For example, in Spillers v. Tillman, 959 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Miss. 1997), remand of a medical malpractice case was ordered, even though an attorney for the defendant doctor filed a timely notice of removal which included the defendant hospital's name, and the hospital subsequently filed an answer and motion to dismiss in federal court, because the notice was not signed by the hospital or its attorney, and there was no independent or unambiguous notice of consent by the hospital within the 30-day period under 28 USCS § 1446(b). In another analogous fact situation, the signing of a joint removal petition by counsel for one defendant on behalf of another defendant's counsel violated the “rule of unanimity” under 28 USCS § 1446, even though the non-signing counsel subsequently filed a notice and an affidavit attesting to his participation in the drafting of the joint notice, his authorization of other counsel to sign the notice on his behalf, his client's consent to removal, and his subsequent attempt to personally sign the notice. The court Case 5:09-cv-14471-JCO-MAR Document 11 Filed 12/03/2009 Page 14 of 16 10 held that these efforts were not timely and did not cure the procedural defect, because the petition did not sufficiently register the non-signing defendant's consent to removal.

Because there was no objectively reasonable basis supporting removal, the State should be awarded attorney fees and costs in seeking this remand and opposing the erroneous removal. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ removal is improper because it is untimely, the unsealed federal qui tam action is not an “other paper” under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama straight away to prevent any further delay or prejudice to the State.

Second, the 1-year rule does not apply where a court finds that “the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1). The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 codified the bad faith exception following the Fifth Circuit’s equitable exception to the 1- year rule as set forth in Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), a copy of this Notice was served upon Plaintiff by Certified Mail with Return Receipt Requested and filed with the Clerk of Court for the Superior Court. As there are no procedural defects regarding the timely filing of FSB’s Removal or the venue, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is baseless and should be denied. B. Removal is Proper Because This Court Has Diversity Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

In his comments, counsel did not address the issue of the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. §1332(a).37 17. As the Court can see, none of the counsel at the Hearing was familiar with the applicable legal principle governing removals of the state court cases based on diversity under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446.

Since 30 days from service of the Initial Complaint was Sunday, May 26, 2013, and Monday, May 27, 2013 was Memorial Day, a legal holiday, the Served Defendants’ time to remove based upon service of the initial Complaint was extended to the next day, Tuesday, May 28, 2013.3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C) (If the last day to comply with a deadline is a “Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday”). Accordingly, the Served Defendants timely removed this case based on the Initial Complaint within the 30-day period to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Similarly, 30 days from service of the Amended Complaint was June 5, 2013.

Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., 629 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010) (plaintiff’s deposition testimony provided the first indication the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, and defendant timely removed within thirty days of the deposition); Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694- 96 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[t]he first thirty-day period for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) only applies if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face”). Accordingly, Defendants’ Notice of Removal, which was filed on April 12, 2013, i.e. within thirty days after Plaintiff Gomez’s deposition, was timely as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) . VI. THIS CASE IS THE EPITOME OF THE ABUSE AND TACTICS THAT CAFA WAS ENACTED TO PREVENT. As noted above, this is not the first time this case – and these Plaintiffs and putative class members – have been before this Court.

Moreover, the Summons with Notice alleges only state law claims against Defendants and specifies no amount in controversy for purposes of determining whether the jurisdictional minimum amount of $75,000 is satisfied under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Thus, because removability cannot be ascertained on its face, the Summons with Notice does not constitute an “initial pleading” which may be removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and this Motion should be granted without reaching Defendants’ improper joinder claim. II.

(Emphasis added). The Expert Deposition, which marks the time from which it was first ascertainable that the case is removable under SLUSA, because Plaintiffs are seeking to recover commissions paid by mutual funds in connection with the purchase or sale of securities by mutual funds, constitutes an “other paper” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).5 Therefore, removal is timely. 1.

In fact, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(C) expressly permits an earlier-served defendant (like GATX) to consent to removal when a later-served defendant (like Trinity) files its notice of removal, even where the earlier- served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)(C); see also Bisso Marine Co. v. Techcrane Int’l, LLC, No. 14-CV-0375, 2014 WL 4489618, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2014).