Moreover, the court in Unfortunate Son, Ltd., held that pursuant to the TIA: … states must afford litigants “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy ... in the courts of such State.” Id., citing 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Courts interpret the plain, speedy and efficient remedy exception narrowly.

Insofar as Karas seeks damages resulting from defendant's alleged breach of contract and tortious interference, his claims are barred by 26 U.S.C. § 3403 and New York Tax Law § 675. To the extent he seeks an order restrain- ing defendant from future withholding of federal and state taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1341 deprive this court of jurisdiction, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 pro- hibits the issuance of any declaratory judgment to that effect. Because the breach of contract and tor- tious interference claims are dismissed, Karas's mo- tion for summary judgment on those claims is denied.

DISCUSSION I. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Tax injunction Act to enjoin or prohibit assessment of taxes by State agency. The Tax Injunction Act, 28 USC § 1341, provides as follows: Case 6:16-cv-01344-JR Document 15 Filed 08/01/16 Page 3 of 9 Page 4 - DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PR3/ssp/7542722-v2 Department of Justice 1162 Court Street NE Salem, OR 97301-4096 (503) 947-4700 / Fax: (503) 947-4791 The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. Accordingly, as long as taxpayers have an adequate remedy available in state court, the principles of comity and federalism underlying the Tax Injunction Act bar them from asserting the invalidity of a state tax in federal court and seeking a remedy in the form of damages or injunctive or declaratory relief.

C. The public interest and balancing of equities weigh against preliminary relief As the Supreme Court expressly declared in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013), and as the Court’s stay of final relief in Kitchen implies, States have a compelling 2 With respect to Plaintiffs’ mention of the ability to file joint tax returns, not only have plaintiffs failed to link that injury to any defendant, but in any event the Tax Injunction Act would preclude jurisdiction over a request for such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”).

The FTIA states that: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the Case 1:13-cv-01456-EGS Document 5 Filed 10/18/13 Page 9 of 49 7 assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The DCTIA likewise provides that: “No suit shall be filed to enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of Columbia or any of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax.”

at 127. The neo-Nazis filed suit, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the 8 The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, does not bar jurisdiction in the present case because the handgun license fee is a regulatory fee rather than a tax: the fee falls on those subject to regulation (those who own handguns), not the general public, and it serves the ostensible purpose of defraying costs associated with licensing. See Cmty.

B. Injunctive Relief Against State Levy Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief against the Georgia DOR is barred by the equivalent statute depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of state taxes, the Tax Injunction Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”).

B. The Tax Injunction Act Is Not a Bar to Any of Plaintiffs’ Claims Because Plaintiffs Do Not Seek to Enjoin, Suspend, or Restrain the Collection of State Taxes The County Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims addressing disposal fees, appraisals, and “tax issues” are barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), which precludes federal courts from “enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The County Defendants’ TIA argument fails.

III. The Tax Injunction Act divests this Court of jurisdiction over Counts III through VI, brought by the Taxpayer Plaintiffs. The Tax Injunction Act (the “TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, divests federal district courts of jurisdiction over challenges to state taxes. The TIA applies equally to municipal and local taxes.

. D. Neither The Tax Injunction Act nor Principles of Comity Apply To This Case RITA’s final argument is that federal jurisdiction is inappropriate by virtue of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341 (the “TIA”), and principles of comity. This position is unpersuasive because: (1) the LaBordes and the class are not seeking to enjoin the assessment, levy, or collection of any taxes; (2) this suit nonetheless falls within the ambit of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004); (3) the purported “state law remedy” is inapplicable; and (4) the LaBordes and the class are willing to forego any available injunctive relief until a final resolution has been made with respect to the construction of the City Code sections at issue in this case and final certification of a injunctive class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) has occurred.