U.S. District Court Lacked Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Infringement Claims Based on Foreign Patents 05-1238 February 01, 2007 Herzfeld, Deborah M. Decision Last Month at the Federal Circuit - March 2007Judges: Newman (dissenting), Gajarsa (author), Prost [Appealed from: W.D. Okla., Judge Leonard] In Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. 05-1238 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2007), the Federal Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, held that the district court had erred in granting supplemental subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over foreign patent infringement claims. All the patents at issue relate generally to angioplasty guide catheters.

In this opinion, the Court held that bringing state claims in federal court stops the clock on the statute of limitations for those claims.Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that arise from the same case or controversy presented in the federal lawsuit. If the federal court later dismisses the federal claims that independently qualify for federal jurisdiction, however, then the court will also ordinarily dismiss the state claims that it had supplemental jurisdiction over as well.

Shah v. Hyatt Corp., No. 10-1492, 2011 WL 1570598 (3d Cir. April 27, 2011).Top of FormIn this case, the Third Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which gives federal courts discretionary power to exercise supplementary jurisdiction over state law claims, does not permit federal courts to decline original jurisdiction on state law claims based on diversity under § 1332(a).Anjali Shah, who worked as an assistant manager for the Hyatt Regency, Philadelphia, initiated a class action in the Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the Hyatt Corporation systematically failed to compensate her and other assistant managers throughout the Commonwealth for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, in violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, and the Wage Payment and Collection Law. Shah brought no federal claims.

The employer moved to dismiss Artis’ claims on the ground that they were time-barred under federal procedural law. Specifically, the statute in question (28 U.S.C. §1367(d) reads: “The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”The employer wanted the court to adopt what is known as the “grace-period approach,” contending that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Artis’ state law claims continued to run during the pendency of the federal litigation.

The employer moved to dismiss Artis’ claims on the ground that they were time-barred under federal procedural law. Specifically, the statute in question (28 U.S.C. §1367(d) reads: “The period of limitations for any claim asserted under [supplemental jurisdiction] . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”The employer wanted the court to adopt what is known as the “grace-period approach,” contending that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Artis’ state law claims continued to run during the pendency of the federal litigation.

In this opinion, the Court held that bringing state claims in federal court stops the clock on the statute of limitations for those claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that arise from the same case or controversy presented in the federal lawsuit. If the federal court later dismisses the federal claims that independently qualify for federal jurisdiction, however, then the court will also ordinarily dismiss the state claims that it had supplemental jurisdiction over as well.

This division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.)28 U.S.C. 1367 (d) (federal supplemental-subject-matter-jurisdiction saving statute) (The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless state law provides for a longer tolling period.)Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St.3d 111 (1983) (a cause of action accrues (and therefore vests) when a patient discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have discovered the resulting injury.)Ruther v. Kaiser, 2012-Ohio-5686 (The medical malpractice statute of repose found in R.C. 2305.11(C) does not extinguish a vested right and thus does not violate the Ohio Constitution’s right to a remedy provision.)

F5 Capital v Pappas, No. 16-530 (2d Cir. April 26, 2017).In this action, while holding that the district court retained jurisdiction, the Second Circuit found that given that CAFA was the jurisdictional anchor for the complaint and that the evident purpose of CAFA was to expand federal jurisdiction over suits that met its requirements, it would be inconsistent with that purpose to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (grant of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims) to keep the pendent claims out of federal court while allowing the class claims to proceed.F5 Capital (“F5”), shareholder, brought a shareholder derivative action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York on behalf of Star Bulk Carriers Corp. (“Star Bulk”), alleging that individual members of Star Bulk’s board and affiliated entities improperly exploited their control over the corporation in entering into three separate self-dealing transactions, and asserting derivative and direct class action claims.

Another good resource is Sustainable Investing, a literature review produced by Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors in 2012, avaialble at http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/EN/_media/ Sustainable_Investing_2012.pdf.Sixth Circuit Establishes New Precedent Sustaining Class-Action Claims Against Timeliness DefensesThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on April 16, 2013, issued an important decision rejecting contentions that a telemarketing-fraud case was time barred.Victims of the telemarketing scheme argued that under the Supreme Court’s American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 94 S. Ct. 1477 (1974), decision, the filing of a prior class action complaint in March of 2002 operated to toll the limitations period on their federal claims, and that a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1367(d), tolled the limitations period on their state-law claims, permitting them to file follow-on class actions when the initial case terminated without obtaining class-wide relief.The defendants insisted that a Sixth Circuit decision interpreting American Pipe permitted the filing of individual claims, but barred further litigation on behalf of a class. Defendants also argued that the court should hold, as a matter of first impression, that §1367(d) applies only to named parties’ claims and does not toll the time for claims of a class to be asserted.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. _____, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2005 WL 1469477 (June 23, 2005). In this case, the United States Supreme Court said “yes” to the question of whether a court sitting in diversity may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1367 over plaintiffs who do not meet the amount in controversy requirement. In a paragraph near the end of the opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted that the Class Action Fairness Act does not come into play in the Court’s analysis of §1367, given that (a) the new law is not retroactive, and (b) cases involving supplemental jurisdiction under §1367 might not necessarily fall under CAFA’s umbrella.