Fourth, there is no related proceeding in state court, rendering this factor neutral. Fifth, there is no basis for federal jurisdiction aside from 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Sixth, as explained above, the degree of relatedness to the CDC Corporation bankruptcy proceeding is negligible.

Fourth, there is no related proceeding in state court, rendering this factor neutral. Fifth, there is no basis for federal jurisdiction aside from 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Case 1:11-cv-02232-NRB Document 10 Filed 05/02/11 Page 28 of 31 24 Sixth, as explained above, the degree of relatedness to any bankruptcy proceeding is negligible.

2. Equitable Remand Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) Is Warranted Even if the Court were to find that it has “related to” jurisdiction and that abstention is not mandatory, the Court should still remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), which provides that “nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.” Here, none of the Defendants are bankrupt, state law issues overwhelmingly predominate, and virtually all of the Defendants have their primary place of business in New York. “Courts in this district look to the following non-exclusive list of factors in determining whether equitable remand is appropriate: (1) the effect on the efficient administration of the bankrupt estate; (2) the extent to which issues of state law predominate; (3) the difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable state law; (4) comity; (5) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case; (6) the existence of the right to a jury trial; and (7) prejudice to the involun

See Pl. Remand/Abstention Mem., pp. 22-24. Even if abstention were not mandatory, the relevant factors support the Court’s exercise of its authority to abstain under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (“permissive abstention”) or remand the action on equitable grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b). See Pl. Mem., p. 25.

. Factors to consider, among others, include: (1) whether issues of state law predominate; (2) whether judicial economy would be served by equitable remand; (3) Case 1:11-cv-06488-BSJ Document 17 Filed 10/14/11 Page 20 of 30 15 whether § 1334(b) is the sole basis for exercising federal jurisdiction; (4) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case; and (5) the likelihood that the proceeding was commenced in a particular forum because of forum shopping on the part of one of the parties.

• No other jurisdictional basis. As acknowledged in Defendants’ Notice of Removal, the only alleged basis for federal jurisdiction in this case is “related to” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. There are no federal claims or issues in dispute, and the parties are not diverse.

Section 1334(e)(1) provides that the district court for the district in which a bankruptcy is pending has exclusive jurisdiction “of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1). Contrary to Plaintiff’s overbroad reading of this statute, all courts but one have held that Section 1334(e)(1) is limited to proceedings concerning rights in or disposition of a specific item of property owned by a debtor.

Similarly, in Hassett v. F.D.I.C. (In re CIS Corp.), 140 B.R. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), also cited by the Debtor, the district court did not decide the issue of subject matter jurisdiction but merely refused to withdraw the issue from the bankruptcy court, which in the district court’s view was equally capable of applying section 1821(d)(13)(D) in accordance with its terms. Construing the two provisions, the Landmark Land court held that the specific limitation on jurisdiction set forth in title 12 “trump[ed]” the more general bankruptcy provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Landmark 7 Section 1818(i)(1) provides: (1) The appropriate Federal banking agency may in its discretion apply to the United States district court, or the United States court of any territory, within the jurisdiction of which the home office of the depository institution is located, for the enforcement of any effective and outstanding notice or order issued under this section or under section 1831o or 1831p-1 of this title, and such courts shall have jurisdiction and power to order and require compliance herewith; but except as otherwise provided in this section or under section 1831o or 1831p-1 of this title no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under any such section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1).

Finally, the AXA Action was commenced in state court, and there is no reason why it cannot be timely adjudicated therein, particularly given the nature of the claims asserted. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc., 337 B.R. 22, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“no basis to find that this action cannot be timely adjudicated in New York state courts” since “action concerning insurance coverage would be a routine action in state court”).11 Permissive abstention is also appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1). The factors to be considered with respect to such abstention are basically “identical” to the equitable remand provisions described above.

Moreover, given the common law state law claims asserted by the Trustee against Grant Thornton, the Court has consistently rejected Grant Thornton’s barrage of nearly identical SLUSA arguments—now in their third iteration and also currently briefed before Special Master Capra on summary judgment—and should do so yet again here after receiving the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation. CONCLUSION Because the Trustee’s claim against Grant Thornton is on the eve of trial, that claim cannot be “timely adjudicated” in New York state court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2). Conversely, abstention continues to be required as to the Trustee’s claims against Mayer Brown, although the issue is not ripe for adjudication given this Court’s prior dismissal of those claims and Mayer Brown’s absence from this briefing.