposition to Ingersoll-Rand’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs raised four main arguments. After electing to apply the law of Massachusetts based on considerations of Full Faith and Credit under 28 U.S.C § 1738, the court rejected each contention. First, the plaintiffs maintained that the Massachusetts decision was not a final judgment on the merits because Hovsepian did not oppose the motion.

It didn’t. Derrick v. Hines, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24261 (7th Cir. Nov. 30, 2017):A decision is preclusive on a particular issue in Wisconsin (whose law governs, see 28 U.S.C. §1738 ¶3) if, among other things, the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the prior litigation and application of preclusion is fundamentally fair. See Estate of Rille v. Physicians Insurance Co., 2007 WI 36 ¶¶ 36-38; Mrozek v. Intra Financial Corp., 2005 WI 73 ¶17.

6 Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 7 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812; see also note 4 and accompanying text. 8 While U.S. CONST. art. IV, and the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738, require courts to give full faith and credit to state courts’ judgments, it is settled law that a “constitutionally infirm judgment” is not entitled to full faith and credit. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982); State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1005 (Vt. 2003).

They asserted that the settlement was not entitled to full faith and credit as to them.Full Faith And Credit To Class Action Settlements The main road block faced by the Plaintiffs challenging the effect of the Webster settlement lies in a U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that: a judgment entered in a class action, like any other judgment entered in a state judicial proceeding, is presumptively entitled to full faith and credit.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996), under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2014). The North Carolina appellate courts have accordingly held that courts should: apply only a “very limited” scope of review when determining whether a foreign judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, with the inquiry limited to whether jurisdictional and due process considerations were “fully and fairly litigated and finally decided” by the court rendering judgment.