Further still, and unlike other grounds for removal, CAFA creates a unique right to appellate review of orders remanding a CAFA removal. 28 U.S.C § 1453(c)(2). Against those presumptions, Plaintiff must prove14 with competent and admissible evidence15 that at least two-thirds of the putative class as defined were citizens (not merely residents) of California at the time of removal.16 13 Jordan, supra, 781 F.3d at 1183.

(Dkt. #18). As shown below and in Defendant's Notice of Removal (Dkt. #1), this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1453, because the number of putative class members exceeds 100, minimal diversity exists, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. I. BACKGROUND On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff Jessica Aparicio ("Plaintiff') individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, filed this case in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, as a putative class action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382.

The State is petitioning the Fifth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), requesting review of the Order’s conclusion that subject matter 1 Case 3:12-cv-00565-WHB-RHW Document 46 Filed 08/09/13 Page 8 of 23 jurisdiction is proper under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Pursuant to authority from a sister Circuit, the appeals court also may review federal question jurisdiction in an appeal perfected pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012).

Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009), said that, even if the named plaintiff has standing, a class that is defined “so broad[ly] that it sweeps within it persons who could not have been injured by the defendant’s conduct” cannot be 5 In Lee, the court also held that a case properly removed may not be remanded to state court. Here, Blue Sky properly removed Chavez’ claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). After § 1453 removal, continuing federal jurisdiction does not depend on certification of the plaintiff’s class.

{W1235719.3} 4 Case 2:08-md-01954-DBH Document 62 Filed 12/15/08 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 648 entire appeal within sixty days of granting leave to appeal, unless that time is extended by agreement of the parties or by no more than ten days for good cause shown. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). Any prejudice to Grimsdale from such a short delay is minimal.

Section 5 of CAFA8 allows for the removal of such applicable class actions to federal court. P.L. 109-2, Section 5; 28 U.S.C. § 1453. As noted above, CAFA was enacted on February 18, 2005.

Brenner I”).1 Plaintiffs—masters of their own complaint—initially filed their claims against P&G in federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15 (“CAFA”). Yet Plaintiffs now apparently refuse to accept the consequences of their chosen forum and governing law, and have decided to file this second lawsuit (“Brenner II”) in state court in order to circumvent the Court’s prior dismissal of Plaintiffs’ injunctive relief remedy, notwithstanding this Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under CAFA.

In determining the propriety of dismissing an action under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will consider the allegations of the complaint at issue along with anything of which the Court may take judicial notice. (Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th Cir.1998), superseded on unrelated grounds, 28 U.S.C. 1453.) A motion to dismiss brought on the ground of res judicata (or “claim preclusion” may properly be granted based on judicial notice of prior court proceedings.

On November 4, 2016, Defendant removed the action to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711- 1715. After Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to participate in an initial meet and confer call set for November 4, on November 6, 2016, Defendant’s counsel met and conferred with Plaintiffs’ counsel

Litig., No. C-05-0969-MMC, 2005 WL 1791559, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005) (“‘[T]he parameters’ of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9) and 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) ‘are intended to be coterminous.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 50 (2005)).