Even if Plaintiff opted to present facts consistent with the Tucker Act, her claim exceeds $10,000, thus removing it from the jurisdiction of this Court. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims in excess of $10,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) and 1491; United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). Therefore, Plaintiff has presented no valid statutory waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity to provide jurisdiction in this Court. IV.

The section also addresses claims by the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(c), claims for a pension, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(d), and civil actions brought by a covered employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(g). Case 3:16-cv-08076-JWS Document 35 Filed 11/21/16 Page 5 of 8 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 sovereign immunity, does not apply in this matter.

. It is impossible to conclude, based on these allegations, that the cause was likely to produce the result, or that the relationship of cause and effect is not too attenuated to impose liability on the tortfeasor. Moreover, it is not foreseeable that any breach of a duty of care by Dr. Villanueva would lead to an altercation between Plaintiff and his roommate (Id. at p. 3 ¶¶ 17-18), resulting in Plaintiff leaving his residence and embarking upon a self-initiated “forced march” on the Appalachian Trail, Case 3:17-cv-00138-RJC-DSC Document 10-1 Filed 06/28/17 Page 14 of 20 15 which ended in an exacerbation or aggravation of pre-existing service-related back and mental health conditions. See Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 947 (10th Cir. 2012) citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (explaining that a plaintiff claiming an injury under the FTCA must demonstrate that the injury arose “from the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a government employee, not solely from a condition that existed before the medical treatment at issue”). Alternately, Plaintiff has plead facts showing the existence of an intervening cause of injury, breaking the causal chain, and absolving Dr. Villanueva of liability

It is not forseeable that any breach of a duty of care owed to Wallace by Dr. Villanueva would lead to an altercation between Wallace and his roommate, resulting in Wallace leaving his residence and embarking upon a self-initiated “forced march” on the Appalachian Trail, which ended in an exacerbation or aggravation of pre-existing service-related back and mental health conditions, i.e., the injury complained of is not an injury of a type that reasonably would be seen as a likely result of the allegedly negligent conduct. See also Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 947 (10th Cir. 2012) citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (explaining that a plaintiff claiming an injury under the FTCA must demonstrate that the injury arose “from the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a government employee, not solely from a condition that existed before the medical treatment at issue”).

28 U.S.C. § 2674; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Anderson v. U.S., 669 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2011). “In other words, a claimant has a FTCA cause of action against the government only if she would also have a cause of action under state law against a private person in like circumstances.”

But such recharacterization of claims is insufficient to state a claim under the Little Tucker Act. See Case 1:13-cv-02802-AKH Document 16 Filed 09/20/13 Page 36 of 37 29 also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (no cause of action under the Little Tucker Act where claim “sound[s] in tort”). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint.

Ineligibility is not just an excuse; it is a disqualifier. Finally, even if the Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (it does not), the Court should still dismiss the class action allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, Compl. ¶ 69-80, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Lipsett v. United States, 37 F.R.D. 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In this case, plaintiff cannot establish that this court has jurisdiction over her complaint for refund under section 1346 for several reasons. Plaintiff has not established she fully paid the amount of tax due and owing for which she seeks the refund as required under Flora.

Under the FTCA, the United States is liable in the same manner and extent as a private individual under similar circumstances pursuant to the law where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2674; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Anderson v. U.S., 669 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2011). “In other words, a claimant has a FTCA cause of action against the government only if she would also have a cause of action under state law against a private person in like circumstances.”

Lipsett v. United States, 37 F.R.D. 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In this case, plaintiffs cannot establish that this court has jurisdiction over their complaint for refund under section 1346 for several reasons. Plaintiffs have not established they have fully paid the amount of tax due and owing for which they seek the refund as required under Flora.