at 327.) Case 1:07-cv-09586-RPP Document 10 Filed 12/07/2007 Page 12 of 17 - 8 - As these cases make clear, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) has no relevance here. Viscern removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and the underlying causes of action in the Complaint do not involve workmen’s compensation issues.

IV. CONCLUSION Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). The FDCPA does not apply.

, Plaintiff fails to argue whether BRLI had an objectively reasonable basis to remove the case. Indeed, BRLI had an objectively reasonable basis to file its removal motion based on diversity jurisdiction because courts in this district have repeatedly held that removal by a forum defendant is permitted prior to proper service as explicitly set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

See, e.g., FBI v. Super. Ct. of Calif., 507 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2007), quoting Barnaby v. Quintos, 410 F.Supp.2d 142, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that “[h]ad Congress intended to abolish derivative jurisdiction altogether, it could have done so when amending Section 1441 again in 2002, but it chose to make it clear that the elimination of derivative jurisdiction was limited to cases removed under Section 1441”);

Except where Congress has expressly forbidden removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits a defendant to remove any claim that could be brought in federal court as well as any claim that is joined with a claim premised on federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1441(c); California Public Emp. Ret. Sys. V. Worldcom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2004); Bill Wolf Petro v. Vill. of Port Washington N., 489 F.Supp2d 203, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). This Court correctly found that it had jurisdiction in its July 2, 2013 Order and should not disturb it. 9 141864.00601/7373824v.

However, the district court also found that the workers’ compensation claim was a non-removable claim (see, 28 U.S.C. §1445(c)) and therefore turned to the question of whether – in light of the 1990 Amendment – a case could be removed based on diversity jurisdiction over one claim (the bad faith claim) where the other claim (the workers’ compensation claim) was non-removable. The court determined that even if the bad faith claim would be removable standing on its own, when coupled with the patently non-removable workers’ compensation claim, it “doomed” removal of the case under the 1990 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. §1441(c). Likewise, in the case now before this court, the patently non-removable claim for reinstatement to the board of directors dooms Holding’s attempt to remove the entire case.

CONCLUSION Where the parties to this action are, and have always been, completely non-diverse, Defendants do not satisfy their burden to prove that diversity jurisdiction exist. Thus, by failing to sufficiently prove that Plaintiff could not have established any of the Ohio law-based causes of action against non-diverse Home Savings in the Original Complaint, Defendants failed to prove there was fraudulent joinder and, as a result, there is no diversity jurisdiction under to § 1332 or that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Accordingly, this Court lacks federal jurisdiction and must remand the action to state court.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 Any contention that federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 can be premised on Plaintiff’s federal securities claims (as opposed to solely Freddie Mac’s charter) would be meritless because Section 22(a) expressly prohibits removal of those very claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Worldcom, 368 F.3d at 101. II.

18. In his second Notice of Removal in this case, Mr. Jackson removed this action based on the existence of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.39 19. As stated above, Ms. Leviston commenced this case on February 24, 2010, against Mr. Jackson in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, asserting three causes of action.

at 642. As previously discussed, the Model N Defendants’ authority for removal derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and the fact that SLUSA has eliminated state court jurisdiction over 1933 Act covered class actions, and in so doing rendered the Act’s anti-removal provision inapplicable to such actions.6 The handful of cases cited by Plaintiff that do discuss the jurisdiction issue are impaired by their inability to provide an explanation of how the SLUSA jurisdictional amendment can be anything more than surplusage if Plaintiff’s reading of the 1933 Act is adopted. See, e.g., 6 The same holds true for Madden (576 F.3d at 865), which cites to Kircher’s analysis of state law claims but never addresses the federal 1933 Act jurisdiction question.