Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). The Court has ruled that the statute should not be interpreted to treat these assets differently despite the “notwithstanding” language of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(a) and TRIA. See Court’s January 28, 2011 Order.

65. An agency or instrumentality of Iran has an ownership interest in each of the Blocked Assets thereby making such assets subject to attachment and execution in satisfaction of the Movants' judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610, et seq. and TRIA § 201(a). Citibank lacks information sufficient to respond to this assertion of undisputed material fact.

For the reasons set forth above, all Defendants have received notice of the Default Judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1608(e) and a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry of Default Judgment and the giving of notice to the Defendants. Therefore, the Court should enter an Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) authorizing the Wultzes to enforce the Default Judgment. Case 1:08-cv-01460-RCL Document 157 Filed 01/14/13 Page 11 of 13 12 DATED: January 14, 2013 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Amy L. Neuhardt Matthew W. Friedrich (Bar No. 502038) Amy L. Neuhardt (Bar No. 996791) Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP 5301 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20015 (202) 237-2727 Counsel for Plaintiffs Case 1:08-cv-01460-RCL Document 157 Filed 01/14/13 Page 12 of 13 13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on January 14 2013, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be served on all parties through the Court’s CM/ECF system.

as in any other sovereign execution proceeding – serves to limit any such orders to the bounds of the FSIA’s immunity exceptions. See Walters, 651 F.3d at 280 (affirming dismissal of petition for turnover order pursuant to Rule 69(a) and CPLR § 5225(b) “[t]o the extent the petition sought assets beyond the scope of the exception to immunity from execution set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2)”); Aurelius Capital Partners, LP, 2010 WL 2925072, at *4 (rejecting as violative of FSIA Section 1610(a) turnover motion pursuant to CPLR § 5225(a)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) (“The procedure on execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.”). Here, plaintiffs seek to exceed the bounds of those exceptions, and the Motions would therefore have to be denied on FSIA grounds even if they did not suffer from the state law and comity defects described above.

(See Pl. Mem. at 9 n.4.) But plaintiff’s interpretation flies in the face of the plain language of § 1610(g), which applies only to “property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A.” 28 U.S.C. 1610(g) (emphasis added). Intesa maintains that plaintiff is not entitled to use § 1610(g), and to the extent that Intesa references the FSIA, it does so for complete rebuttal of plaintiff’s arguments and does not concede that plaintiff can use § 1610(g) for its enforcement mechanism. (See Intesa Mem. at 16 n.17.) Case 1:12-cv-01596-AKH Document 177 Filed 04/08/13 Page 15 of 20 11 . apply to a judgment creditor seeking to execute upon the assets of a terrorist party, but . . . is [merely] intended to abrogate any laws that may provide immunity to . . .

"). In short, the law under the FSIA is crystal clear: under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1610, any order issued by this Court may only assign assets and rights to payments located in the United States. Accordingly, plaintiffs' argument that the Court can issue an order affecting overseas assets and payment streams is simply wrong.

(quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. 107-779, at 27 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1430, at 1434-35). For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g), one of the statutory grounds relied upon by the Heisers, advances Congress’ express goal of “better promot[ing] and execut[ing] the federal interest in deterring terrorist attacks and compensating victims.” In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 79. The indefinite stay requested by the Respondent will frustrate Congress’ stated goal and thwart the public support of justice for terrorism victims. See Youngbloods, 2011 WL 43510, at *8 (denying stay where the public interest would not be promoted). III. Respondent Cannot Wait Indefinitely to Seek Interpleader Relief In the Motion, the Respondent asserts that it intends to file an interpleader petition. As an initial matter, the Respondent must seek leave of Court to engage in third-party practice because its deadline to do so has long-passed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1) (“[T]hird-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court’s leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 14 day

295 F.Supp. 2d at 393.17 THE PROPERTY IS NOT IMMUNE Joint Movants argue briefly that none of the funds restrained are “used for a commercial activity in the United States”, as required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1610(a). They contend that the restraints fail both prongs of the test (i.e., “commercial activity” and “in the United States.”)

Moreover, this Court has previously applied §1610(c) in precisely this context of executions against blocked assets. See Hausler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 09 Civ. 10289 (VM), Order (S.D.N.Y dated Sept. 21, 2010) (ordering turnover of blocked assets pursuant to TRIA upon finding that judgment creditors had obtained 28 U.S.C. §1610(c) court order for the issuance of the writ of execution at issue, among other things). Thus, absent any new controlling or persuasive authority to the contrary, the Levins have failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal, and their motion for a stay pending such appeal ought to therefore be denied.

Without a judgment enforcing an arbitral award, Plaintiffs would not be entitled to any relief, provisional or final, from this Court. Case 1:16-cv-00904-LPS Document 24-2 Filed 03/27/17 Page 24 of 26 PageID #: 323 19 DUFTA permits a creditor to avoid a fraudulent transfer and seek the return of the transferred assets, 6 Del. C. § 1307(a)(1), the FSIA only permits a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state’s “property in the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1610; see also Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir. 2009). A foreign state’s property abroad is immune from the process of a U.S. court.